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Abstract
Me, Myself and I: time-inconsistent stochastic control, contract theory and
backward stochastic Volterra integral equations
Miguel Camilo Hernández Ramírez
This thesis studies the decision-making of agents exhibiting time-inconsistent prefer-
ences and its implications in the context of contract theory. We take a probabilistic approach
to continuous-time non-Markovian time-inconsistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated
agents. By introducing a refinement of the notion of equilibrium, an extended dynamic program-
ming principle is established. In turn, this leads to consider an infinite family of BSDEs analogous
to the classical Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. This system is fundamental in the sense that
its well-posedness is both necessary and sufficient to characterise equilibria and its associated value
function. In addition, under modest assumptions, the existence and uniqueness of a solution is
established.
With the previous results in mind, we then study a new general class of multidimensional type-I
backward stochastic Volterra integral equations. Towards this goal, the well-posedness of a system
of infinite family of standard backward stochastic differential equations is established. Interestingly,
its well-posedness is equivalent to that of the type-I backward stochastic Volterra integral equation.
This result yields a representation formula in terms of semilinear partial differential equation of
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman type. In perfect analogy to the theory of backward stochastic differen-
tial equations, the case of Lipschitz continuous generators is addressed first and subsequently the
quadratic case. In particular, our results show the equivalence of the probabilistic and analytic
approaches to time-inconsistent stochastic control problems.
Finally, this thesis studies the contracting problem between a standard utility maximiser prin-
cipal and a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent. We show that the contracting problem faced
by the principal can be reformulated as a novel class of control problems exposing the complica-
tions of the agent’s preferences. This corresponds to the control of a forward Volterra equation
via constrained Volterra type controls. The structure of this problem is inherently related to the
representation of the agent’s value function via extended type-I backward stochastic differential
equations. Despite the inherent challenges of this class of problems, our reformulation allows us to
study the solution for different specifications of preferences for the principal and the agent. This
allows us to discuss the qualitative and methodological implications of our results in the context
of contract theory: (i) from a methodological point of view, unlike in the time-consistent case,
the solution to the moral hazard problem does not reduce, in general, to a standard stochastic
control problem; (ii) our analysis shows that slight deviations of seminal models in contracting
theory seem to challenge the virtues attributed to linear contracts and suggests that such contracts
would typically cease to be optimal in general for time-inconsistent agents; (iii) in line with some
recent developments in the time-consistent literature, we find that the optimal contract in the
time-inconsistent scenario is, in general, non-Markovian in the state process X.
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Preface
In the typical situation of interest, a principal, who is offering a contract, is imperfectly
informed about the actions of a time-inconsistent agent, who can accept or reject the contract. The
goal is to design a contract, compatible with the agent’s preferences, that maximises the utility of
the principal while that of the agent is held to a given level.
Being able to provide a satisfactory solution requires a complete understanding of the agent’s
preferences. As such, a large part of this thesis is devoted to tackling several fundamental questions
in the study of time-inconsistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated agents, also known
as the game-theoretic approach. First, the results in the existing literature depend critically on
the Markovian structure of the formulation: can these results be extended once we abandon this
framework? Second, it is known that a solution to a system of equations provide an equilibrium
strategy and its associated value function: in what sense is the converse true? Do all equilibria
arise as solutions to such system? Third, what can be said about the existence and uniqueness
of equilibria? Answering these questions is necessary to proceed to study the challenges of the
problem faced by the principal. In the time-consistent case, the contracting problem can, without
loss of generality, be reformulated as an optimal control problem: is there an analogue in the time-
inconsistent case? To what extend does said reformulation help in finding a solution? Finally, how
do the agent’s preferences change the form of the contract?




Throughout this document we take the convention ∞−∞ := −∞, and we fix a time horizon
T > 0. R+ and R?+ denote the sets of non-negative and positive real numbers, respectively. Given
(E, ‖ · ‖) a Banach space, a positive integer p, and a non-negative integer q, Cpq (E) (resp. C
p
q,b(E))
will denote the space of functions from E to Rp which are at least q times continuously differentiable
(resp. and bounded with bounded derivatives). We set Cq,b(E) := C1q,b(E), i.e. the space of q times
continuously differentiable bounded functions with bounded derivatives from E to R . Whenever
E = [0, T ] (resp. q = 0 or b is not specified), we suppress the dependence on E (resp. on q or b),
e.g. Cp denotes the space of continuous functions from [0, T ] to Rp. Given x ∈ Cp, we denote by x·∧t
the path of x stopped at time t, i.e. x·∧t := (x(r ∧ t), r ≥ 0). Given (x, x̃) ∈ Cp × Cp and t ∈ [0, T ],
we define their concatenation x⊗t x̃ ∈ Cp by (x⊗t x̃)(r) := x(r)1{r≤t} + (x(t) + x̃(r)− x̃(t))1{r≥t},
r ∈ [0, T ].
For ϕ ∈ Cpq (E) with q ≥ 2, ∂2xxϕ will denote its Hessian. For a function φ : [0, T ] × E with
s 7−→ φ(s, α) uniformly continuous uniformly in α, we denote by ρφ : [0, T ] −→ R its modulus of
continuity, which we recall satisfies ρφ(`) −→ 0 as ` −→ 0. For (u, v) ∈ Rp × Rp, u · b will denote
their usual inner product, and |u| the corresponding norm. For positive integersm and n, we denote
byMm,n(R) the space of m×n matrices with real entries. For M ∈Mm,n(R), M:i and Mi: denote
the i-th column and row. S+n (R) denotes the set of n×n symmetric positive semi-definite matrices,
while Tr[M ] denotes the trace of M ∈ Mm(R), and |M | :=
√
Tr[M>M ] for M ∈ Mm,n(R). By
0m,n and In we denote the m × n matrix of zeros and the identity matrix ofMn(R) :=Mn,n(R),
respectively. S+n (R) denotes the set of n × n symmetric positive semi-definite matrices. Tr[M ]
denotes the trace of a matrix M ∈Mn(R).
For (Ω,F) a measurable space, Prob(Ω) denotes the collection of all probability measures on
(Ω,F). For a filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] on (Ω,F), Pprog(E,F) (resp. Ppred(E,F), Popt(E,F)) will
denote the set of E-valued, F-progressively measurable processes (resp. F-predictable processes,
F-optional processes). For P ∈ Prob(Ω) and a filtration F, FP := (FPt )t∈[0,T ], denotes the P-
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augmentation of F. We recall that for any t ∈ [0, T ], FPt := Ft ∨ σ(N P), where N P := {N ⊆ Ω :
∃B ∈ F , N ⊆ B and P[B] = 0}. With this, the probability measure P can be extended so that
(Ω,F ,FP,P) becomes a complete probability space, see Karatzas and Shreve [150, Chapter II.7].
FP+ denotes the right limit of FP, i.e. FPt+ :=
⋂
ε>0FPt+ε, t ∈ [0, T ), and FPT+ := FPT , so that FP+ is the
smallest filtration that contains F and satisfies the usual conditions. Moreover, given P ⊆ Prob(Ω)
we introduce the set of P-polar sets NP := {N ⊆ Ω : N ⊆ B, for some B ∈ F with supP∈P P[B] =
0}, as well as the P-completion of F, FP := (FPt )t∈[0,T ], with FPt := Ft∨σ(NP), t ∈ [0, T ] together
with the corresponding right-continuous limit FP+ := (FPt+)t∈[0,T ], with FPt+ :=
⋂
ε>0FPt+ε, t ∈ [0, T ),
and FPT+ := FPT . For {s, t} ⊆ [0, T ], with s ≤ t, Ts,t(F) denotes the collection of [t, T ]-valued
F–stopping times.
Additionally, given A ⊆ Rk, A denotes the collection of finite and positive Borel measures on
[0, T ] × A whose projection on [0, T ] is the Lebesgue measure. In other words, any q ∈ A can be
disintegrated as q(dt, da) = qt(da)dt, for an appropriate Borel measurable kernel qt which is unique
up to (Lebesgue–) almost everywhere equality. We are particularly interested in the set A0, of
q ∈ A of the form q = δφt(da)dt, where δφ the Dirac mass at a Borel function φ : [0, T ] −→ A.









valid for any positive integer n and any collection (ai)1≤i≤n of non-negative numbers, as well as,






An extremely important point that has redrawn the attention of many academic disciplines in
recent years is that human beings do not necessarily behave as perfectly rational economic agents.
Hence, their criteria for evaluating their well-being are most of the time a lot more involved than
the ones used in the classic economic literature. This has been amplified due to the rapid advent
and flourishment of new economies, such as e-commerce and online advertisement. These activities
are characterised by, notably, a higher number of agents from both the supply and demand sides,
and an unprecedentedly large menu of tailor-made and personalised services. Naturally, this has led
to more intricate behaviours and interactions at all levels of the economy. Though the development
of large scale algorithms provides practical tools to circumvent the intricacies of these kind of
behaviours, there is also a growing demand for models that shed some light into how these agents
make their decisions and facilitate a deeper analysis. Notably of interest are models that study how
to incentivise such agents so that they perform a particular task. This is how time-inconsistency
and contract theory intersect.
In the moral hazard contracting problem between a principal (she) and an agent (he), the
principal’s objective is to use the information available to create the appropriate incentives, in
the form of a contract, to: (i) encourage the agent, whose actions influence an output process,
to accept the contract; (ii) maximise her utility. Though this is quite a simple scenario it has
the virtue of being able to accommodate a wide spectrum of possibilities: the agent performing a
task on the principal’s behalf, the agent consuming a good produced by the principal, the agent
buying something from the principal... The main problem is then to design contracts (that is wages,
prices,...) such that the agent accepts them, and is given proper incentives to behave in a way that
allows the principal to get the most out of the contract.
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This thesis studies the previous situation in the case were the agent’s preferences are time-
inconsistent. Fortunately, there is a well-established blueprint for how to solve principal–agent
problems in continuous-time in the case of a classical time-consistent utility maximiser agent. The
following section serves as an introduction to contract theory models in continuous-time and, in
particular, the dynamic programming approach will be presented. By virtue of the clarity of this
approach, the steps necessary to successfully extend these ideas to the time-inconsistent case will
become apparent. Developing and putting these steps together will guide much of the work of this
thesis.
1.1 Contract theory in continuous-time models
In this thesis, we are interested in the moral hazard contracting problem between a principal and
an agent with time-inconsistent preferences. A principal–agent problem is a problem of optimal
contracting between two parties. The principal, who is interested in hiring the agent, offers a
contract. Provided the agent accepts, he can influence a random process, the outcome, via his
actions. A key feature in these models is the amount of information available to the principal when
designing the contract. There are three classical cases studied in the literature: risk-sharing with
symmetric information, hidden action, and hidden type. We are only concerned with the first two
in this work.
In the risk-sharing scenario, also referred to as the first-best, both parties have the same in-
formation and have to agree on how to share the underlying risk. In the first-best problem, the
principal has all the bargaining power, i.e. she offers the contract and dictates the agent’s actions
(the agent is compelled to follow or else he would be severely penalised). In the case of hidden ac-
tions, the principal is imperfectly informed about the agent’s actions. Either they are too costly to
be monitored or simply unobservable. Consequently, the principal expects to receive a second-best
utility compared to the risk-sharing scenario. As the agent is allowed to take actions that are not in
the principal’s best interest, this situation is also referred to as moral hazard, and incentives play a
crucial role. Indeed, the principal hopes to influence the agent’s actions by offering an appropriate
contract.
In the case of a traditional (time-consistent) agent, a common feature of these models is that
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their resolution boils down to standard stochastic control models. Indeed, in light of the principal’s
bargaining power, the first-best case is always cast as a stochastic control problem for a single
individual, the principal, who chooses both the contract and the actions under the participation
constraint. On the other hand, in the second-best problem, it being a two-stage Stackelberg game,
one has to solve the agent’s problem for any given fixed contract before moving to study the
principal’s problem. In principle, this renders a much more complicated structure on the problem.
Since the introduction of the continuous-time framework, it took time for the literature to present
a general approach that arrived at the same conclusion for the second-best problem.
The study of the moral hazard problem in continuous time has its roots in the seminal paper
of Holmström and Milgrom [130]. In this model, the principal and the agent have CARA utility
functions, and the agent’s effort influences the drift of the output process, the solution to a con-
trolled diffusion, but not the volatility. The resulting optimal contract is an affine function of the
aggregate output. The model in [130] drew great attention as the resolution of the, seemingly more
complicated, continuous-time formulation was much more amenable, could be rigorously justified
and provided useful explicit solutions for the economic analysis. This was not the case for most of
the discrete-time models that dominated the existing literature., see Laffont and Martimort [162].
For instance, Schättler and Sung [222, 223] study the validity of the so-called first order approach.
Sung [234, 235] provides extensions to the case of diffusion control and hierarchical structures. The
linearity of the optimal contract, a feature also present in [130] and [234], is further studied in
Müller [187, 188], Hellwig [126] and Hellwig and Schmidt [127] for the first-best problem and in
the interplay between the discrete- and continuous-time models, respectively.1 Notably, Williams
[262, 263, 264] and Cvitanić, Wan, and Zhang [60, 61, 62] characterise the optimal contract for
general utilities by means of the so-called stochastic maximum principle and forward–backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs).2
1The previous list is my no means exhaustive. Other early continuous-time contract theory models were introduced
in Adrian and Westerfield [1], Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet [26], Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve [27],
Biais, Mariotti, and Rochet [28], Capponi and Frei [44], DeMarzo and Sannikov [72], DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and
Wang [73], Fong [100], He [124], Hoffmann and Pfeil [129], Ju and Wan [145], Keiber [154], Leung [166], Mirrlees and
Raimondo [186], Myerson [189], Ou-Yang [195], Pagès [198], Pagès and Possamaï [199], Piskorski and Tchistyi [204],
Piskorski and Westerfield [205], Sannikov [218], Schroder, Sinha, and Levental [224], Van Long and Sorger [239],
Westerfield [261], Zhang [274], Zhou [275], and Zhu [276]
2We refer to the monograph Cvitanić and Zhang [59] for a general framework that systematically surveys a great
portion of the literature exploiting the maximum principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion.
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Nevertheless, it was not until the approach in Sannikov [219], see also Sannikov [220], was
available that the study of the moral hazard problem was, once again, reinvigorated and arrived
finally at the methodical programme presented in Cvitanić, Possamaï, and Touzi [63, 64]. The idea
of this approach is to focus on the dynamic continuation value of the agent as a state variable for the
principal’s problem, an idea already acknowledged in the discrete-time literature, see for instance
Spear and Srivastava [231]. In a nutshell, this method leverages the dynamic programming principle
and the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) to reformulate the principal’s
problem as a standard optimal stochastic control problem with an additional state variable, namely,
the agent’s continuation utility.
1.1.1 The dynamic programming approach
Let us describe, informally, the dynamic programming approach as derived in [64], for the case
of a time-consistent agent, i.e. an agent that discounts according to an exponential parameter
ρ > 0. To ease the presentation, we will exclude the case of volatility control here, and will take
both the principal and agent risk-neutral. A denotes the set of A-valued3 admissible actions used
by the agent to control the distribution of the state process X, the canonical process on the space
of Rd-valued continuous functions on [0, T ], as follows. For ν ∈ A and a Pν–Brownian motion W ν
(depending on ν), X satisfies the dynamics





br(X·∧r, νr)dr + dW νr
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], Pν–a.s.,
where X·∧t denotes the path up to time t of the state process X and x denotes its past trajectory.
Let F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] denote the augmented filtration generated by X, and R0 ∈ R the agent’s
reservation utility below which he refuses the contract. Given an arbitrary fixed contract ξ ∈ Ξ,












Let A?(ξ) denote the optimal responses to contract ξ, ν? ∈ A. The problem of the principal is












Let us note that both the agent’s and the principal’s problems are non-standard stochastic
control problems. Indeed, the agent’s problem is non-Markovian and the principal’s involves the
optimisation over the set Ξ. Recall ξ, and all the data, is allowed to be of non-Markovian nature.
Moreover, the principal’s optimisation is, a priori, a control problem that can not be approached by
dynamic programming. Let us expand on this last comment regarding VP. As a typical two-stage
Stackelberg game, for a long time, the predominant approach taken in the literature consisted of
characterising the agent’s value process, or continuation/promised utility, and his optimal actions
given an arbitrary contract payoff. This, in turn, enabled the analysis of the principal’s maximisa-
tion problem over all possible payoffs.4 Yet, this approach may be challenging for several reasons:
(i) it may be difficult to solve the agent’s stochastic control problem given an arbitrary, possibly
non-Markovian, payoff; (ii) it may be hard for the principal to maximise over all such contracts.;
(iii) the agent’s optimal control may depend on the given contract in a highly nonlinear manner,
rendering the principal’s optimisation problem even more complicated.
The following three steps summarise the dynamic programming approach.










∣∣∣∣Fσ], VAT (ξ) = ξ.
Note that this implies that the value process VA· (ξ) admits the representation via the standard
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
Hr(Xr∧·, Yr, Zr)dr −
∫ T
t
ZrdXr, t ∈ [0, T ], Pν–a.s.,
where H denotes the Hamiltonian, given by
Ht(x, y, z) := sup
a∈A
{
σt(x)bt(x, a)·z − ct(x, a)
}
− ρy.
4For completeness we remark the different approach in Evans, Miller, and Yang [97], where for each possible action
process of the agent, they characterise contracts that are incentive compatible for it.
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Moreover, the principal identifies all the agent’s optimal actions as the maximisers of H,
a?(r, x, z), which, to ease the presentation, we assume to be unique.
Step 2: For an appropriate admissibility class H, introduce the family of contracts
Ξ̃ :=
{





Hr(Xr∧·, Y Y0,Zr , Zr)dr+
∫ t
0
ZrdXr, t ∈ [0, T ], (Y0, Z) ∈ [R0,∞)×H
}
,
and establish there is no lost of generality in offering such contracts, i.e. Ξ = Ξ̃.









XT − Y Y0,ZT
]
where P?(Z) := Pa?(·,X·,Z·) denotes the probability induced by the agent’s optimal response. In the
above problem, Z is the control variable and (X,Y Y0,Z) the state variables. The control on X is
via the probability P?(Z).
This methodology has been extended to several scenarii including random horizon contracting
Possamaï and Touzi [209] and Lin, Ren, Touzi, and Yang [172], ambiguity features from the point
of view of the principal, as in Mastrolia and Possamaï [180], Hernández Santibáñez and Mastrolia
[128], Chen and Sung [48], and Sung [236], a principal contracting a finite number of agents Élie and
Possamaï [90], several principals contracting a common agent Mastrolia and Ren [181], hierarchical
contracting problems Hubert [140], a principal contracting a mean-field of agents Élie, Mastrolia,
and Possamaï [91], and applications in, optimal electricity demand response contracting, as in
Aïd, Possamaï, and Touzi [6], Alasseur, Chaton, and Hubert [7], and Élie, Hubert, Mastrolia,
and Possamaï [92], market microstructure, as in El Euch, Mastrolia, Rosenbaum, and Touzi [83]
and Baldacci, Possamaï, and Rosenbaum [16], green bond markets Baldacci and Possamaï [15],
pandemic control Hubert, Mastrolia, Possamaï, and Warin [141]. The road map suggested by this
approach is quite clear: (i) identify the generic dynamic programming representation of the agent’s
value process, (ii) express the contract payment in terms of the value process, (iii) optimise the
principal’s objective over such payments.
Not surprisingly, each of these steps would bring its own challenges in the case of a time-
inconsistent agent. Notably, as we will see next, the distinctive feature of time-inconsistent pref-
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erences is that they do not satisfy a dynamic programming principle. This casts doubt upon the
very starting point of our strategy.
1.2 Part II: non-Markovian time-inconsistent control
Let us begin by considering the following illustrative example in discrete time. When choosing
his working routine an agent chooses an action ν ∈ {nap,work}. The utility at time t corresponds
to the discounted flow of utilities, given by
J(t, ν) := ut(xνt ) + β
(
ρut+1(xνt+1) + ρ2ut+2(xνt+2) + . . .
)
,
where xνt denotes the value of the Agent’s state variable induced by ν, and ut(xνt ) the corresponding
utility at time t. (ρ, β) are the parameters of the so-called quasi-hyperbolic discounting for which
its distinguishing parameter β acts as an intra-personal weight which may bias towards present
(β < 1) or future (resp. β > 1) utilities and δ is a classic discount factor. Assume that working
today generates an immediate disutility of −2/3 and a postponed benefit of 1, and normalise the
utility of napping to 0. Then, for ρ = 1 and β = 1/2, it is not hard to see that at time t the agent
prefers napping today (0 > −2/3 + 1/2) and defers working for tomorrow (−1/3 + 1/2 > 0). All
together, the discounting structure induces dynamically inconsistent preferences, i.e. for any time
reference t, at time t the agent prefers to work at time t+ 1, but at time t+ 1 the agent prefers to
nap.
Time-inconsistency has recently redrawn the attention of many academic disciplines, ranging
from mathematics to economics, due to both the mathematical challenges that rigorously under-
standing this phenomenon carries, as well as the need for the development of economic theories
that are able to explain the behaviour of agents that fail to comply with the usual rationality as-
sumptions. Indeed, one can find clear evidence of such attitudes in a number of applications, from
consumption problems to finance, from crime to voting, from charitable giving to labour supply, see
Rabin [213] and Dellavigna [71] for detailed reviews. In recent years, the need for thorough studies
of this phenomenon has become more urgent, due notably to the rapid advent of new economies
such as e-commerce and online advertisement.
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The distinctive feature in these situations is that human beings do not necessarily behave as
what neoclassical economists refer to perfectly rational decision-makers. Such idealised individuals
are aware of their alternatives, form expectations about any unknowns, have clear preferences, and
choose their actions deliberately after some process of optimisation, see Osborne and Rubinstein
[194, Chapter 1]. In reality, their criteria for evaluating their well-being are in many cases a lot more
involved than the ones considered in the classic literature. For instance, empirical studies suggest
that relative preferences of agents do seem to change with time, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue [101] and Fang and Silverman [98]. Similarly, there is robust evidence of an inclination
for imminent gratification even if accompanied by harmful delayed consequences, see Mehra and
Prescoot [183], Friedman and Savage [104], Ellsberg [93] and Allais [8]. In mathematical terms, this
translates into stochastic control problems in which the classic dynamic programming principle, or
in other words the Bellman optimality principle, is not satisfied.
Let us consider the form of pay-off functionals at the core of the continuous-time optimal
stochastic control literature in a non-Markovian framework. Given a time reference t ∈ [0, T ],
where T > 0 is a fixed time horizon, a past trajectory x for the state process X, whose path up to
t we denote by X·∧t, and an action plan ν, that is to say, a probability distribution for X and an
action process, the reward derived by an agent is
J(t, x, ν) = EP
[ ∫ T
t
fr(X·∧r, νr)dr + ξ(X·∧T )
]
.
However, as pointed out by Samuelson [217, pp. 159], ‘it is completely arbitrary to assume that
the individual behaves so as to maximise an integral of the form envisaged above. This involves the
assumption that at every instant of time the individual’s satisfaction depends only upon the action
at that time, and that, furthermore, the individual tries to maximise the sum of instantaneous
satisfactions reduced to some comparable base by time discount.’ As a consequence, adds [217],
‘the solution to the problem of maximising these type of rewards holds only for an agent deciding
her actions throughout the period at the beginning of it, and, as she moves along in time, there
is a perspective phenomenon in that her view of the future in relation to her instantaneous time
position remains invariant, rather than her evaluation of any particular year.[...] Moreover, these
results will remain unchanged even if she were to discount from the existing point of time rather
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than from the beginning of the period. Therefore, the fact that this is so is in itself a presumption
that individuals do behave in terms of these functionals.’ Consequently, understanding the rationale
behind the actions of a broader class of economic individuals calls for the incorporation of functionals
able to include the previous one as a particular case. This is the motivation behind any theory of
time-inconsistency.
Time-inconsistency is generally the fact that marginal rates of substitution between goods
consumed at different dates change over time, see Strotz [233], Laibson [163], Gul and Pesendorfer
[110], Fudenberg and Levine [105], O’Donoghue and Rabin [192, 193]. For example, the marginal
rate of substitution between immediate consumption and some later consumption is different from
what it was when these two dates were seen from a remote prior date. In many applications, these
time-inconsistent preferences introduce a conflict between ‘an impatient present self and a patient
future self ’, see Brutscher [43]. In [233], where this phenomenon was first treated, three different
types of agents are described: the pre-committed agent does not revise her initially decided strategy
even if that makes her strategy time-inconsistent; the naive agent revises his strategy without taking
future revisions into account even if that makes her strategy time-inconsistent; the sophisticated
agent revises her strategy taking possible future revisions into account, and by avoiding such makes
her strategy time-consistent.
Which type is more relevant depends on the entire framework of the decision in question.
Marín-Solano and Navas [179] comment on which strategies the three different types of agents
should use, see also Harris and Laibson [117] and Vieille and Weibull [242] for explanations of
the deep mathematical problems arising in seemingly benign situations, such as non uniqueness.
Indeed, in some applications one is interested in the rational decision-maker who pre-commits his
future behaviour by precluding future options and conforming to his present desire, for instance
individuals who make irrevocable trusts or buy life insurance. This is in stark contrast to the one
who, aware of his inconsistency, searches for strategies where the inconsistency is anticipated and
embedded in her decision plan. In this thesis we are interested in the latter type.
Let us illustrate these ideas in the context of contract theory, in line with the example at the
beginning of this section. Suppose an online ride-sharing platform wants to revise its contracts
scheme as it has noticed a decline in the frequency drivers are available in the platform. The
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company is considering to make available different bonus packs whose access depends on the number
of rides fulfilled. In such scenario one could find, due to time-inconsistency, how bonus plans can
be designed so as to motivate drivers to fulfil rides in a short amount of time. This is similar in
spirit as to how, with credit cards and non-traditional mortgages, consumers are motivated to repay
their loan fast, and why delaying repayment carries large penalties, see Heidhues [125] and Eliaz
and Splieger [89]. Now, provided empirical evidence confirms drivers indeed have time-inconsistent
preferences, in light of the dynamic programming approach presented above one must develop the
tools in order to thoroughly understand the decision-making behind time-inconsistent sophisticated
drivers before addressing the contracting situation mentioned above.
The study of time-inconsistency has a long history. The game-theoretic approach started with
[233] where the phenomenon was introduced in a continuous-time setting, and it was proved that
preferences are time-consistent if, and only if, the discount factor representing time preferences
is exponential with a constant discount rate. Pollak [206] gave the right solution to the problem
for both naive and sophisticated agents under a logarithmic utility function. For a long period
of time, most of the attention was given to the discrete-time setting introduced by Phelps and
Pollak [203]. This was, presumably, due to the unavailability of a well-stated system of equations
providing a general method for solving the problem, at least for sophisticated agents. Nonetheless,
the theory for time-inconsistent problems for sophisticated agents progressed, and results were
extended to new frameworks, although this was mostly on a case-by-case basis. For example, Barro
[18] studied a modified version of the neoclassical growth model by including a variable rate of
time preference, and [163] considered the case of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences. Notably, Basak
and Chabakauri [19] treated the mean–variance portfolio problem and derived its time-consistent
solution by cleverly decomposing the nonlinear term and then applying dynamic programming.
In addition, Goldman [107] presented one of the first proofs of existence of an equilibrium under
quite general conditions. More recently, [242] showed how for infinite horizon dynamic optimisation
problems with non-exponential discounting, the multiplicity of solutions (with different pay-offs)
was the rule rather than the exception.
To treat these problems in a systematic way, the series of works carried out by Ekeland and
Lazrak [80, 81], and Ekeland and Pirvu [82] introduced and characterised the first notion of sub-
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game perfect equilibria in continuous-time, where the source of inconsistency is non-exponential
discounting. [80] consider a deterministic setting, whereas [81] extend these ideas to Markovian
diffusion dynamics. In [82], the authors provide the first existence result in a Markovian context
encompassing the one in their previous works. This was the basis for a general Markovian theory
developed by Björk and Murgoci [35] in discrete-time and Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci [38] in
continuous-time. Inspired by the notion of equilibrium in [81] and their study in the discrete-
time scenario in [35], in [38] the authors consider a general Markovian framework with diffusion
dynamics for the controlled state process X, and provide a system of PDEs whose solution allows to
construct an equilibrium for the problem. Recently, He and Jiang [120] fills in a missing step in [38]
by deriving rigorously the PDE system and refining the definition of equilibrium while Lindensjö
[173] shows that solving the PDE system is a necessary condition for a refinement of the notion of
equilibrium which enforces additional regularity.
Simultaneously, extensions have been considered, and unsatisfactory seemingly simple scenarii
have been identified. Björk, Murgoci, and Zhou [36] study the time-inconsistent version of the
portfolio selection problem for diffusion dynamics and a mean–variance criterion. Czichowsky [65]
considers an extension of this problem for general semi-martingale dynamics. Hu, Jin, and Zhou
[135, 136] provide a rigorous characterisation of the linear-quadratic model, and Huang and Zhou
[137] perform a careful study in a Markov chain environment. Regarding the expected utility
paradigm, Karnam, Ma, and Zhang [151] introduce the idea of the dynamic utility under which an
original time-inconsistent problem (under the originally fixed utility) becomes a time-consistent one.
He, Strub, and Zariphopoulou [123] propose the concept of forward rank-dependent performance
processes, by means of the notion of conditional nonlinear expectation introduced by Ma, Wong,
and Zhang [178], to incorporate probability distortions without assuming that the model is fully
known at the initial time. One of the first negative results was introduced by Landriault, Li, Li,
and Young [164], here the authors present an example, stemming from a mean–variance investment
problem, in which uniqueness of the equilibrium via the PDE characterisation of [35] fails.
A different approach is presented in Yong [270] and Wei, Yong, and Yu [260], where, in the
framework of recursive utilities, an equilibrium is defined as a limit of discrete-time games leading
to a system of FBSDEs. Building upon the analysis in [260], Wang and Yong [245] consider the
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case where the cost functional is determined by a so-called backward stochastic Volterra integral
equation (BSVIE) which covers the general discounting situation with a recursive feature. An HJB
equation is associated in order to obtain a verification result. Moreover, Wang and Yong [245]
establish the well-posedness of the HJB equation and derive a probabilistic representation in terms
of a novel type of BSVIEs. Han and Wong [116] study the case where the state variable follows a
Volterra process and, by associating an extended path-dependent Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equa-
tion system, obtains a verification theorem. Hamaguchi [115] provides a necessary condition for an
open-loop equilibria in a Markovian time-inconsistent consumption–investment problem. Finally,
Mei and Zhu [184] deals with a class of time-inconsistent control problems for McKean–Vlasov
dynamics which are, for example, a natural framework to study mean–variance problems.
When it comes to time-inconsistent stopping problems, recent works have progressed signific-
antly in understanding this setting, yet many peculiarities and questions remain open. A novel
treatment of optimal stopping for a Markovian diffusion process with a payoff functional involving
probability distortions, for both naïve and sophisticated agents, is carried out by Huang, Nguyen-
Huu, and Zhou [139]. Huang and Zhou [138] consider a stopping problem under non-exponential
discounting, and looks for an optimal equilibrium, one which generates larger values than any other
equilibrium does on the entire state space. He, Hu, Obłój, and Zhou [122] study the problem of a
pre-committed gambler and compare his behaviour to that of a naïve one. Another series of works
is that of Christensen and Lindensjö [55]; Christensen and Lindensjö [54, 53] and Bayraktar, Zhang,
and Zhou [20]. [55] study a discrete-time Markov chain stopping problem and propose a definition
of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for which necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions are
derived, and an existence result is obtained. They extend their study to the continuous-time set-
ting by considering diffusion dynamics in [54], and study in [53] a moment constrained version of
the optimal dividend problem for which both the pre-committed and sub-game perfect solutions
are studied. Independently, [20] studied a continuous Markov chain process and proposed another
notion of equilibrium. The authors thoroughly obtain the relation between the notions of optimal-
mild, weak and strong equilibrium introduced in [139], [54] and [20], respectively, and provide a
novel iteration method which directly constructs an optimal-mild equilibrium bypassing the need
to find first all mild-equilibria. Notably, Tan, Wei, and Zhou [237] gives an example of nonexist-
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ence of an equilibrium stopping plan. On the other hand, Nutz and Zhang [191] provide a first
approach to the recently introduced conditional optimal stopping problems which are inherently
time-inconsistent.
In light of the limitations of the existing literature and keeping in mind the dynamic program-
ming approach, presented in Section 1.1.1, it is clear that our analysis needs to start at the level
of the problem faced by a generic time-inconsistent agent in a non-Markovian framework. The
purpose of the next section is to review some of the main results in the literature which remained
focused on the Markovian case.
1.2.1 Existing results for Markovian time-inconsistent problems
In this section, we present some of the results available in the literature in the Markovian case
which are relevant to our goal. As a note to the reader, we will do our best to balance the main
ideas, and the notation and specifics of the statements. That being said, they should nevertheless
be considered as informal presentations. We will refer to the original sources accordingly. We also
mention that a review encompassing most of the classical results, as well as some recent development
in the time-inconsistent literature is available in He and Zhou [121].
The existence literature on time-inconsistent control has focused on the strong formulation of





supporting a Brownian motion W is given. Here, F denotes the
P-augmented Brownian filtration. Let A denote the set of admissible actions. For a process ν ∈ A,
representing an action process, the state process X is given by the unique strong solution to the
Rn-valued SDE






σs(X0,x,νs , νs)dWs, for t ∈ [r, T ].
The agent’s reward is given, for (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn ×A, by
J(t, x, ν) = E
[ ∫ T
t




where E[·|Ft] denotes the expectation operator conditional on Xt,x,νt = x. Let us remark that the
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dependence of f , ξ (resp. of G) on (t, x) (resp. on (t, x,E[Xt,x,νT |Ft])) are the sources of time-
inconsistency. In the game-theoretic approach, the individual reconciles his current and future
preferences by seeking for an equilibrium as defined next.
Definition (Equilibrium [82]). ν? ∈ A is said to be an equilibrium if for all (t, `, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ] ×
(0, T − `]× Rn ×A, and ν ⊗t+` ν? := ν1[t,t+`) + ν?1[t+`,T ],
lim inf
`↘0
J(t, x, ν?)− J(t, x, ν ⊗t+` ν?)
`
≥ 0.
For an equilibrium ν? we write ν? ∈ E, and define the value function v(t, x) := J(t, x, ν?).
Analogue to the HJB equation for classic time-consistent stochastic control problem, an ex-
tended PDE system is available to study the time-inconsistent analogue in a systematic way.
We follow [38]. Let ν be a Markovian feedback control, i.e. νt = u(t,X0,x,νt ) for an func-
tion u : [0, T ] × Rn −→ A, a ∈ A, and a smooth function ϕ : [0, T ] × Rn −→ R. We define




















Moreover, for functions G(t, x, y) and g(t, x), we introduce (G  g)(t, x) := G(t, x, g(t, x)), and the
operator Hag(t, x) := ∂yG
(
t, x, g(t, x)
)
(Aag)(t, x).
Definition (Extended HJB [38]). We define smooth function v, J , and g via the equations

























(ii) for (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, the function Js,y(t, x) is determined by, Js,y(T, x) = F (s, y, x), and
(
Aν?J t,y)(t, x) + f(s, y, t, x, u?(t, x)) = 0;
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(t, x) = 0,
where ν? denotes the Markovian feedback control induced by the mapping u?(t, x) that realises the
supremum in (i).
Several comments are in order: it is immediate to the eye that instead of a single equation for
the value function, as it is the case for time-consistent problems, in the game-theoretic approach
the so-called extended HJB equation consists of a system equations. We remark that the second
equation defines a infinite family of functions (Js,y)(s,y)∈[0,T ]×Rn . Second, the system is fully coupled
in the sense that the entire family (Js,y)(s,y)∈[0,T ]×Rn as well as the function g(t, x) appear in the
first equation and determine the action ν? which in turn appears in the definition of the second
and third equation. Lastly, we notice that in the absence of time-inconsistency the previous system
reduces to the classic HJB equation. Indeed, if f does not depend on (s, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn and G
is linear in y then the G term can be added into the conditional expectation of the reward J . It
then follows that J coincides with the value function. This is, the second and third equation are
redundant and we are left with the classical HJB equation.
All things considered, the previous system yields a verification result analogous to the one for
classic time-consistent control problems.
Theorem (Verification [38]). Assume that for all (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, the functions v(t, x), Js,y(t, x),
g(t, x) and u?(t, x) have the following properties:
(i) v, Js,y, and g, are smooth solutions to the extended HJB system;
(ii) the function u?(t, x) realizes the supremum in the extended HJB and ν? = u?(·, X·) ∈ A;
(iii) v, J, Js,y, g, and G  g, have appropriate integrability.
Then ν? is an equilibrium law, and v is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Furthermore,
Js,y and g have the probabilistic representations







r )dr + ξ(s, y, X
t,x,ν?
T )
∣∣∣∣Ft], g(t, x) = E[Xt,x,ν?T ∣∣Ft], t ∈ [0, T ].
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In simple terms, the previous theorem provides a sufficient set of conditions that certifies
whenever an action is an equilibrium and identifies its corresponding value function. Regularity
assumptions aside, we remark that for the purposes of solving a time-inconsistent control problem,
i.e. finding an equilibrium and its value function, the previous result does the job.
Another matter of interest bring us back to the very own definition of the sophisticated agent.
Let us recall, this agent revises his strategy taking possible future revisions into account, and by
avoiding such makes his strategy time-consistent. Therefore, one expects some form of dynamic
programming principle to hold for this kind of problems. This is the purpose of [37, Proposition 8.1],
which provides a link between time-inconsistent and time-consistent Markovian control problems.
Recall this is a crucial, actually the initial, step in the dynamic programming approach of [64], see
Section 1.1.1. Indeed, it allows to establish the reverse direction of the standard verification result,
which we will refer to as a necessity result.
Proposition (A primer DPP [37]). For every time inconsistent problem in the present framework
there exists a standard, time consistent optimal control problem with the following properties:
(i) the optimal value function for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium value function
for the time inconsistent problem;
(ii) the optimal control for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium control for the time
inconsistent problem.
[37, Proposition 8.1] states that (in the framework of strong formulation with Markovian feed-
back actions) given an equilibrium, as defined above, for any time-inconsistent stochastic control
problem it is possible to associate a classical time-consistent optimal stochastic control problem
which attains the same value and satisfies a dynamic programming principle. However, the argu-
ment layed down in [37, Proposition 8.1], which we have ommitted, assumes a priori a smooth
solution to the above PDE system. This is, it presupposes that the value function associated to
the equilibrium action and the decoupled pay-off functionals belong to C1,2([0, T ]× Rd), and is in
the spirit of the (easy direction) of the Feynman–Kac representation formula. This means that the
class of equilibria for which the DPP used in [37] holds is actually a sub-class of the ones given
by classical definition via the liminf presented above. Moreover, it was recently shown that these
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would correspond to regular equilibria as defined in in [173]. In fact, as explained in [173, Remark
3.9], regular equilibria are a priori required to be continuous in time and space. We remark that
even for time-consistent problems the previous regularity assumptions on the value function and
the control it is known to often not hold.
Even more critical in our view, in the context of classic time-consistent control, the argument
in [37, Proposition 8.1] would be equivalent to assuming that the HJB equation has a smooth
classical solution to prove the DPP. We find this line of argument to be quite atypical in the sense
that: (i) this is usually done the other way around: the DPP allows one to show that the value
function is related to the HJB PDE, usually in the viscosity sense; (ii) quid of the cases where
the value function fails to be smooth, which are ubiquitous in the literature? In classical control
problems, the DPP holds under mere Borel-measurability of the value function, see El Karoui and
Tan [85, 86], and we do not feel that it is reasonable to assume smoothness a priori to prove it.
All in all, in order to obtain a useful necessity result one should obtain the underlying DPP
circumventing these a priori assumptions on the value function of the associated equilibria. More
generally, one should aim to obtain a proof of a DPP from first principles, by which we mean
that by introducing a refinement on the notion of equilibrium a DPP can be establish as a direct
consequence of it. Such approach, will open the door to a necessity result which remained mostly
absent in the literature.
Indeed, the community quickly started to investigate such necessity type results hoping to arrive
to a complete characterisation of equilibria and their value function. This is, both a necessary and
sufficient condition for an admissible action to be an equilibrium. For this we follow [120] and
introduce some additional notation.
For (s, t, r, y, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]3 × Rn × A, let f̂s,y,ν(t, x) := Et,x
[
ft(s, y, x, u(t, x))
]
























(t, x) + ∂yG(s, y, g(t, x))(Aνg)(t, x).
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Theorem (Characterisation of Markovian equilibria [120]). Under appropriate assumptions
lim inf
`↘0
J(t, x, ν?)− J(t, x, ν ⊗t+` ν?)
`
= −Γt,x,ν?(t, x, ν), ∀(t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn ×A.
Moreover, ν? is an equilibrium if and only if
Γt,x,ν?(t, x, a) ≥ 0, ∀(t, x, a) ∈ [0, T )× Rn ×A.
The previous result is quite remarkable as [120] succeeds in characterising equilibria via the
mapping Γ. Yet, we highlight that we have remained vague regarding the assumptions of the pre-
vious theorem. Indeed, the conditions under which such result holds are quite stringent, requiring
for instance that the optimal action and the mappings involve in the definition of Γ to be differen-
tiable in time and with spacial derivatives of polynomial growth. This relates to the fact that the
argument in [120] makes a strong use of the infinitesimal generator operator and may, in general,
limit the class of equilibria that are able to be identified by the previous result. Moreover, the
previous characterisation bypasses the extended HJB system and makes no direct link between it
and Γ.
For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter, the previous results summarise the state of
the understanding of Markovian time-inconsistent control problems. According to [38, Section 10],
the following remained as open research problems at the time of its writing:
• ‘[t]he present theory depends critically on the Markovian structure. It would be interesting
to see what can be done without this assumption’;
• ‘[a] related (hard) open problem is to prove existence and/or uniqueness for solutions of the
extended HJB system’;
• ‘[a]n open and difficult problem is to provide conditions on primitives which guarantee that
the functions V and f are regular enough to satisfy the extended HJB system’;
• ‘[a]nother problem is to give conditions on primitives which guarantee that the assumptions
of the verification theorem are satisfied’.
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To not get ahead of ourselves, we will just mention that this thesis makes contributions to
each of these problems. We highlight that the third point above is making reference to a type of
necessity result, which we stress again, is crucial in the dynamic programming approach of [64],
see Section 1.1.1. As we mentioned earlier, one avenue to arrive at this result is to provide a DPP
circumventing any kind of a priori assumptions on the value function of the associated equilibria.
In this way, we can conduct the analysis in a non-Markovian framework, and, at the same time,
we will remain at the greatest level of generality possible, i.e. without implicit assumptions on the
class of equilibria into consideration.
In the following section, we present an informal description of our contributions to the time-
inconsistent literature. In synthesis, inspired by the results of [64] in the context of contract theory,
we take a probabilistic approach that allow us to, among other things, extends the results for
Markovian models with time-inconsistency to the non-Markovian framework and provide answers
to each of the previous items.
1.2.2 Contributions
In the second part of this thesis, we develop a probabilistic theory for continuous-time non-
Markovian stochastic control problems which are inherently time-inconsistent. Our formulation is
cast within the framework of a controlled non-Markovian forward stochastic differential equation,
and a general objective functional. To illustrate our results, suppose the dynamics of the controlled
state process are given as in Section 1.1.1. Suppose the utility drawn by the Agent, from an effort
action ν at time t ∈ [0, T ] and past trajectory x ∈ X 5, is given by





f(r − t)cr(X·∧r, νr)dr
∣∣∣∣Ft],
where f : [0, T ] −→ R, f(0) = 1, denotes a generic discount function. We remark that its pres-
ence in the terminal utility and the running cost, are the sources of inconsistency. We adopt a
game-theoretic approach to study such problems, meaning that we seek for sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium points. As a first novelty of this work, we introduce and motivate a refinement on the
5To alleviate the notation we set X := Cd, which we recall denotes the space of Rd-valued continuous functions on
[0, T ] endowed with the sup topology
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notion of equilibrium from which one can directly and rigorously establish an extended dynamic
programming principle, in the same spirit as in the classical theory, which takes the following form.


















As an immediate consequence of this result, we can associate a system of BSDEs to study
equilibria in the case of uncontrolled volatility, i.e. σt(x, a) = σt(x). Let us introduce the system
which for any s ∈ [0, T ] satisfies









Zr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
∂Y st = −f ′(T − s)UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
∇h?r(s,X·∧r, ∂Zsr ,Zr)dr −
∫ T
t
∂Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
(H)
where
Ht(x, z) := sup
a∈A
{
σt(x)bt(x, a)·z − ct(x, a)
}
,
∇h?t (s, x, z, z) := σt(x)bt(x, a?(t, x, x))·z + f ′(t− s)ct(x, a?(t, x, x)),
and a?(t, x, z) denotes the unique, by assumption, maximiser in H. The previous system is of
an infinite-dimensional nature as the second equation induces a family of BSDEs, one for every
s ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, it is fully-coupled as the diagonal term of the family (∂Y s)s∈[0,T ] appears in
the generator of the first equation and Z appears, via a?, in the generator of the family of BSDEs.
Be it as it may, we are able to show that: (i) (H) is of both sufficient and necessary to characterise
equilibria α? ∈ E , in particular our results establish that any equilibria must arise from a solution
to the system, and thus, the existence of an equilibria is equivalent to the existence of a solution
to (H); (ii) Y coincides with the value function VA, and α? always arises as a maximiser of the
Hamiltonian; and (iii) (H) is well-defined, and consequently, in the case of drift control, there exists
a unique equilibria.
Let us mention that (H) extends naturally to a system incorporating second-order BSDEs
(2BSDEs) in the case the agent is allowed to control the volatility. Indeed, the extended DPP
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holds true in the case the Agent controls the volatility as well. For such system we are able to show
(i) and (ii) still hold. Nevertheless, (iii) becomes a much more delicate matter as the existence
of a solution requires the existence of an optimal measure P?. This problem is worth of analysis
in the future, as we discuss later in this chapter, see Section 1.5. As a final comment, we also
address the extensions of (H) to the case of more general rewards. In particular, to those with
mean–variance type of criteria which are indispensable, for example, in applications in portfolio
selection, or energy consumption management.
Lastly, we remark that a central part of our analysis is based on establishing that letting
h?t (s, x, z, z) := σt(x)bt(x, a?(t, x, x)) ·z − f(t − s)ct(x, a?(t, x, x)), given a solution to (H) we can
introduce the family of BSDEs
Y st = f(T − s)UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
h?r(s,X·∧r, Zsr ,Zr)dr −
∫ T
t
Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
and verify that
VAt = Yt = Y tt , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., and, Zt = Ztt , dt⊗ dP–a.e.
This is, (Y,Z) prescribe a solution to a so called type-I backward stochastic Volterra integral
equation (BSVIE) of the form
Y st = f(T − s)UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
h?r(s,X·∧r, Zsr , Zrr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
In the context of Section 1.1.1, the extended DPP and the previous observation are the analogous
version of Step 1 in the time-inconsistent case. This is, we have successfully provided an extended
DPP and are able to identify the natural probabilistic objects, analogous to the BSDE, that are
associated with it. Moreover, in Chapter 2 we show that in the absence of time-inconsistency, i.e.
when f(t) = e−ρt, the extended DPP (resp. the system (H) or, equivalently, the previous BSVIE)
reduces to the classic DPP (resp. the BSDE in Section 1.1.1).
The link between the previous time-inconsistent control problem and type-I BSVIEs was the
motivation of our analysis in the following part of the thesis were we explore the well-posedness of
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a general class of type-I BSVIEs in both the case of Lipschitz and quadratic generators.
1.3 Part III: backward stochastic Volterra integral equations
Seeking to understand the parallel stream of works that study time-inconsistency via BSVIEs, in
Part III we questioned the extent to which our approach via system (H) relates to those via BSVIEs
of the form described at the end of the previous section. Building upon the strategy devised in
Chapter 2, we addressed the well-posedness of a general and novel class of multidimensional type-I
BSVIEs, that we coined extended BSVIEs.
BSVIEs are regarded as natural extensions of backward stochastic differential equations, BSDEs
for short. On a complete filtered probability space (Ω,G,G,P), supporting an n-dimensional
Brownian motion B, and denoting by G the P-augmented natural filtration generated by B, one is
given data, that is to say a GT -measurable random variable ξ, and a mapping g, referred to respect-
ively as the terminal condition and the generator. A solution to a BSDE is a pair of G-adapted
processes (Y·, Z·) such that






ZrdBr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (1.3.1)
BSDEs of linear type were first introduced by Bismut [31, 32] as an adjoint equation in the
Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle. Actually, the contemporary work of Davis and Varaiya
[67]6 studied a precursor of a linear BSDE for characterising the value function and the optimal
controls of stochastic control problems with drift control only. In the same context of the stochastic
maximum principle, BSDEs of linear type are present in Arkin and Saksonov [12], Bensoussan [22]
and Kabanov [146]. Remarkably, the extension to the non-linear case is due to Bismut [33], as a
type of Riccati equation, as well as Chitashvili [50], and Chitashvili and Mania [51, 52]. Later,
the seminal work of Pardoux and Peng [201] presented the first systematic treatment of BSDEs
in the general nonlinear case, while the celebrated survey paper of El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez
[88] collected a wide range of properties of BSDEs and their applications to finance. Among such
6Indeed, [67] was received for publication on October 27, 1971 and it is part of the bibliography of [32].
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properties we recall the so-called flow property, that is to say, for any 0 ≤ r ≤ T ,
Yt(T, ξ) = Yt(r, Yr(T, ξ)), t ∈ [0, r], P–a.s., and Zt(T, ξ) = Zt(r, Yr(T, ξ)), dt⊗dP–a.e. on [0, r]×Ω,
where (Y (T, ξ), Z(T, ξ)) denotes the solution to the BSDE with terminal condition ξ and final time
horizon T .
A natural extension of (1.3.1) arises by considering a collection of GT -measurable random vari-
ables (ξ(t))t∈[0,T ], referred in the literature of BSVIEs as the free term, as well as a generator g. In
such a setting, a solution to a BSVIE is a pair (Y·, Z ·· ) of processes such that
Yt = ξ(t) +
∫ T
t
gr(t, Yr, Ztr, Zrt )dr −
∫ T
t
ZtrdBr, P–a.s., t ∈ [0, T ]. (1.3.2)
Of noticeable interest is the case in which the term Zrt is absent in the generator, i.e.
Yt = ξ(t) +
∫ T
t
gr(t, Yr, Ztr)dr −
∫ T
t
ZtrdBr, P–a.s., t ∈ [0, T ]. (1.3.3)
Nowadays (1.3.3) and (1.3.2) are referred in the literature as type-I and type-II BSVIEs, re-
spectively. The first mention of such equations is, to the best of our knowledge, due to Hu and Peng
[132]. Indeed, in the context of well-posedness of BSDEs valued in a Hilbert space, a prototype of
type-I BSVIEs (1.3.3) is considered, see the comments following [132, Remark 1.1]. Two decades
passed before a direct consideration of BSVIEs of the form given by (1.3.3) was made by Lin [171],
where the author studied the case ξ(t) = ξ, t ∈ [0, T ], for a GT -measurable ξ. The general form
of (1.3.2) was first addressed in Yong [267, 269] in the context of optimal control of (forward)
stochastic Volterra integral equations (FSVIEs, for short).
There are significant distinctions between BSDEs and BSVIEs. Nevertheless, a satisfactory
concept of solution for such equations can be defined by extrapolating from the theory of BSDEs.
In broad terms, a pair (Y·, Z ·· ) is said to be a solution to a BSVIE, see [269], if for each s ∈ [0, T ),
the mapping t 7−→ (Yt, Zst ) is G-adapted on [s, T ], (Y,Z) is appropriately integrable and satisfies
(1.3.2). It is also worth pointing out the distinctions between type-I and type-II BSVIEs. As a
consequence of the presence of Zst in the generator, to obtain a solution to a type-II BSVIE one
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has to determine Zst for (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]2, and (1.3.2) alone does not give enough restrictions. Indeed,
[269] showed that an adapted solution to the type-II BSVIE (1.3.2) may, in general, not be unique.
This is in contrasts with type-I BSVIEs, where it suffices to determine Zst for (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]2,
0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Moreover, without additional assumptions, a solution to a general type-II BSVIE
does not satisfy the flow property.
Since their introduction, BSVIEs have been extended to much more general frameworks than
the one presented above. Hence, Wang [248] studies the case of random Lipschitz data; Wang and
Zhang [258] and Shi and Wang [225] deal with general non-Lipschitz data; Coulibaly and Aman [58]
study time-delayed generators; mean-field BSVIEs are considered in Shi, Wang, and Yong [226];
Lu [176], Hu and Øksendal [131], Overbeck and Röder [196] and Popier [207] studied extensions
to general filtrations and the case where B is replaced by more general processes; infinite horizon
BSVIEs are investigated in Hamaguchi [113]; Djordjević and Janković [79, 78] were interested in
perturbed BSVIEs, i.e. when the coefficients depend additively on small perturbations; BSVIEs in
Hilbert spaces have been investigated in Anh and Yong [10], Anh, Grecksch, and Yong [11], and
Ren [214]; and an analysis of numerical schemes for BSVIEs has been proposed in Bender and
Pokalyuk [21]. There is also a wide spectrum of applications of BSVIEs. Hence, dynamic risk
measures have been considered in Yong [268], Wang and Shi [252, 253], Wang, Sun, and Yong [246]
and Agram [2]. Kromer and Overbeck [159] also studied the question of dynamic capital allocations
via BSVIEs. Wang and Shi [251] dealt with a risk minimisation problem by means of the maximum
principle for FBSVIEs, while the optimal control of SVIEs and BSVIEs via the maximum principle
has been studied in Chen and Yong [47], Wang [250], Agram, Øksendal, and Yakhlef [4, 5], Shi,
Wang, and Yong [227], Shi, Wen, and Xiong [228], see also Wei and Xiao [259] for the case with
state constraints.
Since their first appearance, a natural and non-trivial question for BSVIEs has been that of the
regularity in time of their solutions. The best known probabilistic results for general type-II BSVIEs
guarantee the regularity of the solutions in an Lp sense only, see Wang [249] and Li, Wu, and Wang
[169]. Nevertheless, analytic results via a representation formula, guarantee the pathwise regularity
of a solution to type-I BSVIEs, see Wang and Yong [255] and Wang, Yong, and Zhang [247] for
results regarding the representation of BSVIEs in the Markovian and non-Markovian framework,
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respectively. Regarding BSVIEs driven by discontinuous processes, it is known that type-I BSVIEs
are known to be much more amenable to the analysis, for example [207; 258] are able to study the
regularity of type-I BSVIEs with jumps by probabilistic methods.These results stress the fact that
extending these ideas to type-II BSVIEs is a more challenging task. General discontinuous BSVIEs
are out of the scope of the current document.
Out of the class of processes described by BSVIEs, a broader family than that of standard type-
I BSVIEs (1.3.3) is known to arise in the study of time-inconsistent control problems. Recently,
Agram and Djehiche [3] studied reflected backward stochastic Volterra integral equations and their
relations to a time-inconsistent optimal stopping problem. Earlier connections were suggested in the
concluding remarks of Wang and Yong [255]. Indeed, BSVIEs provide a probabilistic representations
of the system of partial differential equation (PDE, for short) appearing in the study of time-
inconsistent optimal control problems, e.g. see Yong [270] and Wei, Yong, and Yu [260] for PDEs
obtained via Pontryagin’s and Bellman’s principle, respectively. A natural link was then made
rigorous independently by Wang and Yong [245, Section 5] and Lemma 2.10.3.1 in Chapter 2.
Although following different approaches, their analyses lead to introduce type-I BSVIEs of the
form
Yt = ξ(t) +
∫ T
t
gr(t, Yr, Ztr, Zrr )dr −
∫ T
t
ZtrdBr, P–a.s., t ∈ [0, T ]. (1.3.4)
These are BSVIEs in which the diagonal of Z appears in the generator. We highlight that, until
the present work, the only well-posedness results in the literature for type-I BSVIEs (1.3.4) are
available in [245] and Chapter 2. Both results hold for the particular case in which the driver g is
linear in Ztr. Indeed, the argument in [245] follows as a consequence of the representation formula,
i.e. an analytic argument via PDEs, and holds in a Markovian setting. On the other hand, the
probabilistic argument in Chapter 2 holds in the non-Markovian case.
Likewise, Hamaguchi [112, 114] studied a time-inconsistent control problem where the cost
functional is defined by the Y component of the solution of a type-I BSVIE (1.3.3), in which g
depends on a control. Via Pontryagin’s optimal principle, the author noticed that the adjoint
equations correspond to an extended type-I BSVIE, as first introduced in Wang [244] in the context
of generalising the celebrated Feynman–Kac formula. An extended type-I BSVIE consists of a pair
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(Y ·· , Z ·· ), with appropriate integrability, such that s 7−→ Y s is continuous in an appropriate sense
for s ∈ [0, T ], Y s· is pathwise continuous, Zs· is predictable, and
Y st = ξ(s) +
∫ T
t
gr(s, Y sr , Zsr , Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
ZsrdBr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ]. (1.3.5)
We highlight that the noticeable feature of (1.3.4) and (1.3.5) is the appearance of the ‘diagonal’
processes (Y tt )t∈[0,T ] and (Ztt )t∈[0,T ], respectively. A prerequisite for rigorously introducing these
processes is some regularity of the solution. Indeed, the regularity of s 7−→ (Y s, Zs) in combination
with the pathwise continuity of Y and the introduction of a derivative of Zs with respect to s, as
first discussed in Chapter 2, make the analysis possible.
Put succinctly, type-I BSVIEs, understood in a broader sense than that of (1.3.3), provide a
rich framework to address new classes of problems in mathematical finance and control. In the case
of time-inconsistent control problems, (1.3.4) and (1.3.5) appear as a consequence of the study of
such problems via Bellman’s and Pontryagin’s principles, respectively.
We also remark that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no well-posedness results for
multidimensional quadratic type-I BSVIEs as general as (1.3.4) or (1.3.5). In fact, the study of
non-Lipschitz BSVIEs remains limited to Ren [214], Shi and Wang [225], Wang, Sun, and Yong
[246], and Wang and Zhang [258]. In [258] and [214], the authors study solutions to general
multidimensional type-I (1.3.3) and type-II (1.3.2) BSVIEs, respectively, where the generator is
increasing and concave in y and Lipschitz in z. [225] continued the study of type-II BSVIEs (1.3.2)
and settled some flaws in the analysis of [214]. On the other hand, [246] presents the first analysis
of BSVIEs whose generator have quadratic growth on z. Indeed, the authors consider a standard
one dimensional type-I BSVIE (1.3.3) in which the generator is Lipschitz in y and quadratic in z,
which we will refer as the Lipschitz–quadratic case, provided the data of the BSVIE is bounded.
The need to introduce this additional assumption is due to underlying results for quadratic BSDEs
that were employed in [246].
Even in the case of one dimensional BSDEs, establishing their well-posedness in the case of
generators with quadratic growth in z is known to be more delicate that in the Lipschitz case and
requires to impose extra assumptions on the data of the problem. The first result in this setting
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was provided by Kobylanski [155] in the case of bounded and Lipschitz–quadratic data. Building
upon the ideas in [155], Briand and Hu [41, 42] showed that imposing sufficiently large exponential
moments on the terminal condition ξ are actually enough. We stress that this approach allows
for unbounded terminal conditions but is limited to the one dimensional Lipschitz–quadratic case.
BSDEs with superquadratic growth were studied in Lepeltier and San Martín [165] and Delbaen,
Hu, and Bao [68]. On the other hand, the original method introduced in Tevzadze [238] takes a
different view of this problem and is able to cover quadratic BSDEs, in both y and z, but requires,
once again, the data to be bounded.
In the multidimensional case, new approaches become necessary as the tools that are usually
used in the one dimensional case, like monotone convergence or Girsanov transformation, are no
longer available. In fact, Frei and Dos Reis [103] provide a simple example of a multidimensional
quadratic BSDE with a bounded terminal condition for which there is no solution. This counter-
example shows that a direct generalisation of the approaches in [155; 41; 42] or the classic approach
in [201] would be unsuccessful in the case of BSDEs and, naturally, of BSVIEs. Nevertheless, it is
known that well-posedness results for BSDEs can be obtained exploiting the theory of BMO mar-
tingales and imposing further structural conditions on the generator. See, for instance, Cheridito
and Nam [49] for specific choices of generators, Hu and Tang [133] for the case of diagonally quad-
ratic generators, the generalisations in Jamneshan, Kupper, and Luo [143] and Kupper, Luo, and
Tangpi [161], as well as Rouge and El Karoui [215] Hu, Imkeller, and Müller [134] for some ap-
plications. To unify these approaches, Harter and Richou [118] provides a well-posedness result
by approximating the solution of a Lipschitz–quadratic BSDE, assuming the a priori existence of




r dWr and exploiting the Malliavin
calculus. In providing scenarri in which such estimates can be obtained [118] recover several results
available in the literature. On the other hand, the methodology devised in [238] reveals that a
positive answer can be stated if the data of the problem is bounded and sufficiently small. We also
mention Frei [102] and Kramkov and Pulido [158] which provide generalisations to slightly more
general terminal condition, as well as, the remarkable global existence result in Xing and Žitković
[265] for Markovian quadratic BSDEs.
Extending the ideas in [41; 42] to the case of BSVIEs was the motivation behind [246] and it
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explains the framework of their result, i.e. scalar BSVIEs with Lipschitz quadratic generator a
bounded data. Moreover, as [246, pp. 4] states: ‘[t]he case [of] Y being higher dimensional will
be significantly different in general.’ Therefore, it is not expected that these ideas would be able
to cover the general multidimensional quadratic BSVIE. Fortunately, a close look at the argument
provided in [238] reveals that a positive answer can be stated as soon as the data of the problem
is bounded and sufficiently small. This will be the inspiration of our approach to address the
quadratic case.
1.3.1 Contributions
In this part of the thesis we built upon the strategy devised in Chapter 2 and address the
well-posedness of a general and novel class of type-I BSVIEs. We let X be the solution to a drift-
less stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short) under a probability measure P, and F be the
P-augmentation of the filtration generated by X, and consider a tuple (Y ·· , Z ·· , N ·· ), of F-adapted
processes, satisfying for every s ∈ [0, T ]
Y st = ξ(s) +
∫ T
t






dN sr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (1.3.6)
We remark that the additional process N corresponds to a martingale process which is P-
orthogonal to X. This is a consequence of the fact that we work with a general filtration F. To
the best of our knowledge, a theory for type-I BSVIEs, as general as the ones introduced above,
remains absent in the literature. Moreover, such class of type-I BSVIEs has only been mentioned
in [114, Remark 3.8] as an interesting generalisation of (1.3.5).
Our approach is based on the following class of infinite families of BSDEs, which for every
s ∈ [0, T ] satisfy
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
hr(X·∧r,Yr,Zr, Y rr , Zrr , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Z>r dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
Y st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t




>dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
∂Y st =∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t




>dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
where (Y,Z,N , Y, Z,N, ∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) are unknown, and required to have appropriate integrability.
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As a first step, in Chapter 3 we worked under classical Lipschitz growth assumptions and
showed that for an appropriate choice of η and h its well-posedness is equivalent to that of the
type-I BSVIE (1.3.6). In addition, we recovered classical results for this general class of BSVIEs:
(i) we provided a priori estimates; (ii) established the stability of solutions; and (iii) provided a
representation formula in terms of a semilinear PDEs. Our approach can naturally be specialised
to recover the version of these results for BSVIEs previously studied in the literature. Lastly, as it
was the motivation for this project, we considered the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent
stochastic control problems and showed that as a consequence of our results, one can reconcile the
two current probabilistic approaches to this problem. Moreover, we provided an equivalent result
for two earlier analytic approaches, based on semi-linear PDEs. We believe this helps to elucidate
connections between the different takes on the problem available in the literature.
Our work in this part of the thesis does not end there. Some of the cornerstone models in the
literature in stochastic control are based on either mean–variance or linear–quadratic models. In
fact, we recall the results in [164], where the authors present a mean–variance investment problem
in which uniqueness of the equilibrium via the PDE characterisation of [35] fails. Consequently,
a natural extension of the results in Chapter 3 is the case of generator with quadratic growth.
For example, such extension becomes necessary when dealing with applications to contract theory
models were the agent has a cost which is quadratic in his effort. As such, this is the objective of
Chapter 4, the second chapter of Part III.
Recall that in Chapter 3 and Chapter 2 we studied a system consisting of an infinite family of
BSDEs in a Lipschitz framework. In general terms, by introducing the equivalent weighted versions
of the classic integrability spaces in the literature on BSDEs and choosing a weight large enough we
were able to obtain its well-posedness. In the setting of this paper, the Lipschitz assumption for the
generators is abandoned. As a consequence, one cannot recover a contraction by simply choosing
a weight large enough. In fact, given our growth assumptions, the usual candidate for providing
a contractive map is no longer Lipschitz–continuous, but only locally Lipschitz-continuous. For-
tunately, by exploiting the theory of bounded mean oscillating (BMO) martingales we can obtain
well-posedness results in the quadratic case in two scenarii: (i) Lipschitz–quadratic generators in
(Y, Z), respectively and data with sufficiently small norm; (ii) fully quadratic generators in (Y,Z)
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and data with sufficiently small norm.
Our results in Chapter 4 follows the idea initially proposed in Tevzadze [238] for multidimen-
sional quadratic BSDEs, namely, that we can localise the usual procedure to a ball of radius R,
thus making the application Lipschitz-continuous again, and then to choose the radius of such a
ball so as to recover a contraction. The crucial contribution of [238] was to show that such controls
can be obtained by taking the norm of the data of the system to be small enough. The procedure
we followed is inspired by this idea and incorporates it into the strategy devised in Chapter 3 to
address the well-posedness of these kind of systems and of extended type-I BSVIEs. We decided
to work on weighted spaces as, in our opinion, it does significantly simplify the arguments in the
proof. We also mention that we estimated the greatest ball, i.e. the largest radius R, for which
such a localisation procedure leads to a contraction.
Bringing ourselves back to the context of contract theory, we echo that the analysis in this part
of the thesis does elucidate the connections between the different approaches to time-inconsistent
control problem at the analytic level, between PDEs in the Markovian setting, and the probabilistic
level, between (H) and extended type-I BSVIEs in the non-Markovian counterpart. This in turn,
leaves us educated enough to bring our attention back to the contracting problem.
1.4 Part IV: time-inconsistent contract theory
When it comes to incorporating time-inconsistent features into contract theory models, the eco-
nomic literature is abundant in discrete-time models with two, and up to three periods. A common
feature in this literature is adopting quasi-hyperbolic discounting structures to draw conclusions
in different mechanism design problems. Yet, the method of resolution in each problem remained
limited to a case-by-case analysis. For instance, Amador, Werning, and Angeletos [9] and Bond and
Sigurdsson [39] study the feasibility of commitment in models of consumption and savings, whereas
Galperti [106] considers the optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both
commitment and flexibility. Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv [30] examines policymakers’ responses to the
political demands of agents with self-control problems, Halac and Yared [111] looks into a fiscal
policy model in which the government has time-inconsistent preferences, while Lim and Yurukoglu
[170] assesses the effects of time-inconsistency on monopoly regulation of electricity distribution.
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Heidhues [125] and Karaivanov and Martin [148] integrate time-inconsistent preferences into credit,
mortgage and insurance contract design problems, respectively. Englmaier, Fahn, and Schwarz [94],
Gottlieb [108] and Gottlieb and Zhang [109] study contracting problems between firms and sophist-
icated, partially naive and naive present-biased consumers. Yılmaz [271, 272] considers a repeated
moral hazard problem involving a sophisticated and naive agent, respectively. Ma [177] studies a
multi-period model in which contracts are subject to renegotiations, and the agent’s action has a
long-term effect. Balbus, Reffett, and Wozny [14] shows the existence of time-consistent equilibria
for dynamic models with generalised discounting. A survey of some of the state of behavioural
economics research in contract theory was provided in Kószegi [156].
In continuous-time, where the dynamic models are sometimes more tractable and the solu-
tions enjoy better interpretability, the literature becomes rather scarce. Models dealing with a
pre-committed agent have been considered in Li and Qiu [167], in which a non-constant exponen-
tial discount factor is the source of time-inconsistency, and Djehiche and Helgesson [75], where
the agent is allowed to have mean–variance utility functions. The case of a sophisticated agent
was considered in Li, Mu, and Yang [168], Liu, Mu, and Yang [174], Liu, Huang, Liu, and Mu
[175] and Wang, Huang, Liu, and Zhang [257] in the case of hyperbolic discounting. However,
the time-inconsistency is restricted in the sense that it manifests only at discrete random times
that are exponentially distributed. Lastly, Cetemen, Feng, and Urgun [46] considers a Markovian
continuous-time contracting problem and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential dis-
counting. The authors’ examples are limited to the case of a principal having time-inconsistent
preferences and the agent has standard time-consistent preferences. Altogether, a thorough ana-
lysis of the general non-Markovian continuous-time contracting problem between a standard utility
maximiser principal and a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent is still missing in the literature.
This is because, in our opinion, the crux of the problem lies in identifying a proper description of
the problem of the principal. In the case of a classic time-consistent agent and a time-inconsistent
principal, following [64], one expects the problem of the principal to boil down to a non-Markovian
time-inconsistent control problem with an additional state variable. As studied in [38], these prob-
lems are characterised by the so called extended HJB equation. Therefore, we expect that the
problem considered in this document will open the door to a complete analysis of the problem in
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which both the principal and the agent are time-inconsistent.
1.4.1 Contributions
The set-up is as follows: given a contract ξ, i.e. an FT -measurable random variable, the agent,
allowed to control only the drift b, as in Section 1.1.1, receives a reward given by JA( · ; ξ), as in
Section 1.2.2 and where we now emphasise its dependence on the contract ξ. We call E(ξ) the set
of all equilibria associated to ξ. Moreover, the agent has a reservation utility R0 ∈ R below which
he refuses the contract ξ. We therefore let the set of admissible contracts be given by Ξ :=
{
ξ :
VA0 (ξ, α) ≥ R0, for α ∈ E(ξ)
}
. The principal has her own utility function UP : X × R −→ R, and







In light of our results in Chapter 2, for ξ ∈ Ξ the problem solved by the Agent is characterised by
the solution to (H), which we denote (Y(ξ),Z(ξ), ∂Y (ξ), ∂Z(ξ)). Nevertheless, the infinite dimen-
sional nature of (H) posed an obstacle for a direct application of the results in [64]. Fortunately, in
Chapter 2 we identified a link between time-inconsistent control problems and BSVIEs. Such type
of links appeared first in the concluding remarks of Wang and Yong [255] and then later in [245].
In our setting, such an equation is satisfied by the value of the agent along the equilibrium, namely
Y(ξ), which coincides with the diagonal process (Y tt (ξ))t∈[0,T ] of the family (Y s(ξ))s∈[0,T ] defined,
for s ∈ [0, T ], by












Zsr (ξ) · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
The previous equation provides, in principle, infinitely many representations of ξ. Nevertheless,










f(T − u) , P–a.s., (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]
2.
This is, understanding the properties of solutions to the BSVIE, we are able to identify the structure
of the contracts that induce equilibria for the Agent. In light of our previous observation, we
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introduce a family of restricted contract payments Ξ. For any contract in this family, we can
solve the associated time-inconsistent control problem faced by the agent. Moreover, we show
that any admissible contract available to the principal admits a representation as a contract in
Ξ. Consequently, the principal’s optimal expected utility is not reduced if she restricts herself to
offer contracts in this family and optimises. To present these results, we need to introduce the set
I := {y0 ∈ C11 : y00 ≥ R0}
Definition (Reduced family of contracts Chapter 5). (i) We denote by H2,2 the collection of pro-
cesses Z, with appropriate integrability satisfying:
for y0 ∈ I, there exists a process Y y0,Z , which satisfies for every s ∈ [0, T ],





























f(T − u) , P–a.s., (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]
2.





, (y0, Z) ∈ I ×H2,2.
The main novelties of our argument, compared to that in the time-consistent case are: (i)
the agent’s time-inconsistent preferences yield that the so-called continuation utility Y y0,Z is now
described by a forward Volterra equation; (ii) as such, the setH2,2 now consist of family of processes
Z; (iii) lastly H2,2 imposes a constraint on its elements, and therefore, it is essential to verify that
H2,2 6= ∅.
We are now ready to state our main result, in words it guarantees that there is no loss of
generality for the principal in offering contracts of the form given by Ξ.
Theorem (Characterisation of principal’s problem Chapter 5). (i) We have Ξ = Ξ. Moreover,
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, VA0 (ξ) = y00.




















Let us emphasise that contrary to the classic time-consistent scenario studied in [64], the pre-
vious problem V (y0) is not a standard control problem in the sense that the Principal optimises
over a family of Volterra controls in H2,2 which satisfy a novel type of Volterra constraint. This
motivates the study of H2,2 under particular specifications of utility functions for both the agent
and the principal, hoping to be able to: (i) reduce the complexity of the set H2,2; (ii) exploit its
particular structure to formulate an ansatz to the problem of the principal. This is exactly what
we do in the last part of Chapter 5. The general case remains subject of further research.
To give a hint of our results let us present the solution to the example considered in this
section. Under additional assumptions on the model, including coefficients independent of X, one
can proceed with the resolution. For instance, in the case of risk-neutral principal and agent, i.e.
UA(x) = UP(x) = x, we found that an optimal contract is given by
ξ? := R0














for some deterministic function z?(t) which depends on the data of the problem, and in particular,
on the discounting function f . Moreover, the family Z? ∈ H2,2, solution to V (y0), is given, for any
s ∈ [0, T ], by
Zst :=
f(T − s)
f(T − t) z
?(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Two noticeable features are worth commenting: (i) the optimal contract takes the form of
a non-Markovian linear function of the output process X, which is a reflection of the intrinsic
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non-Markovian nature of contracting theory in continuous time; (ii) the optimal family Z? is,
surprisingly, deterministic.
Nevertheless, the extent to which the previous structure of the family Z and the optimal contral
ξ? is true in greater generality is a challenging problem. Let us just mention that: (i) we succeed in
extending the previous result to the case of random non-Markovian coefficients; (ii) we also address
the solution under another two specfications of preferences for both the prinpical and the agent. In
particular, we consider the case of an agent with time-inconsistent CARA preferences analogue to
the seminal work of [130].
Regarding the implications of our results we can mention the following:
(i) from a methodological point of view, unlike in the time-consistent case, the solution to the
moral hazard problem does not reduce, in general, to a standard stochastic control problem. Nev-
ertheless, the solution to the risk-sharing problem between a utility maximiser principal and a
time-inconsistent sophisticated agent does, see Section 2. This suggest a dire difference between
the first-best and second-best problems as soon as the agent is allowed to have time-inconsistent
preferences;
(ii) a second takeaway from our analysis is associated with the so-called optimality of linear con-
tracts. These are contracts consisting of a constant part and a term proportional to the terminal
value of the state process as in the seminal work of [130]. We study two examples that can be
regarded as (time-inconsistent) variations of [130], which we refer to as discounted utility, and
utility of discounted income. In the former case, by virtue of the simplicity of the source of time-
inconsistency, we find that optimal contract is linear. In the latter case, we find that the optimal
contract is no longer linear unless there is no discounting (as in [130]). Our point here is that slight
deviations of the model in [130] seem to challenge the virtues attributed to linear contracts and
this suggests that would typically cease to be optimal in general for time-inconsistent agents;
(iii) lastly, we comment on the non-Markovian nature of the optimal contract. It is known that,
beyond the realm of the model in [130], the optimal contract in the time-consistent scenario is,
in general, non-Markovian in the state process X, see [64]. Indeed, we find the same result in
the case of an agent with separable time-inconsistent preferences. Moreover, in our context the
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non-Markovian structure is also manifestation of the agent’s time-inconsistent preferences.
1.5 Perspectives and future research
The topic of time-inconsistency has proven to be a sufficiently rich area of study, yet, the research
conducted for this thesis has revealed numerous questions that still remained unanswered and
cleared the way for a whole new set of applications incorporating the behaviour of non-traditional
economic agents. Let us now comment on some of them.
Inconsistent mixed optimal control/stopping
Arguably, one of the limitations of the framework presented in the previous section is the fact
that the contracts are strictly binding and do not allow the Agent to terminate the contract, i.e.
to quit, before the terminal time T . Therefore, extensions to mixed optimal control/stopping
problems could also prove interesting. This is the scenario in which the Agent chooses a pair (α, τ)
consisting of an action and a stopping time. In this case, the first equation in (H) should become
a reflected BSDE, giving us a candidate equilibrium stopping time in addition to a candidate
equilibrium action. Such stopping time will in turn play the role of the terminal horizon for the
second equation in (H). We conjecture the system to be of the following form, where (ξt)t∈[0,T ] is
the salary when contract ends at t, and K is a non-decreasing process starting at 0,













∂Y st = f ′(T − s)UA(ξτ?) +
∫ τ?
t










dKr = 0, τ? := inf{t ≥ 0 : Kt > 0}.
Naturally, these results would lead to contracting models in which the Agent is given the
possibility to quit his job and in this way to draw economic intuitions on how the principal may
deter the agent to do so.
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Relaxed BSDEs and existence of equilibria
One central question that has been addressed for discrete-time principal–agent models, see
Balder [17], Page Jr. [197], is that of existence of a contract. Yet, there are no results available
in the continuous-time literature, not even in the time-consistent setting. As can be inferred from
the results [64], existence of an optimal contract boils down to the existence of optimal controls in
a general stochastic control problem. It is known, see Haussmann and Lepeltier [119], El Karoui,
Nguyen, and Jeanblanc-Picqué [87], that randomisation (that is considering actions as probability
measure-valued processes) is in general necessary to compactify the set of controls and obtain
existence. Moreover, randomisation has been employed in one-period principal–agent models to
argue existence of optimal contracts, see Kadan, Reny, and Swinkels [147]. As such, we plan
to study this question using these techniques and prove general existence results for randomised










∣∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ [0, T ],
Let A be the collection of all finite and positive Borel measures on [0, T ]×A, whose projection
on [0, T ] is the Lebesgue measure. Consider the canonical space Ω := Cd×A, with canonical process
(X,Λ) and Borel σ-algebra F . Let Pt := {P ∈ Prob(Ω,F) : M(ϕ) is a P-local martingale on [t, T ]























, t ∈ [0, T ].
Our goal is then to obtain a probabilistic representation of the relaxed formulation. We recall the
theory of 2BSDEs provides such representation for both weak and strong formulations, i.e. without
7Prob(Ω,F) denotes the set of all probability measures on (Ω,F) and C2,b(Rd) is the set of bounded twice con-
tinuously differentiable functions from Rd to R, with bounded first and second derivatives.
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randomisation, of this control problem, see Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou [210]. To extend these results
to the relaxed formulation we would develop a new theory of relaxed 2BSDEs. Preliminary results
suggest the following.
Conjecture. We have VA,r0 = supP∈P0 E
P[Y0] where (Y, Z,K) solves the following relaxed 2BSDE











• Pt is defined as Pt with b = 0;










2 bt(x, a) · z − ct(x, a)
}
;
• K is a non-decreasing process satisfying infP∈P EP[KT ] = 0;
• moreover, there exists P? ∈ P such that EP? [KT ] = 0.
Provided this holds, one expects to be able to characterise optimal relaxed controls as maximisers
in F and the probability measure P?. This is in itself a result with implications that go beyond
the applications in contract theory. Indeed, it encompasses any stochastic control problem and will
also open the way to numerical considerations for relaxed optimal control, through the numerical
simulation of these new 2BSDEs, see Possamaï and Tan [208]. However, these existence results are
abstract and non-constructive in general, which makes the study of properties of optimal controls
(and thus of optimal contracts) delicate. In a second step, one should push the analysis further, by
finding characterisations of optimal controls in relaxed stochastic control problems.
Volterra control of forward Volterra processes
Another avenue of research that emerges from our study of principal–agent problems involving a
time-inconsistent agent pertains the thorough understanding of the novel class of control problems
that characterise the problem of the principal. In the easiest set up we could consider the following.
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Let A be an appropriate class of A-valued doubly indexed controls of the form (αst )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 . We
would then let the dynamics of the controlled state process X be given by



























where B is a P–Brownian motion. This is, the dynamics of X correspond to a forward Volterra
process. Notably the control α is allowed to impact the dynamics of X via both processes αs and
its diagonal (αtt)t∈[0,T ]. With this a control problem is then defined by








In the general situation, it is unclear—at least to us—how to address this class of problems.
In fact, our discussion in Chapter 5 shows that under mild regularity assumptions on the data
and the class of controls there are two possible representations for the term XT,x0,αT appearing in
the reward of the principal, each coming with its own challenges. For simplicity, let us assume
σt(s, x, x, a, a) = σt(s) for some deterministic mapping σt(s).
Indeed, it is possible to show that XT,x0,αT corresponds to the final value of the process X
t,x0,α
t
given by the system













































(i) If we choose to focus on the dynamics of Xt,x0,Zt as given by the first equation, one can ex-
ploit the fact that the action of the control is only through the diagonal (αt)t∈[0,T ]. Moreover,
given (∂Xt,x0,Zt )t∈[0,T ], the first equation implies (X
t,x0,α
t )t∈[0,T ] is an Itô process. Nevertheless, as
(∂Xt,x0,αt )t∈[0,T ] is not given, there is no direct access to the dynamics of (∂X
t,x0,α
t )t∈[0,T ] that is
amenable to the analysis, i.e. that would allow us to use Itô calculus. Moreover, the process ∂X





























(ii) Alternatively, suppose we choose the representation as in the statement of the problem. In
that case, the problem of the principal involves the control of the family of FSVIEs Xs,x0,Zt ,
where the controls consist of a Volterra type processes α ∈ A that impacts the dynamics via
((αt)t∈[0,T ], (αs)t∈[0,T ]). The fact that the dependence is through both arguments makes the recent
approach in Viens and Zhang [243] for controlled FSVIEs inoperable.
In general, this seems to be quite a challenging problem. We shall leave the analysis of these
class of problems for future research.
1.6 Outline of the thesis
Overall, the contributions of this thesis can be encompassed into the area of stochastic control
and can be classified into two categories:
(i) infinite families backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), and backward stochastic
Volterra integral equations (BSVIEs);
(ii) time-inconsistency and contract theory for sophisticated agents.
These categories correspond to the tools and their applications. That being said, this thesis is
structure into four parts, the third of which being divided into two chapters.
Part I, which consists of this chapter, was dedicated to introduce the main ideas in contract
theory, including a description of the dynamic programming approach; to describe the phenomenon
known as time-inconsistency; to comment on a selection of the existing results in the literature on
Markovian time-inconsistent control problem; to present our contributions; and to communicate
some perspectives and future directions of research.
Part II, which consist of Chapter 2, we develop a probabilistic theory for continuous-time non-
Markovian stochastic control problems which are inherently time-inconsistent. Our formulation is
cast within the framework of a controlled non-Markovian forward stochastic differential equation,
and a general objective functional setting. We adopt a game-theoretic approach to study such
problems, meaning that we seek for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium points. As a first novelty
of this work, we introduce and motivate a refinement on the definition of equilibrium that allows
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us to establish rigorously an extended dynamic programming principle, in the same spirit as in the
classical theory. This in turn allows us to introduce a system of backward stochastic differential
equations analogous to the classical HJB equation. We prove that this system is fundamental, in
the sense that its well-posedness is both necessary and sufficient to characterise the value function
and equilibria. As a final step we provide an existence and uniqueness result. Some examples and
extensions of our results are also presented.
Part III, which consist of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we take a temporary detour from the world
of contract theory and dedicate ourselves to understanding the tools the appeared in the study
of the time-inconsistent problem faced by a sophisticated agent. This is we study a novel general
class of multidimensional type-I backward stochastic Volterra integral equations. Toward this goal,
we introduce an infinite family of standard backward SDEs and establish its well-posedness, and
we show that it is equivalent to that of a type-I backward stochastic Volterra integral equation.
In light of the inherent nature of the cornerstone models in the literature, we study the cases of
Lipschitz, Chapter 3, and quadratic generators, Chapter 4.
In Part IV, which consist of Chapter 5, we come back to the moral hazard problem equipped
with all the knowledge gained in Part II and Part III. This is, we study the contracting problem
between a time-consistent principal and sophisticated time-inconsistent agent. Our main contribu-
tion consists of a characterisation of the moral hazard problem faced by the principal. Nevertheless,
this characterisation yields, as far as we know, a novel class of control problems that involve the
control of a forward Volterra equation via constrained Volterra type controls. Despite the inherent
challenges of these class of problems, we study the solution to this problem under three different
specifications of utility functions for both the agent and the principal and draw implications from





Non-Markovian time-inconsistent control for
sophisticated agents
This chapter is devoted to develop a theory for continuous-time non-Markovian stochastic con-
trol problems which are inherently time-inconsistent. Their distinguishing feature is that the clas-
sical Bellman optimality principle no longer holds. Our formulation is cast within the framework of
a controlled non-Markovian forward stochastic differential equation, and a general objective func-
tional setting. We adopt a game-theoretic approach to study such problems, meaning that we
seek for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium points. As a first novelty of this work, we introduce
and motivate a new definition of equilibrium that allows us to establish rigorously an extended
dynamic programming principle, in the same spirit as in the classical theory. This in turn allows
us to introduce a system of backward stochastic differential equations analogous to the classical
HJB equation. We prove that this system is fundamental, in the sense that its well-posedness is
both necessary and sufficient to characterise the value function and equilibria. As a final step we




Let d and n be two positive integers. For consistency and in order to alleviate the notation we
set X := Cd. We will work on the canonical space Ω := X ×Cn×A, whose elements we will denote
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generically by ω := (x,w, q), and with canonical process (X,W,Λ), where
Xt(ω) := x(t), Wt(ω) := w(t), Λ(ω) := q, (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
X and Cd are endowed with the topology T∞, induced by the norm ‖x‖∞ := sup0≤t≤T |x(t)|,
x ∈ X , while A is endowed with the topology Tw induced by weak convergence, which we recall is
metrisable, for instance, by the Prohorov metric, see Stroock and Varadhan [232, Theorem 1.1.2].
With these norms, both spaces are Polish.




ϕ(r, a)Λ(dr, da), so that ∆t[ϕ](ω) =
∫∫
[0,t]×A
ϕ(r, a)qr(da)dr, for any ω ∈ Ω.
We denote by F the Borel σ-field on Ω. We will work with the filtrations F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] and
FX := (FXt )t∈[0,T ] defined for t ∈ [0, T ] by
Ft := σ
(





(Xr,∆r[ϕ]) : (r, ϕ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb([0, T ]×A)
)
.
Additionally, we will work with processes ψ : [0, T ] × X −→ E, (t, x) 7−→ ψ(t, x), for E some
Polish space, which are G-optional, with G an arbitrary filtration, i.e. Popt(E,G)-measurable. In
particular, these processes are automatically non-anticipative, that is to say, ψr(X) := ψr(X·∧r) for
any r ∈ [0, T ]. We denote by πX the canonical projection from Ω to X and let πX#P := P ◦ (πX )−1
denote the push-forward of P. As the previous processes are defined on [0, T ]×X ( [0, T ]×Ω, we
emphasise that throughout this chapter, the assertion




[X ] = 1. (2.1.1)
P ∈ Prob(Ω) will be called a semi-martingale measure if X is an (F,P)–semi-martingale. By
Karandikar [149], there then exists an F-predictable process, denoted by 〈X〉 = (〈X〉t)t∈[0,T ], which
coincides with the quadratic variation of X, P–a.s., for every semi-martingale measure P. Thus, we
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can introduce the d×d symmetric positive semi-definite matrix σ̂ as the square root of σ̂2 given by




, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.1.2)
We also recall the celebrated result on the existence of a well-behaved ω-by-ω version of the
conditional expectation. We also introduce the concatenation of a measure and a stochastic kernel.
These objects are key for the statement of our results in the level of generality we are working with.
Recall Ω is a Polish space and F is a countably generated σ-algebra. For P ∈ Prob(Ω) and
τ ∈ T0,T (F), Fτ is also countably generated, so there exists an associated regular conditional
probability distribution (r.c.p.d. for short) (Pτω)ω∈Ω, see [232, Theorem 1.3.4], satisfying
(i) for every ω ∈ Ω, Pτω is a probability measure on (Ω,F);
(ii) for every E ∈ F , the mapping ω 7−→ Pτω[E] is Fτ -measurable;
(iii) the family (Pτω)ω∈Ω is a version of the conditional probability measure of P given Fτ , that is
to say for every P-integrable, F-measurable random variable ξ, we have EP[ξ|Fτ ](ω) = EP
τ
ω [ξ], for
P–a.e. ω ∈ Ω;
(iv) for every ω ∈ Ω, Pτω[Ωωτ ] = 1, where Ωωτ := {ω′ ∈ Ω : ω′(r) = ω(r), 0 ≤ r ≤ τ(ω)}.
Moreover, for P ∈ Prob(Ω) and an Fτ -measurable stochastic kernel (Qτω)ω∈Ω such that Qτω[Ωωτ ] =







1A(ω ⊗τ(ω) ω̃)Qω(dω̃), ∀A ∈ F . (2.1.3)
The following result, see [232, Theorem 6.1.2], gives a rigorous characterisation of the concatenation
procedure.
Theorem 2.1.1 (Concatenated measure). Consider a stochastic kernel (Qω)ω∈Ω, and let τ ∈
T0,T (F). Suppose the map ω 7−→ Qω is Fτ -measurable and Qω[Ωωτ ] = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. Given
P ∈ Prob(Ω), there is a unique probability measure P⊗τ(·) Q· on (Ω,F) such that P⊗τ(·) Q· equals
P on (Ω,Fτ ) and (δω⊗τ(ω)Qω)ω∈Ω is an r.c.p.d. of P⊗τ(·)Q·|Fτ . In particular, for some t ∈ [0, T ],
suppose that τ ≥ t, that M : [t, T ] × Ω −→ R is a right-continuous, F–progressively measurable
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function after t, such that Mt is P ⊗τ(·) Q·-integrable, that for all r ∈ [t, T ], (Mr∧τ )r∈[t,T ] is an
(F,P)-martingale, and that (Mr −Mr∧τ(ω))r∈[t,T ] is an (F,Qω)-martingale, for all ω ∈ Ω. Then
(Mr)r∈[t,T ] is an (F,P⊗τ(·) Q·)-martingale.
In particular, if ξ is an F-measurable function, we have EP⊗τPτ· [ξ] = EP[EP[ξ|Fτ ]] = EP[ξ]. This
is nothing else than the classical tower property. We also mention that the reverse implication in
the last statement in Theorem 2.1.1 holds as a direct consequence of [232, Theorem 1.2.10].
2.1.2 Controlled state dynamics
Let k be a positive integer, and let A ⊆ Rk. An action process ν is an FX -predictable process
taking values in A. Given an action process ν, the controlled state equation is given by the stochastic
differential equation (SDE for short)





br(X, νr)dr + dWr
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.1.4)
where W is an n-dimensional Brownian motion, x0 ∈ Rd, and
σ : [0, T ]×X ×A −→Md,n(R), b : [0, T ]×X ×A −→ Rn, bounded, (2.1.5)
with (t, x) 7−→ (σ, b)(t, x, a), FX -optional for any a ∈ A.
In this work we characterise the controlled state equation in terms of weak solutions to (2.1.4).
These are elegantly introduced via the so-called martingale problems, see [232, Chapter 6]. Let







For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , we define P(t, x) as the collection of P ∈ Prob(Ω) such that
(i) there exists w ∈ Cn such that P ◦ (X·∧t,W·∧t)−1 = δ(x·∧t,w·∧t);
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Λ(du,da), r ∈ [t, T ], (2.1.6)
is an (F,P)–local martingale;
(iii) P[Λ ∈ A0] = 1.
There are classical conditions ensuring that the set P(t, x) is non-empty. For instance, it
is enough that the mapping x 7−→ σt(x, a) is continuous for some constant control a, see [232,
Theorem 6.1.6]. We also recall that uniqueness of a solution, i.e. there is a unique element in
P(t, x) , holds when in addition σσ>t (x, a) is uniformly positive away from zero, i.e. there is λ > 0
s.t. θ>σσ>t (x, a)θ ≥ λ|θ|2, (t, x, θ) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rd, see [232, Theorem 7.1.6].
Given P ∈ P(x) := P(0, x),W is an n-dimensional P–Brownian motion and there is an A-valued
process ν such that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, νr)dWr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (2.1.7)
Remark 2.1.2. We remark some properties of the previous martingale problem which, in particular,
justify (2.1.7)
(i) for any P ∈ P(t, x) and ν verifying P[Λ ∈ A0] = 1, (2.1.6) implies
σ̂2r = (σσ>)r(X, νr), dr ⊗ dP–a.e., on [t, T ]× Ω; (2.1.8)
(ii) we highlight the fact that our approach is to enlarge the canonical space right from the beginning
of the formulation. This is in contrast to, for instance, El Karoui and Tan [86, Remark 1.6], where
the canonical space is taken as X × A and enlargements are considered as properly needed. As
P(t, x) ought to describe the law of X as in (2.1.7), this cannot be done unless the canonical space
is extended. We feel our approach simplifies the readability and understanding of the analysis at
no extra cost. Indeed, the extra canonical process W allows us to get explicitly the existence of
































dWs, t ∈ [0, T ]; (2.1.9)
(iii) the reader might notice that the notation P(t, x) does not specify an initial condition for
neither the process W , nor for the measure valued process Λ. Arguably, given our choice of Ω,
one is naturally led to introduce P(t, ω), with initial condition ω = (x,w, q) ∈ Ω. Nevertheless, by
(2.1.6) and (2.1.9), we see that the dynamics of X depends on the increments of the application
[0, T ] 3 t 7−→ ∆t[σσ>](ω) ∈Md(R) for ω ∈ Ω. It is clear from this that the initial condition on W
and Λ are irrelevant. This yields P(t, ω) = P(t, ω̃) for all ω̃ = (x, w̃, q̃) ∈ Ω.
We now introduce the class of admissible actions. We let A denote the set of A-valued and FX -
predictable processes. At the formal level, we will say ν ∈ A is admissible whenever (2.1.7) has a
unique weak solution. A proper definition requires first to introduce some additional notations. We
will denote by (Pνt,x)(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X the corresponding family of solutions associated to ν. Moreover,
we recall that uniqueness guarantees the measurability of the application (t, x) 7−→ Pνt,x, see [232,
Exercise 6.7.4]. For (t, x,P) ∈ [0, T ]×X × P(t, x), we define
A0(t, x,P) :=
{





(P, ν) ∈ P(t, x)×A0(t, x,P)
}
,
P0(t, x, ν) :=
{
P ∈ Prob(Ω) : (P, ν) ∈M0(t, x)
}
.
Letting A0(t, x) :=
⋃
P∈P(t,x)A0(t, x,P), we define rigorously the class of admissible actions
A(t, x) :=
{
ν ∈ A0(t, x) : P0(t, x, ν) = {Pνt,x}
}
. (2.1.10)
We set A(x) := A(0, x) and define similarly, A(t, x,P), P(t, x, ν), M(t, x), A(x,P), M(x) and
P(x, ν).
Remark 2.1.3. (i) We remark that the sets M(t, x) and A(t, x) are equivalent parametrisations of
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the admissible solutions to (2.1.7). This follows since uniqueness of weak solutions for fixed actions






(ii) The convenience of introducing the sets A(t, x,P) is that it allows us to better handle action
processes for which the quadratic variation of X is the same. For different P ∈ P(t, x) the dis-
crepancy among such probability measures can be read from (2.1.8), i.e. in the (support of the)
quadratic variation of X. This reflects the fact that different diffusion coefficients of (2.1.7) might
induce mutually singular probability measures in P(t, x). We also recall that in general P(t, x) is
not finite since it is a convex set, see Jacod and Shiryaev [142, Proposition III.2.8].
Remark 2.1.4. (i) Since b is bounded, it follows that given (P, ν) ∈ M(x), if we define M :=











WMt := Wt −
∫ t
0
br(X, νr)dr, t ∈ [0, T ],
we have that WM is a Pν–Brownian motion, and





br(X, νr)dr + dWMr
)
, Pν–a.s.
(ii) We will exploit the previous fact and often work under the drift-less dynamics (2.1.7). We
stress that in contrast to the strong formulation setting, in the weak formulation the state process
X is fixed and the action process ν allows to control the distribution of X via Pν .
In light of the previous discussion, we define the collection of admissible models with initial
conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X
M(t, x) :=
{
(Pν , ν) : (P, ν) ∈M(t, x)
}
.
and we set M(x) := M(0, x). To ease notations we set Tt,T := Tt,T (F), for any τ ∈ T0,T ,
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Pτ· := (Pτω)ω∈Ω, and for any (τ, ω) ∈ T0,T × Ω, P(τ, x) := P(τ(ω), x), M(τ, x) := M(τ(ω), x),
andM(τ, x) :=M(τ(ω), x).
We will take advantage in the rest of this chapter of the fact that we can move freely from
objects inM to their counterparts in M, see Lemma 2.10.3.2. Also, we mention that we will make
a slight abuse of notation, and denote by M elements in both M(t, x) andM(t, x). It will be clear
from the context whether M refers to a model for (2.1.4), or the drift-less dynamics (2.1.7).
2.1.3 Objective functional
Let us introduce the running and terminal cost functionals
f : [0, T ]× [0, T ]×X ×A −→ R, ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ R, Borel-measurable,
with f·(s, ·, a), FX -optional, for any (s, a) ∈ [0, T ]×A.
We are interested in a generic pay-off functional of the form




fr(t,X, νr)dr + ξ(t,X·∧T )
]
, (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A(t, x).
Remark 2.1.5. (i) As we work on an enlarged probability space, one might wonder whether the
value of the reward under both formulations coincide or not. We recall that we chose to enlarge
the canonical space, see Section 2.1.2, to explicitly account for the randomness driving (2.1.4), i.e.
the process W . Nevertheless, as for any ω ∈ Ω and M ∈M(t, x), the latter depends only on x, see
Remark 2.1.2, we see that given M, J is completely specified by (t, x).
(ii) Given the form of the pay-off functional J , the problem of maximising A(x) 3 ν 7−→ J(0, x, ν)
has a time-inconsistent nature. More precisely, the dependence of both f and ξ on the current time
t is here the source of inconsistency.
Due to the nature of the pay-off functional, the classic dynamic programming principle falls
apart, and the action prescribed by a maximiser is in general not optimal at future times. In
this work, out of the three approaches to time-inconsistency, namely naive, pre-committed and
sophisticated planning, we adopt the latter. Thus, we study this problem from a game-theoretic
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perspective and look for equilibrium laws. The next section is dedicated to explaining these concepts
more thoroughly.
2.1.4 Game formulation
In order to define a game, say G, one has to specify a certain number of elements, see Osborne
and Rubinstein [194]: a set of I players; a set of decision nodes D; a specification of the unique
immediate predecessor Υ; a set of actions Θ; a set H forming a partition of D referred to as
information sets; a function H : D 7−→ H that assigns each decision node into an information set;
a probability distribution P on (Ω,F ,F) that dictates nature’s moves and the rewards J.
Let x ∈ X , D := {(s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, T ] × X : s = t and x(0) = x(0)}, H :=
{
{z} : z ∈ D
}
and z 7−→ H(z) := {z} ∈ H. Defining Υ is one of the bottlenecks in a continuum setting which we
address via our definition of equilibrium. We define G := {[0, T ], [0, T ],A,H,H, (Ω,F ,F,P), J} as a
non-cooperative game in which
(i) we have one player for each point in time s ∈ [0, T ], we refer to this player as ‘Player s’;
(ii) at time t = s, Player s can control the process X exactly at time t. He does that by choosing
an admissible action model, (Pν , ν) ∈M(t,X·∧t), after negotiating with future versions of himself,
i.e. s ∈ [t, T ];













, where following [35], for (s, t, x, ν) ∈
[0, T ]× [s, T ]×X ×A(s, x) we introduce




fr(s,X, νr)dr + ξ(s,X·∧T )
]
. (2.1.11)
To motivate the concept of equilibrium law we will introduce in the sequel, we recall the idea
behind the concept of a Nash equilibrium. An action profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can do
better by unilaterally deviating from his strategy while the other players still play the equilibrium.
In other words, imagine that each player asks himself: ‘knowing the strategies of the others, and
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treating them as fixed, can I benefit by changing my strategy?’. If the answer is no, then the current
combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. In the context of dynamic games, the concept of
sub-game perfection has been commonly adopted, see [194]. To introduce this concept we recall
that a sub-game is any part, i.e. subset, of a game that satisfies
• the initial decision node is in a singleton information set, which means that only one possible
sequence of actions could have led to the sub-game’s initial decision node;
• if a decision node is contained in the sub-game, then so are all of its subsequent decision
nodes;
• if a decision node in a particular information set is in the sub-game, then all members of that
information set belong to the sub-game.
In our framework, the first condition translates into the fact that every player, together with a
past trajectory, define a new sub-game. In the particular case of the first player, i.e. s = 0, we
will write, now and in the following, x ∈ X so that the initial decision node is well defined. Note
this corresponds to fixing an initial value for the trajectories of X. The last two conditions imply
that, given a player s ∈ [0, T ], every sub-game of which a subsequent player s ≤ t ≤ T is part of,
must be part of the sub-game defined by s. These three conditions together yield sub-games of the
form [s, T ], together with a past trajectory. A strategy profile is therefore sub-game perfect if it
prescribes a Nash equilibrium in any sub-game. This motivates the idea behind the definition of
an equilibrium model, see among others [233], [80] and [34].
Let x ∈ X , ν? ∈ A(x) be an action, which is a candidate for an equilibrium, (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω
an arbitrary initial condition, ` ∈ (0, T − t], τ ∈ Tt,t+` and ν ∈ A(τ, x). We define
ν ⊗τ ν? := ν1[t,τ) + ν?1[τ,T ].
Definition 2.1.6 (Equilibrium). Let x ∈ X , ν? ∈ A(x). For ε > 0 let
`ε := inf
{
` > 0 : ∃P ∈ P(x),
P
[{
x ∈ X : ∃(t, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×A(t, x), J
(












If for any ε > 0, `ε > 0 then ν? is an equilibrium model, and we write ν? ∈ E(x).
Remark 2.1.7. We now make a few remarks regarding our definition.
(i) The first advantage of Definition 2.1.6 is that `ε is monotone in ε. Indeed, let 0 < ε′ ≤ ε, then
by definition, `ε satisfies the condition in the definition of `ε′, thus `ε′ ≤ `ε.
(ii) We chose A(t, x) for the class of actions to be compared to in the equilibrium condition. One
could have chosen instead
A(t, x, t+ `) :=
{
ν ∈ A(t, x) : ν ⊗t+` ν? ∈ A(t, x)
}
, (2.1.12)
as it was actually considered in [82]. Clearly, A(t, x, t + `) ⊆ A(t, x) for ` > 0 and, a priori,
A(t, x, t+`) could be considered as a more sensible choice, since there is no guarantee that ν⊗t+`ν? ∈
A(t, x) for any ν ∈ A(t, x). It turns out that under the assumption of weak uniqueness, this is indeed
the case, see Lemma 2.10.3.1.
(iii) From the definition, given (ε, `) ∈ R?+ × (0, `ε), for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and any (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×
A(t, x)
J(t, t, x, ν?)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+` ν?) ≥ −ε`. (2.1.13)
From this we can better appreciate two distinguishing features of our definition. The fist one is that
(2.1.13) holds for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X . This is in contrast to [35] and [120], where the rewards are
respectively compared for all x ∈ X and x in the support of Pν? ∈ P(x). The approach in [35] is
too stringent as it might impose a condition on trajectories that are not reachable by any admissible
action. On the other hand, requiring it to hold only in the support of the probability measure
associated with the equilibrium might lead to situations which fail to be sub-game perfect. Our
choice is motivated by the rationale behind sub-game perfection, i.e. a sub-game perfect equilibrium
should prescribed a (ε–)Nash equilibrium in any possible sub-game, i.e. for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X . The
second one is that Definition 2.1.6 imposes (2.1.13) for all ` < `ε. This local feature had not been
considered in the literature before, and it will be key to rigorously prove that these equilibria lead to
an extended DPP, see Section 2.2.1 for more details.
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(iv) Alternatively, we could have introduced `ε,t,ν > 0, i.e. let the choice of ` depend on ε, t and ν,
via (2.1.13), which we will refer here as lax equilibria. These equilibria are in close connection
with the current standard definition of equilibrium in the Markovian context. Furthermore, we
could have also considered strict equilibria as those lax equilibria for which (2.1.13) holds with
ε = 0. While this document was being finalised, we were made aware of the works [137] and [120]
where this last notion of equilibrium, referred there as regular equilibrium, was studied. See once
more Section 2.2.1 for a discussion on how we compare our definition to this and other notions of
equilibria in the literature.
(v) In addition, one could analyse something that we would coin f-equilibria. This corresponds
to considering, for a given increasing right-continuous function f : R?+ −→ R+ with f(`) −→ 0 as
` −→ 0, the criterion
J(t, t, x, ν?)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+` ν?) ≥ −εf(`), for any 0 < ` < `ε.
With this, one could study the optimal speed at which the term on the left-hand side converges to
zero. It is known that provided extra regularity of the action process, f would be in general linear in
`. Nevertheless, as in this work the action processes are only measurable, in general, f needs to be
appropriately chosen, and it need not be linear in `. In the case of strict equilibria, [120, Theorems 1
and 2] state sufficient conditions on the data of the problem for the term on the left hand side in the
above inequality to be a linear (or quadratic) decreasing function of `, respectively. Insights on how
f is related to the dynamics of X can be drawn from [65], where X is a general semi-martingale.
Motivated by the Dambis–Dubins–Schwarz theorem on time-change for continuous martingales, see
[150, Theorem III.4.6], the quadratic variation of the controlled process is exploited to define an
equilibria. See again Section 2.2.1 for more details.
In the rest of the this chapter we fix x ∈ X and study the problem
v(t, x) := J(t, t, x, ν?), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , ν? ∈ E(x). (P)
The previous functional is well-defined for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X and measurable. This follows
from the weak uniqueness assumption.
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Remark 2.1.8. We emphasise that (P) is fundamentally different from the problem of maximising
A(t, x) 3 ν 7−→ J(t, t, x, ν). First, (P) is solved by finding ν? ∈ A(x) and then defining the value
function. This contrasts with the classical formulation of optimal control problems. Second, the
previous maximisation problem will correspond to finding the pre-committed strategy for player t,
i.e. solving an optimal control problem for which dynamic programming does not hold.
In fact, given the sequential nature of G, our definition of equilibrium which compares rewards
on sub-games of the form [t, T ] via coalitions among players [t, t+ `], is compatible with sub-game
perfection. Indeed, to find his best response, Player t reasons as follows: for any τ ∈ [t, t + `ε)
knowing that Players [τ, T ] are following the equilibrium ν?, i.e. the sub-game [τ, T ] is following
the equilibrium, and treating the actions of those players as fixed, the action prescribed by the
equilibrium to Player t is such that he is doing at least as good as in any coalition/deviation ν from
the equilibrium with players t+` ∈ [t, τ), give or take ε`. This allows us to interpret the equilibrium
as Player t’s ε–best response for all sub-games containing [t, T ] via coalitions. Consequently the
equilibrium agrees with an ε–sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Additionally, note that according to our definition, if ν? is an equilibrium action model for
the game [0, T ], by sub-game perfection it is also an equilibrium for [t, T ]. Indeed, this follows
immediately from the fact `ε in Definition 2.1.6 is uniform in t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, we expect the
value of the game to be time-consistent. This feature motivates why these type of solutions are
referred in the literature as consistent plans, see [233].
2.2 Related work and our results
As a preliminary to the presentation of our contributions, this section starts by comparing our
setting with the ones considered in the extant literature.
2.2.1 On the different notions of equilibrium
We now make a few comments on our definition of equilibria, its relevance and compare it with
the ones previously proposed. Let us begin by recalling the set-up adopted by most of the existing
literature in time-inconsistent stochastic control models in continuous time.
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supporting a Brownian motionW is given. Here, FW denotes the P-augmented Brownian filtration.
Let A denote the set of admissible actions and G a (possibly) smaller filtration than FW . For a
G-adapted process ν ∈ A, representing an action process, the state process X is given by the unique
strong solution to the SDE






σs(X0,x0,νs , νs)dWs, for t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.2.1)
As introduced in [82], ν? is then said to be an equilibrium if for all (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A
lim inf
`↘0
J(t, t, x, ν?)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+` ν?)
`
≥ 0.
If we examine closely the above condition, we obtain that for any κ := (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ] × X × A,
ε > 0 and sequence (`n)n∈N ⊆ [0, T ], `n −→ 0, there is a positive integer Nκε such that
∀n ≥ Nκε , J(t, t, x, ν?)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+`n ν?) ≥ −ε`n. (2.2.2)
From (2.2.2) it is clear that the classical definition of equilibrium is an ε-like notion of equilibrium.
Now, ever since its introduction, the distinctive case in which the lim inf is 0 has been noticed. In
fact, a situation in which the agent is worse-off in a sequence of coalitions with future versions of
himself but in the limit is indifferent, conforms with this definition. This case is excluded when ε =
0, i.e. the case of regular equilibria in [120]. We also remark that [120, Section 4] presents several
examples from the existing literature on time-inconsistent control in which a classical equilibria fails
to be a strict equilibria, recall Remark 2.1.7. This is a consequence of the fact that (2.1.13) does
in general depend on (t, x, ν). From these examples one can further show that classical equilibria
fail to be an equilibrium as in Definition 2.1.6.
At this point we want to emphasise the main idea in our approach to time-inconsistent control
for sophisticated agents: any useful definition of equilibrium for a sophisticated agent ought to
lead to a dynamic programming principle. This idea has substantial justification from both the
economical as well as the mathematical perspectives to the problem. Firstly, the idea behind the
reasoning of the sophisticated agent is that he ‘internalises’ his time-inconsistency, so as to design
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a plan that reconciles present and future preferences, i.e. versions of himself. Consequently, this
leads to time-consistent game values under equilibria from which a dynamic programming principle
is expected. Secondly, one expects, and we chose, this to be a direct consequence of the notion of
equilibrium and as such a necessary condition to achieve this is a nice local behaviour. Thus, a
definition with no local features in the windows for ‘negotiation’ prescribed by ` is not amenable
to our analysis of the problem. As we will see in the next section, once a DPP is available, all the
pieces necessary for a complete theory of time-inconsistent non-Markovian stochastic control will
become apparent.
We also mention that the definition proposed in this work is by no means the only definition
complying with the features just described. The notion of strict equilibrium, which is point-wise in
(t, ν) and imposes a sign condition on (2.1.13) leads, under extra assumptions, to the same dynamic
programming principle we obtain for equilibria, see Remark 2.2.5.
We use the rest of this section to address different works in the area.
(i) The inaugural papers on the sophisticated, i.e. game theoretic, approach to inconsistent control
problems are the sequence of papers by Ekeland and Lazrak [80, 81], and Ekeland and Pirvu [82].
In their initial work [80], the authors consider a strong formulation framework, i.e. (2.2.1) and
G = GX denotes the augmented natural filtration of X0,x0,ν , and seek for closed loop, i.e. GX -
measurable, action processes defined via spike perturbations of the form
(a⊗t+` ν)r := a1[t,t+`)(r) + ν(X0,x0,νr )1[t+`,T ](r), (2.2.3)
that maximise the corresponding Hamiltonian. However as already pointed out by Wei, Yong, and
Yu [260], the local comparison is made between a Markovian feedback control, i.e. G = GX and
νr = ν(X0,x0,νr ), and an open-loop control value a, i.e. G = FW , and there is no argument as
to whether admissibility is preserved. The later two works [82] and [81] introduce the definition
of equilibrium via (2.2.2), in which admissibility is defined by progressively measurable open loop
processes with moments of all orders. This last condition is imposed to guarantee uniqueness of
a strong solution to the dynamics of the state process. In our framework we do not need such
condition as the state dynamics hold in the sense of weak solutions.
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(ii) The study in the linear quadratic set-up is carried out by Hu, Jin, and Zhou [135, 136]. There,
the dynamics are stated in strong formulation. To bypass the admissibility issues in [80], [82] and
[81], the class of admissible actions is open loop, i.e. G = FW . Equilibria are defined via (2.2.2) but
contrasting against spike perturbation as in (2.2.3). In [135], the authors obtain a condition which
ensures that an action process is an equilibrium, and in [136] the authors are able to complete
their analysis and provide a sufficient and necessary condition, via a flow of forward-backward
stochastic differential equations. The approach taken to characterise equilibria in both [135] and
[136] leverages on the particular structure of the linear quadratic setting and the admissibility
class. Moreover, the authors are able to prove uniqueness of the equilibrium in the setting of a
mean–variance portfolio selection model in a complete financial market, where the state process is
one-dimensional and the coefficients in the formulation are deterministic. Unlike theirs, our results
require standard Lipschitz assumptions.
(iii) Another sequence of works that has received great attention is by Björk and Murgoci [35] and
Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci [38]. There, the authors approach the problem of inconsistent control
in strong formulation, i.e. (2.2.1), and admissibility is defined by Markovian feedback actions,
i.e. G = GX and νr = ν(X0,x0,νr ). The first of these works deals with the problem in discrete-
time, a scenario in which the classic backward induction algorithm is implemented to obtain an
equilibrium by seeking for a sign on the difference of the pay-offs corresponding to ν? and ν⊗t+` ν?.
In their subsequent paper, the results are extended to a continuous-time setting, implementing the
definition of equilibrium (2.2.2). Their main contribution is to provide a system of PDEs associated
to the problem and provide a verification theorem. Nevertheless, the derivation of such system is
completely formal and, in addition, there is no rigorous argument about the well-posedness of the
system.
(iv) The study of more general dynamics for the state processes X began in Czichowsky [65] where
the mean–variance portfolio selection problem was considered for general semi-martingales. There,
the author developed a time-consistent formulation, based on a local notion of optimality called
local mean–variance efficiency. Namely, given GX , the augmented natural filtration of the semi-






J(ti, ti, x,P, ν)− J(ti, ti, x,P, ν + µ1(ti,ti+1])
E[〈X〉ti+1 − 〈X〉ti |GXti ]
.
With this, given a sequence of increasing partitions (Πn)n∈N, Πn ⊂ [0, T ] with mesh, i.e. ‖Πn‖ :=





n [ν?, ν] ≥ 0.
We highlight how the notion of LMVE serves as a justification as to why the dependence in ` in
(2.2.2) is linear. Clearly extensions of our results to more general state processes would call for such
considerations to be taken into account, via the study of f -equilibria, as mentioned in Remark 2.1.7.
(v) A different setting is taken in Wei, Yong, and Yu [260] and Wang and Yong [245], see ref-
erences therein too. Both works study a time-inconsistent recursive optimal control problem in
strong formulation setting, i.e. (2.2.1), in which the class of admissible actions are Markovian
feedback, i.e. G = GX and νr = νr(X0,x0,νr ). The motivation is the following: when J̃(t;x0, ν) :=
EP[e−λ(T−t)ξ(X0,x0,νT )|Gt], it is known that J̃(t;x0, ν) = Yt, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., where the pair (Y,Z)
solves the BSDE dYt = −λYtdt+ZtdXt, YT = ξ(X0,x0,νT ). In other words, in the case of exponential
discounting, the generator of the BSDE representing the reward functional depends (linearly) on
the Y term of the solution (Y,Z). Therefore, [260] studies the natural extension to a general time-
inconsistent recursive utility problem. An equilibrium is defined as the unique continuous solution
to a forward–backward system that describes the controlled state process and the reward function-
als of the players, and satisfy a local approximate optimality property. More precisely, u is the limit
of a sequence of locally optimal controls at discrete times. Such property builds upon the known
fact, see [35], that in discrete-time, equilibria are optimal given the best response of subsequent
players. We highlight that in addition to a verification theorem, the authors are able to prove
well-posedness of their system in the uncontrolled volatility scenario. However, we do not think
their definition of an equilibrium is tractable in theory or practice. The definition is lengthy enough
to fit a whole page, making the overall definition quite hindered and hard to check in practice. We
believe this is due to the fact that their approach relies heavily on the approximation of the solution
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to the continuous game by discretised problems, and requires the equilibrium to be continuous in
time, as opposed to mere measurability which is the case for us, see Equation (2.1.10). Overall, we
feel it might send the wrong impression and make the sophisticated approach to time-inconsistent
stochastic control problems look somehow excessively cumbersome and convoluted to deal with.
We believe the approach taken in this work makes a good case to show the opposite. We also would
like to mention [245] which, building upon the ideas in [260], modelled the reward functional by a
BSVIE and look for a time-consistent locally near optimal equilibrium strategy. The authors are
able to extend the results of the previous paper, but more importantly, they argue that a BSVIE is
a more suitable way to represent a recursive reward functional with non-exponential discounting.
On this matter, we highlight that in our approach, (H) allows us to identify as well a BSVIE, see
Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.10.3.
(vi) Other recent works on this subject are Huang and Zhou [137] and He and Jiang [120]. The
first article considers an infinite-horizon stochastic control problem in which the agent can control
the generator of a time-homogeneous, continuous-time, finite-state Markov chain at each time. The
authors begin by introducing two variations of the notion of lax equilibria, referred there as strong
and weak equilibria. Exploiting the structure on their dynamics, and in particular by computing
an expansion of the reward at a given equilibria, they derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
both notions of equilibria. Moreover, under compactness of the set of admissible actions, existence
of an equilibria is proved. In the second work, motivated by the missing steps in [38] and working in
the same framework, i.e. strong formulation (2.2.1), and Markovian feedback actions, i.e. G = GX
and νr = ν(X0,x0,νr ), the authors ‘perform the analysis of the derivation of the system posed in
[38], i.e. lay down sufficient conditions under which the value function satisfies the system’. In
addition to their analysis, the authors introduce two new notions of equilibria, regular and strong
equilibria. Regular equilibria compare rewards in (2.1.13) with feasible actions different from ν? at
t, and strong equilibria allow comparisons with any feasible actions. These notions correspond to
pointwise versions of our notion of equilibrium with ε = 0, see Remark 2.1.7. By requiring extra
regularity on the actions, the authors provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy
to be a regular or a strong equilibria. It is our opinion that our definition of equilibrium is both
natural and advantageous compared to their setting, as it allows to derive an extended DPP which
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in turn naturally links the value function to an appropriate system of equations. Moreover, even
though their notion of equilibrium is a variation of ours, an extended DPP can be also be obtained,
but extra requirements are necessary, see Remark 2.2.5. Finally, we mention that even though [120]
succeeds in characterising regular equilibria, the conditions under which such results hold are, as
expected, quite stringent, requiring for instance that the optimal action is differentiable in time
and with derivatives of polynomial growth.
We emphasise that in our setting the dynamics of the state process are non-Markovian, and
the class of admissible actions is ‘closed loop’1 and non-Markovian, i.e. FX -adapted see Sec-
tion 2.1.1, both being novelties of this work. Additionally, another novelty of our treatment of
time-inconsistent control problems is our weak formulation set-up. which is an extension on all the
previous works in the subject. See Zhang [273, Section 4.5] for a presentation of weak formulation
in optimal stochastic control and [64] for an application in contract theory in which both features
are essential.
The remaining of this section is devoted to present the main results of this chapter.
2.2.2 Dynamic programming principle
Our first main result for the study of time-inconsistent stochastic control problems for soph-
isticated agents, Theorem 2.2.2, concerns the local behaviour of the value function v as defined in
(P). This result is the first of its kind in a continuous-time setting and it is the major milestone for
a complete theory. This result confirms the intuition drawn from the behaviour of a sophisticated
agent, in the sense that v does indeed satisfy a dynamic programming principle. In fact, it can be
regarded as an extended one, as it does reduce to the classic result known in optimal stochastic
control in the case of exponential discounting, see Remark 2.5.5. This result requires the following
main assumptions.
Assumption A. (i) The map s 7−→ ξ(s, x) (resp. s 7−→ ft(s, x, a)) is continuously differentiable
uniformly in x (resp. in (t, x, a)), and we denote its derivative by ∂sξ(s, x) (resp. ∂sft(s, x, a)).
1This is not a closed-loop formulation per se, as our controls are allowed to be adapted as well to the information
generated by the canonical process Λ.
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(ii) a 7−→ ft(s, x, a) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. ∃C > 0, s.t. ∀(s, t, x, a, a′) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×
X ×A2,
∣∣ft(s, x, a)− ft(s, x, a′)∣∣ ≤ C|a− a′|.
(iii) (a) x 7−→ ξ(t, x) is lower-semicontinuous uniformly in t, i.e. ∀(x̃, ε) ∈ X × R?+, ∃Ux̃ ∈
T∞, x̃ ∈ Ux̃, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Ux̃,
ξ(t, x) ≥ ξ(t, x0)− ε, when ξ(t, x0) > −∞.
(b) x 7−→ (b, σ)(t, x, a) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. ∃C > 0, s.t. ∀(t, x, x′, a) ∈ [0, T ]×
X 2 ×A,
|bt(x, a)− bt(x′, a)|+ |σt(x, a)− σt(x′, a)| ≤ C‖x·∧t − x′·∧t‖∞.
Remark 2.2.1. Let us comment on the above assumptions. As it will be clear from our analysis in
Section 2.5 and Section 2.7, to study time-inconsistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated
agents under our notion of equilibrium, one needs to make sense of a system. The fact that we
get such a system should be compared to the classical stochastic control framework, where only one
BSDE suffices to characterise the value function and the optimal control, see [273, Section 4.5].
Consequently, Assumption A.(i) and Assumption A.(ii) are fairly mild requirements in order
to understand the behaviour of the reward functionals on the agent’s type, which is the source of
inconsistency. We also remark that Assumption A.(i) guarantees that the map t 7−→ ft(t, x, a) is
continuous, uniformly in (x, a), which ensures extra regularity in type and time for the player’s
running rewards. Lastly, given our approach and our choice to not impose regularity on the action
process, in order to get a rigorous dynamic programming principle, we cannot escape imposing
extra assumptions. Namely, if we do not want to assume that t 7−→ νt(X) is continuous, we have
to impose regularity in x, which is exactly what Assumption A.(iii) does. This allows us to use
the result in [86] regarding piece-wise constant approximations of stochastic control problems. We
believe our choice is the least stringent and it is clearly much weaker than any regularity assumptions
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made in the existing literature, see [35], [260], [120]. For details see the discussion after (2.5.3) and
Remark 2.5.3.
Our dynamic programming principle takes the following form.
Theorem 2.2.2. Let Assumption A hold, and ν? ∈ E(x). For {σ, τ} ⊆ Tt,T , σ ≤ τ and
P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , we have





















Moreover, ν? attains the sup.
Remark 2.2.3. (i) In light of Theorem 2.2.2 we are led to consider a system consisting of a second
order BSDE (2BSDE for short) and a infinite dimensional collection of processes in order to solve
Problem (P). This will be the object of the next section. As a by-product, we recover below a
connection already mentioned in [37, Proposition 8.1] between time-inconsistent control problems
and optimal stochastic control problems in a Markovian setting. In words, it says that given an
equilibrium for a time-inconsistent stochastic control problem, it is possible to associate a classical
time-consistent optimal stochastic control problem which attains the same value.
(ii) We emphasize that Theorem 2.2.2 is a direct consequence of Definition 2.1.6. Moreover, it
differs from [37, Proposition 8.1] in that the latter argues via the PDE (2.2.9). In fact, the result
in [37] is obtained assuming a solution exists and it is in the spirit of the Feynman–Kac represent-
ation formula. This would be analogous to us assuming a solution to the 2BSDE in the proof of
Theorem 2.2.2 which, among other things, would automatically rule out the possibility to prove the
necessity of the 2BSDE, i.e. that any equilibria prescribes a solution to such system. In our prob-
abilistic framework, the proof of Theorem 2.2.2 will ultimately allow us to bypass this and establish
the necessity result.
(iii) We also point out that even for classic optimal control in discrete time proving a DPP in
fairly general settings is a very difficult task because of crucial measurability issues, see for instance
Bertsekas and Shreve [25, Section 1.2].
(iv) Lastly, we mention that the extend to which this result holds true goes beyond the type of
67
reward functionals considered in this chapter. Indeed, in Section 2.4 (resp. Chapter 5) we consider
a broader class of time-inconsistent rewards, namely those with mean–variance type of rewards
(resp. those given by standard type-I BSVIEs).
Corollary 2.2.4. Let Assumption A hold, and ν? ∈ E(x). There exists a time-consistent stochastic
control problem with the same value v, for which ν? prescribes an optimal control. Namely let










Then, for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X






kr(X, νr)dr + ξ(T,X·∧T )
]
.
Remark 2.2.5. (i) For the purposes of this work, this is as much as we can gain from this last
result as it requires knowing the equilibrium strategy a priori, since the functional k does depend
on ν?. This is obviously of little practical use as it was already mentioned in [38, Proposition 8.1].
Nevertheless, as a direct consequence of Theorem 2.2.2, we are led to consider a system consisting
of a second order BSDE and a infinite dimensional collection of processes in order to solve Problem
(P), which will be the object of the next section.
(ii) We remark that all the results in this section are true for strict equilibria, provided there is
more control of `ε,t,ν , see Remark 2.1.7 and Remark 2.5.4. Namely, it suffices, for instance, to have




2.2.3 BSDE system associated to (P)
Let us introduce the functionals needed to state the rest of our results. As in the classical
theory of optimal control, we introduce the Hamiltonian operator associated to this problem. For
(s, t, x, z, γ,Σ, u, v, a) ∈ [0, T )2 ×X × Rd × Sd(R)× Sd(R)× R× Rd ×A, let








Ht(x, z, γ, u) := sup
a∈A
{
ht(t, x, z, γ, a)
}
− u.
Following the approach of Soner, Touzi, and Zhang [230], we introduce the range of our squared
diffusions coefficient and the inverse map which assigns to every squared diffusion the corresponding
set of generating actions
Σt(x) :=
{
Σt(x, a) ∈ Sd(R) : a ∈ A
}
, where Σt(x, a) := (σσ>)t(x, a),
At(x,Σ) :=
{
a ∈ A : (σσ>)t(x, a) = Σ
}
, Σ ∈ Σt(x).
The previous definitions allow us to isolate the partial maximisation with respect to the squared
diffusion. Let
ht(s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)>z,
∇ht(s, x, v, a) := ∂sft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)>v,
Ft(x, z,Σ, u) := sup
a∈At(x,Σ)
{
ht(t, x, z, a)
}
− u.
With this, 2H = (−2F )∗ is the covex conjugate of −2F , i.e.
Ht(x, z, γ, u) = sup
Σ∈Σt(x)
{





Moreover, we assume there exists a unique A-valued Borel-measurable map V?(t, x, z) satisfying2
[0, T ]×X × Rd 3 (t, x, z) 7−→ V?(t, x, z) ∈ arg max
a∈At(x,σ̂2t (x))
ht(t, x, z, a). (2.2.5)
In the most general setting for (P) considered in this chapter, where control on both the drift
and the volatility are allowed, to ξ, ∂sξ, ∂sf , and F as above, we associate the system
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dKPr , t ∈ [0, T ], P(x)–q.s.,









, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω.
(H)
2The existence of such mapping is guaranteed by Schäl [221, Theorem 3] in the case of A bounded and a 7→
ht(t, x, z, γ, a) Lipschitz for every (t, x, z, γ) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rd × Sd(R)
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where Pν? ∈ P(x) with ν?t := V?(t,X,Zt) ∈ A(x).
If only drift control is allowed, i.e. σt(x) := σt(x, a) for all a ∈ A, the weak uniqueness
assumption for (2.1.7) implies P(x) = {P}. Letting
hot (s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x)>z, ∇hot (s, x, z, a) := ∂sft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x)>z,
Hot (x, z, u) := sup
a∈A
{hot (t, x, z, a)} − u,
we show, see Proposition 2.9.1, that (H) reduces to the system, which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds
P–a.s., for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t




∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t





Though BSDEs have been previously incorporated in the formulation and analysis of control prob-
lems which are time-inconsistent, the kind of systems of BSDEs prescribed by (H) and (Ho) are new
in the literature. Indeed, in [82] an auxiliary family of BSDEs was introduced in order to argue, in
combination with the stochastic maximum principle, that a given action process complies with the
definition of equilibrium (2.2.2). This was a reasonable line of arguments as we recall at the time
no verification theorem was available. More recently, [245] studied the case in which the reward
functional is represented by a type-I BSVIEs, a generalisation of the concept of BSDEs. In fact,
[245] argues that when the running cost rate and the terminal cost are time dependent, then the
reward functional does satisfy a BSVIE. As it happens, in order to conduct our analysis of (Ho),
we also identify a link to such type of equations, namely we obtained that the process (∂Y tt )t∈[0,T ]
satisfies a type-I BSVIE, see Lemmata 2.8.2 and 2.8.3.
In the general case, the first equation in (H) defines a 2BSDE, whereas the second defines an
infinite dimensional family of processes, (∂Y s)0≤s≤T , each of which admits a BSDE representation.
We chose to introduce such processes via the family (Pν?t,x)(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X , since in the first equation
one needs an object defined on the support of every P ∈ P(x). We recall that when the volatility
is controlled, the supports of the measures in P(x) may be disjoint, whereas in the drift case, the
support is always the same. Had we chosen to introduce the BSDE representation, we would have
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obtained an object defined only on the support of Pν
?
. Moreover, as we work with non-dominated
probabilities measures, this last choice would not have been consistent with our extended DPP, nor
would have sufficed to obtain the rest of our results.
The novel features of system (H) mentioned above raise several theoretical challenges. At
the core of such system is the coupling arising from the appearance of ∂Y tt , the diagonal process
prescribed by the infinite dimensional family (∂Y s)0≤s≤T , in the first equation and of Z in the
definition of the family. This makes any standard results available in the literature immediately
inoperative. Therefore, the natural questions of stating sufficient conditions under which well-
posedness holds, i.e. existence and uniqueness of a solution, needed to be addressed. Of course
part of these duties consists of determining in what sense such a solution exists, see Definition 2.2.7
and Definition 2.2.13 for the general case and the drift control case, respectively. Answers to
well-posedness of (Ho), i.e. when only drift control is allowed are part of our, rather technical,
Section 2.2.6.
We now introduce the concept of solution of a 2BSDE which we will use to state the definition




P′ ∈ P(t, x) : P′ = P on Gr
}
. (2.2.6)
We will write Px(r,P,G) for P0,x(r,P,G). We postpone to Section 2.6 the definition of the spaces
involved in the following definitions.
Definition 2.2.6. For a given process (∂Y tt )t∈[0.T ], consider the equation
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −KPt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.2.7)
We say (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x)) is a solution to 2BSDE (2.2.7) under P(x) if for some p > 1
(i) Equation (2.2.7) holds P(x)–q.s.;
















(iii) the family (KP)P∈P(x) satisfies the minimality condition









∣∣FX,P′t+ ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s., ∀P ∈ P(x). (2.2.8)
We now state our definition of a solution to (H).





is a solution to the 2BSDE in (H) under P(x);













∣∣∣FX,Pν?t+ ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Pν?–a.s.
An immediate result about system (H) is that it is indeed a generalisation of the system of
PDEs given in [35] in the Markovian framework. This builds upon the fact second-order, parabolic,
fully nonlinear PDEs of HJB type admit a non-linear Feynman–Kac representation formula.
Theorem 2.2.8. Consider the Markovian setting, i.e. ψt(X, ·) = ψt(Xt, ·) for ψ = b, σ, f, ∂sf , and,
ψ(s,X) = ψ(s,XT ) for ψ = ∂sξ, ξ. Assume that
(i) there exists a unique A-valued Borel-measurable map V?(t, x, z, γ) satisfying
[0, T ]×X × Rd × Sd(R) 3 (t, x, z, γ) 7−→ V
?(t, x, z, γ) ∈ arg max
a∈A
{
ht(t, x, z, γ, a)
}
;
(ii) for (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × [0, T ] × Rd := O, there exists (v(t, x), J(s, t, x)) ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) ×
C1,1,2([0, T ]2 × Rd) classical solution to the system3

∂tV (t, x) +H(t, x, ∂xV (t, x), ∂xxV (t, x), ∂sJ (t, t, x)) = 0, (s, t, x) ∈ O,
∂tJ s(t, x) + hs(t, x, ∂xJ s(t, x), ∂xxJ s(t, x), ν?(t, x)) = 0, (s, t, x) ∈ O,
V (T, x) = ξ(T, x), J s(T, x) = ξ(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd.
(2.2.9)
3Following [35], for a function (s, ·) 7−→ ϕ(s, ·), ϕs(·), stresses that the s coordinate is fixed.
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where ν?(t, x) := V?(t, x, ∂xV (t, x), ∂xxV (t, x)).
(iii) v, ∂xv, J , ∂xJ and f(s, t, x) := f(s, t, x, ν?(t, x)) have uniform exponential growth in x4, i.e.
∃C > 0, ∀(s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 × Rd,
|v(t, x)|+ |∂xv(t, x)|+ |J(s, t, x)|+ |∂xJ(s, t, x)|+ |f(s, t, x)| ≤ C exp(C|x|1),
Then, a solution to the 2BSDE in (H) is given by
Yt := v(t,Xt), Zt := ∂xv(t,Xt), Kt :=
∫ t
0
krdr, ∂Y st := ∂sJs(t,Xt),
where kt := H(t,Xt, Zt,Γt, ∂Y tt )−Ft(Xt, Zt, σ̂2t , ∂Y tt )− 12Tr[σ̂
2
t Γt] and Γt := ∂xxv(t,Xt). Moreover,
if for ν?t := V
?(t,Xt, Zt,Γt) there exists P? ∈ P(x, ν?), then (Y,Z,K, ∂Y ) and ν? are a solution to
(H).
Remark 2.2.9. We highlight the assumption on P(x, ν?) is satisfied, for instance, if the map
x 7−→ σσ>t (x, ν?(t, x)) is continuous for every t, see [232, Theorem 6.1.6]. Note that the latter is a
property of (2.2.9) itself. In addition, we also remark that under the assumptions in the verification
theorem in [34, Theorem 5.2], it is immediate that (H) admits a solution.
The next sub-sections present the remaining of our results. The first of them is about the
necessity of our system. We show that given an equilibrium and the associated game value function,
one can construct a solution to (H). The second result is about the sufficiency of our system, i.e.
a verification result. In words, it says that from a solution to (H) one can recover an equilibrium.
Our last result is about the well-posedness of the system (H) when volatility control is forbidden.
2.2.4 Necessity of (H)
The next result, familiar to those acquainted with the literature on optimal stochastic control,
is new in the context of time-inconsistent control problems for sophisticated agents. Up until now,
the study of such problems, regardless of the notion of equilibrium considered, remained limited
to a verification argument, and the study of multiplicity of equilibria. Ever since the work of [38,




Section 5], it had been conjectured that, in a Markovian setting, given an equilibrium ν? and its
value function v, the latter would satisfy the associated system of PDEs (2.2.9), and ν? would attain
the supremum in the associated Hamiltonian. Nevertheless, according to [38] this remained an open
and difficult problem. Fortunately, capitalising on the DPP satisfied by any equilibrium and our
probabilistic approach, we are able to present a proof of this claim in a general non-Markovian
setting.





|ξ(T,X)|p + |∂sξ(s,X)|p +
∫ T
t
|Fr(X, 0, σ̂2r , 0)|p + |∂sfr(s,X, ν?r )|pdr
]
<∞.
(ii) Rd 3 z 7−→ Ft(x, z,Σ, u) is Lipschitz-continuous, uniformly in (t, x,Σ, u), i.e. ∃C > 0, s.t.
∀(t, x,Σ, u, z, z′) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Σt(x)× R× Rd × Rd,
|Ft(x, z,Σ, u)− Ft(x, z′,Σ, u)| ≤ C|Σ1/2(z − z′)|.
(iii) Rd 3 z 7−→ V?(t, x, z) ∈ A is Lipschitz-continuous, uniformly in (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , i.e. ∃C > 0
s.t. ∀(t, x, z, z′) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rd × Rd,
∣∣V?(t, x, z)− V?(t, x, z′)∣∣ ≤ C|z − z′|.
Theorem 2.2.10 (Necessity). Let Assumption A and Assumption B hold. Given ν? ∈ E(x), one
can construct (Y,Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) solution to (H), such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)–q.e. x ∈
X







Moreover, ν? satisfies Definition 2.2.7.(iii), i.e. ν? is a maximiser of the Hamiltonian.
Remark 2.2.11. (i) We stress that in light of Theorem 2.2.10, every equilibrium must necessarily
maximise the Hamiltonian associated to (P). This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time
such a statement is rigorously justified in the framework of time-inconsistent control problems at
the level of generality of this paper.
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(ii) Even for Markovian time-consistent control problems, we recall that necessity results are quite
technical and typically require the theory of viscosity solutions, see Fleming and Soner [99]. To
appreciate the scope of Theorem 2.2.10, we recall that Markovian BSDEs (resp. 2BSDEs) coincide
with viscosity (resp. Sobolev type) solutions of PDEs (resp. path dependent PDEs), see [273,
Theorem 5.5.8] (resp. [273, Proposition 11.3.8]) .
(iii) We also comment on [173, Theorem 3.11] which states that given a regular equilibria, see
[173, Definition 3.7], one can define a classic solution the PDE system in [38], i.e. (2.2.9). In the
Markovian setting of [173], regular equilibria render, by definition, smooth classic solutions to the
value function and the decoupled pay-off functionals. Not surprisingly, one can construct a classic
solution to (2.2.9) by means of Itô’s formula. However, even for time-consistent problems this
assumption rarely holds. Moreover, regular equilibria, which are feedback Markovian, are a priori
required to be continuous. This contrast with our non-Markovian framework and the fact that we
take admissible actions and equilibria to be, in general, measurable.
2.2.5 Verification
As is commonplace for control problems, we are able to prove the sufficiency of our system.
Indeed, our notion of equilibrium is captured by solutions to System (H). Our result is not the first
of its kind, though our framework allows us to state a fairly simple proof with clear arguments.
For instance, [35, Theorem 6.3] is stated to be a direct consequence of the simpler case of a state
dependant final reward functional plus a non-linear functional of a conditional expectation of the
final state value, but no proof is presented. Also, the proof of [260, Theorem 6.2] requires laborious
arguments, as a consequence of the notion of equilibrium considered, and relies heavily on PDE
arguments. Our theorem requires the following set of assumptions.





|ξ(T,X)|p + |∂sξ(s,X)|p +
∫ T
t
|Fr(X, 0, σ̂2r , 0)|p + |∂sfr(s,X, ν?r )|pdr
]
<∞;
(ii) s 7−→ ξ(s, x) (resp. s 7−→ ft(s, x, a)) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x (resp. in
(t, x, a));
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(iii) x 7−→ Φ(r, x) := ∂sξ(r, x) +
∫ T
r ∂sfu(r, x, a)du is continuous in x.
Theorem 2.2.12 (Verification). Let Assumption C hold. Let (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) be a solution
to (H) as in Definition 2.2.7 with ν?t := V?(t,Xt, Zt). Then, ν? ∈ E(x) and for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X







We stress that together, Theorem 2.2.10 and Theorem 2.2.12 imply that System (H) is funda-
mental for the study of time-consistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated agents.
2.2.6 Well-posedness
Our analysis would not be complete without a well-posedness result. The well-posedness result
we present is limited to the drift control case, see Section 2.9. In this framework, there is a unique
weak solution to (2.1.7) which we will denote by P. In the context of PDEs, under a different
and stronger notion of equilibrium, a well-posedness result for the corresponding system of PDEs
was given in [260]. Nonetheless, as we present a probabilistic argument as opposed to an analytic
one, our proof makes substantial improvements in both weakening the assumptions as well as the
presentation and readability of the arguments. We state next our definition of a solution to (Ho).
Definition 2.2.13. The pairs (Y, Z), and (∂Y, ∂Z) are a solution to the system (Ho) if for some
p > 1
(i) (Y, Z) ∈ Spx(FX,P+ )×H
p
x(FX,P+ , X) satisfy the first equation in (Ho) P–a.s.;
(ii) (∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ Sp,2x (FX,P+ )×H
p,2
x (FX,P+ , X) and for every s ∈ [0, T ], (∂Y s, ∂Zs) satisfies the second
equation in (Ho) P–a.s.;
(iii) there exists ν? ∈ A(x) such that
Hot (X,Zt, ∂Y tt ) = hot (t,X, Zt, ∂Y tt , ν?t ) dt⊗ dP–a.e. on [0, T ]×X .
Our well-posedness result in the uncontrolled volatility case is subject to the following assump-
tion.
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Assumption D. (i) σt(x) := σt(x, a) for any a ∈ A, i.e. the volatility is not controlled;
(ii) s 7−→ ξ(s, x) (resp. s 7−→ ft(s, x, a)) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x (resp. in
(t, x, a));
(iii) z 7−→ Hot (x, z, u) is Lipschitz-continuous, uniformly in (t, x, u), i.e. ∃C > 0, s.t. ∀(t, x, u,
z, z′) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× Rd × Rd,
|Hot (x, z, u)−Hot (x, z′, u)| ≤ C|σt(x)1/2(z − z′)|;
(iv) z 7−→ V?(t, x, z) ∈ A is Lipschitz-continuous, uniformly in (t, x), i.e. ∃C > 0, s.t. ∀(t, x,
z, z′) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rd × Rd,
∣∣V?(t, x, z)− V?(t, x, z′)∣∣ ≤ C|σt(x)1/2(z − z′)|;
(v) (z, a) 7−→ ∂hot (s, x, a) is Lipschitz-continuous, uniformly in (s, t, x), i.e. ∃C > 0 s.t. ∀(s, t, x,
z, z′, a, a′) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X × Rd × Rd ×A2
|∇hot (s, x, z, a)−∇hot (s, x, z′, a′)| ≤ C(|σt(x)1/2(z − z′)|+ |a− a′|);
(vi) there exists p > 1 such that for any (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X
EP
[∣∣ξ(T,X)∣∣p + ∫ T
t
∣∣Hot (x, 0, 0)∣∣pdr]+ EP[∣∣∂sξ(s,X)∣∣p + ∫ T
t
∣∣∇hot (s, x, 0, 0)∣∣pdr] <∞.
Remark 2.2.14. We would like to comment on the previous set of assumptions. We will follow
a classic fix point argument to get the well-posedness of System (Ho), thus Assumption D consists
of a tailor-made version of the classic requirements to get a contraction in a Lipschitz context.
Conditions (iii), (iv) and (v) will guarantee the Lipschitz property of the drivers. Condition (ii)
will be exploited to control the coupling between the two BSDEs.
The technical but simple results regarding well-posedness are deferred to Chapter 3. In fact, we
are able to establish a well-posedness result for a more general class of systems, see System (S) for
which we allow for orthogonal martingales. Moreover, we stress that coupled systems as the ones
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considered in this work, where the coupling is via an uncountable family of BSDEs, have not been
considered before in the literature.
Theorem 2.2.15 (Wellposedness). Let Assumption D hold with p = 2. There exists a unique
solution, in the sense of Definition 2.2.13, to (Ho) with p = 2.
We would like to mention here that the assumption p = 2 is by no means crucial in our analysis
and our results hold in the general case p > 1, a fact that should be clear to our readers familiar
with the theory of BSDEs. Nevertheless, hoping to keep our arguments simple and to not drown
them in additional unnecessary technicalities, we have opted to present the case p = 2 only. In this
case, it is easier to distinguish between the essential ideas behind our assumptions, and how they
work into the probabilistic framework we propose for the study of (P) and (Ho).
2.3 Example: optimal investment
We consider the following non-exponential discounting framework
ξ(s, x) = ϕ(T − s)ξ̃(x), ft(s, x, a) = ϕ(t− s)f̃t(x, a), (t, s, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A,
where ξ̃ is a Borel-map, and
f̃ : [0, T ]×X ×A −→ R, Borel, with f̃·(·, a) FX -optional for any a ∈ A,
and
ϕ : [0, T ] −→ R, non-negative, differentiable, with ϕ(0) = 1.
Let us assume in addition d = m = 1, A = R?+ × R?+ and a Markovian framework. We define
an action process ν as a 2-dimensional FX -adapted process (αt(Xt), ct(Xt))t∈[0,T ] with exponential
moments of all orders bounded by some arbitrary large constant M . We let σt(Xt, νt) := αt(Xt),
bt(Xt, νt) := β + α−1t (Xt)(rXt − ct(Xt)). Consequently, for M = (P, ν) ∈M(s, x), with M(s, x) =
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{(P, ν) ∈ Prob(Ω)×A(s, x,P)}
dXs,x,νt = αt
(
β + α−1t (rXt − ct)dt+ dWMt
)
, Pν–a.s.




1− η , η ∈ (0, 1),
log(x), η = 1,
so that
J(s, t, x, ν) = EP
ν
[






This model, studied for specific cases of U and ϕ in [82] and [37], represents an agent who
is seeking to find investment and consumption plans, in cash value, α and c respectively, which
determine the wealth process X. he derives utility only from consumption. At time s, the present
utility from consumption at time r is discounted according to ϕ(r− s). Here, we present a solution
based on the verification theorem introduced in this chapter. The system (H) is defined by
Yt = U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(Xr, Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −KPt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)–q.s.,




∂sϕ(T − s)U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
∂sϕ(r − s)U(c?(r,Xr, Zr))dr
]
, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω,
where for (t, x, z, γ,Σ) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× R× R?+
Ft(x, z,Σ, u) = sup
(c,α)∈R?+×{α2=Σ}
{
(rx+ βα− c)z + U(c)
}
− u,
Ht(x, z, γ) = sup
Σ∈R?+
{





Proposition 2.3.1. Let (Y,Z,K) and ν? be given by
Yt := a(t)U(Xt) + b(t), Zt := a(t)X−ηt , Kt :=
∫ t
0









t Γt], Γt := −ηa(t)X
−(1+η)
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
∂Y s is defined as above, and a(t) and b(t) as in Section 2.10.1, which we assume has a unique and
continuous solution. Then, there exists P? ∈ P(x, ν?), (Y,Z,K, ∂Y ) define a solution to (H) and
(P?, ν?) is an equilibrium model. Moreover
dXt = Xt
((






, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Pν
?
–a.s.
Proof. By computing the Hamiltonian, we obtain (c?(t, x, z), α?(t, x, z, γ)) := (z−
1
η , |βzγ−1|) define
the maximisers in F and H respectively. Therefore, in this setting, the 2BDE in (H) can be
rewritten for any P ∈ P(x). Indeed, P–a.s. for t ∈ [0, T ] we have that




Zr(rXr + βσ̂r − Z
− 1
η
r ) + U(Z
− 1
η





Zr · dXr +KPT −KPt .
Moreover, taking Y,Z andK as in the statement we obtain ν?t := (α?t , c?t ) = (βη−1Xt, a(t)
− 1
ηXt),
t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that the map (t, x, z, u) 7−→ Ft(x, z,Σ, u) is clearly continuous for fixed Σ and
that the processes X,Y, Z and Γ are continuous in time for fixed ω. This yields, as in the proof
of Theorem 2.2.8, that the process K satisfies the minimality condition under every P ∈ P(x).
Moreover, note that x 7−→ α?t (x) is continuous for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, there exists Pν
? ∈
A(x, ν?) such that
dXt = Xt
((






, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Pν
?
–a.s.
Moreover, we may find a(t) and b(t) given as in Section 2.10.1 so that for any P ∈ P(x)
Yt = U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
hr(r,Xr, a(r)X−ηr , a(t)
− 1
ηXt)− ∂Y rr dr −
∫ T
t
a(r)X−ηr · dXr +KT −Kt,
= U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(Xr, Xr, a(r)X−ηr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
a(r)X−ηr · dXr +KT −Kt,




We are left to argue the integrability of Y, Z,K. This follows as in the proof of Theorem 2.2.8 as the
uniform exponential growth assumption is satisfied, since a(t) and b(t) are by assumption continuous
on [0, T ]. The integrability follows as the action processes are assumed to have exponential moments
of all orders bounded by M . With this we obtained that (Y,Z,K) is a solution to the 2BSDE in
(H). The integrability of ∂Y is argued as in the proof of (2.2.10).
2.4 Extensions of our results
We use this section to present some extensions of our results to more general classes of pay-off
functionals. This is motivated by [37, Section 7.4]. We present the corresponding results and defer
their proofs to Section 2.10.2. We emphasise that the formulation of the dynamics of the controlled
process X remains as in Section 2.1.2. We will consider
f : [0, T ]×X −→ R, Borel-measurable, with f·(·) FX -optional; g : X −→ R, Borel-measurable;
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ R, Borel-measurable; G : [0, T ]× R −→ R, Borel-measurable,
f : [0, T ]2 ×X × R×A −→ R, Borel-measurable, with f·(s, n, ·, a) FX -optional,
for any (s, n, a) ∈ [0, T ]× R×A, and define for (s, t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A(t, x)






















As a motivation for the consideration for this kind of pay-off functionals, notice that the presence
of the term G(s,EP
ν
t,x [g(x)]) allows, for example, to include classic mean–variance models into the
analysis. In order to present the corresponding DPP in this framework we need to adapt the
notation and assumptions that led to it.
We will continue to use the convention ∂2nnft(s, x,n, a) := ∂
2
∂n2 ft(s, x,n, a) to denote the respect-
ive derivatives. Let ν? ∈ E(x) and define






, N s,?t (x) := EP
ν?
s,x [ft(X·∧t)], (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X .
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We emphasise that N defines an infinite family of processes, when considered as functions
of s, one for every t ∈ [0, T ]. We also recall that under the weak uniqueness assumption, both
processes are well–defined. Moreover, we know that the application (t, x) 7−→ Pν?t,x is measurable
and continuous for the weak topology, see [232, Corollary 6.3.3] and the preceding comments.
To be able to extend our results, we work under the following set of assumptions.
Assumption E. (i) s 7−→ ξ(s, x) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x.(s,m) 7−→ G(s,m)
belongs to C1,2([0, T ]×R,R) with spatial derivatives Lipschitz-continuous uniformly in s. (s, n) 7−→
ft(s, x,n, a) belongs to C1,2([0, T ]×R,R) with spatial derivatives Lipschitz-continuous uniformly in
(s, t, x, a).
(ii) ft(s, x,n, a) = f̃t(s, x, a) + f̂t(s, n) for an FX-optional (resp. deterministic) mapping f̃ (resp.
f̂). The mappings x 7−→ ft(x), t 7−→ ft(x), and x 7−→ g(x) are continuous uniformly in the other
variables.
(iii) ∃C > 0, ρ : (0,∞) −→ [0,∞), ρ(|`|) −→ 0, ` −→ 0, such that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , ν ∈
A(t, x), t ≤ t′ ≤ r ≤ T ,
EP
ν
[∣∣∣EPνt,· [N t′,?r ]−N t,?r ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣EPνt,· [M?t′ ]−M?t ∣∣∣2] ≤ C|t′ − t|ρ(|t′ − t|).
(iv) a 7−→ ft(s, x, a) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. ∃C > 0, ∀(s, t, x, a, a′) ∈ [0, T ]2×X×A2,
∣∣ft(s, x, a)− ft(s, x, a′)∣∣ ≤ C|a− a′|.
(v) (a) x 7−→ ξ(t, x) is lower-semicontinuous uniformly in t, i.e. ∀(x̃, ε) ∈ X × R?+, ∃Ux̃ ∈
T∞, x̃ ∈ Ux̃, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Ux̃,
ξ(t, x) ≥ ξ(t, x0)− ε, when ξ(t, x0) > −∞.
(b) x 7−→ (b, σ)(t, x, a) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e. ∃C > 0, s.t. ∀(t, x, x′, a) ∈ [0, T ]×
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X 2 ×A,
|bt(x, a)− bt(x′, a)|+ |σt(x, a)− σt(x′, a)| ≤ C‖x·∧t − x′·∧t‖∞.
Remark 2.4.1. We would like to comment on the previous set of assumptions. The extensions of
our previous set of assumptions correspond to (i), (iv) and (v). In addition, the reader might have
noticed the assumptions imposed on f , f and g in Assumption E.(ii) and Assumption E.(iii).
The condition of f basically disentangles the randomness coming from X·∧r and EP
ν
s,x [fr(X·∧r)].
This helps us bypass some measurability issues arising from the interaction between these two vari-
ables. Given the non-linear dependence of the reward, when passing to the limit in the proof of
Theorem 2.4.3 below, one should expect that first order, i.e. linear, approximations, would not suf-
fice to rigorously obtain the limit. Not surprisingly, it is necessary to have access to the quadratic
variations of the previously introduced processes. This is usually carried out by having a pathwise
construction of the stochastic integral. For this, a viable way is to follow the approach in [149]. It
is thus necessary to guarantee that M? and N?,·r are left limits of càdlàg processes. In light of the
continuity of the map (t, x) 7−→ Pν?t,x, Assumption E.(ii) ensures that these processes are continu-
ous. Hence, there exists a process [M?] (resp. [N?,·r ] for any r ∈ [0, T ]) which coincides with the
quadratic variation of M? (resp. N?,·r for any r ∈ [0, T ]) under Pν
?.
Moreover, f and g can be understood as changes of variables from the canonical process X. As
such, it is expected to require some control on the quadratic difference under the laws induced by
an arbitrary action ν and the equilibrium ν?. This is precisely the goal of Assumption E.(iii). We
highlight that both processes appearing in Assumption E.(iii) are Ft-measurable and differ only,
from ν to ν?, on the action performed over the interval [t, t′]. In fact, when ν = ν? this condition
holds trivially as both expression are equal to zero. In fact, when ν = ν? this condition holds
trivially as both expression are equal to zero. It is also possible to verify this condition in the case
of uncontrolled volatility if f and g are regular in the sense of Cont and Fournié [57] so that the
functional Itô formula holds, see below.
Lemma 2.4.2. Assumption E.(iii) holds if either
(i) the volatility is uncontrolled, A is bounded, f has bounded horizontal, first and second order
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vertical derivatives, Dtf , ∇xf and ∇2x, respectively. Moreover, the process A(t,X·∧t, νt) is square
integrable for any ν ∈ A, where A(t, x, a) := Dtft(x) +σt(x)bu(x, a)∇xfu(x) + 12(σσ
>)u(x)∇2xfu(x);
(ii) the problem is in strong formulation with state dependent coefficients, unique strong solution.
This is, there is a probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) and a P–Brownian motion W such that for any
ν ∈ A(x) there is a unique process Xx,ν that satisfies






σr(Xr, νr)dWr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s..
Moreover, (f, g) ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × R,R) × C2(R,R) and A(t,Xt, νt) is square integrable for any
ν ∈ A, where A(t, x, a) := ∂tft(x) + σt(x, a)bu(x, a)∂xfu(x) + 12(σσ
>)u(a, x)∂2xxfu(x).
In light of Remark 2.4.1 we define m̂ and n̂ square roots of the processes




, n̂t 2r := lim sup
ε↘0
[N ·,?r ]t − [N ·,?r ]t−ε
ε
, (r, t) ∈ [0, T ]2.
Building upon our previous analysis, we can profit from the recent results available in Djete, Pos-
samaï, and Tan [76] to obtain the next dynamic programming principle, Theorem 2.4.3. It concerns
the local behaviour of the value function v. We also remark that time-inconsistent McKean–Vlasov
problems have been recently studied by Mei and Zhu [184].
Theorem 2.4.3. Let Assumption E hold, and ν? ∈ E(x). For {σ, τ} ⊆ Tt,T , σ ≤ τ and
P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , we have









































Analogously, we can associate a system of BSDEs to the problem. Define for (s, t, x, z, γ,Σ, u, v,
n, z,m, z, a) ∈ [0, T )2 ×X × Rd × Sd(R)× Sd(R)× R× Rd × R× Rd × R× Rd ×A
ht(s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, ft(x), a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)>z;
Ft(x, z,Σ, u,m, z) := sup
a∈At(x,Σ)
{
ht(t, x, z, a)
}
− u− 12 z
>Σ z ∂2mmG(t,m),
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and V?(t, x, z) denotes the unique (for simplicity) A-valued Borel-measurable map satisfying
[0, T ]×X × Rd 3 (t, x, z) 7−→ V?(t, x, z) ∈ arg max
a∈A
ht(t, x, z, a).
In light of Theorem 2.4.3, we consider for (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2 and ω ∈ Ω the system
Yt = ξ(T,X) +G(T, g(X)) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr ,M?r , m̂2t )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −KPt ,









































where ∂sf?t (s, x, n, z) := ∂sf?t (s, x, n,V?(t, x, z)) and ∂2nnf?t (s, x, n, z) := ∂2nnf?t (s, x, n,V?(t, x, z)).
In the case of drift control only, we define
hot (s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, n, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x)>z,
∂hot (s, x, v, n, z, a) := ∂sft(s, x,n, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x)>v +
1
2z
>σt(x)>σt(x) z ∂2nnft(s, x,n, a),
Hot (x, z, u,m, z) := sup
a∈A
{






and (He) reduces to the infinite family of BSDEs which holds P–a.s. (recall the notations in Sec-
tion 2.2.3) for (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2
Yt = ξ(T,X) +G(T, g(X)) +
∫ T
t












































In the same way, a necessity theorem holds. It does require us to introduce the following set of
assumptions.
Assumption F. Assumption B.(ii) and B.(iii) together with
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|Fr(X, 0, σ̂2r , 0, 0, 0)|p + |∂hor(s,X, 0, N s,?r , n̂s,?r , ν?r )|pdr
]
<∞.
Theorem 2.4.4 (Necessity). Let Assumption E and Assumption F hold. Given ν? ∈ E(x), one can
construct (Y,Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) solution to (H), such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X







Moreover, ν? satisfies Definition 2.2.7.(iii), i.e. ν? is a maximiser of the Hamiltonian.
Remark 2.4.5. We would like to comment that the well-posedness of (Hoe), i.e. the extended system
when only drift control is allowed, remains a much harder task. In particular, it is known that the
presence of a non-linear functionals of conditional expectations opens the door to scenarii with
multiplicity of equilibria with different game values, see [164] for an example in a mean–variance
investment problem. Consequently and in line with current results available for systems of BSDEs
with quadratic growth, see Frei and Dos Reis [103], Harter and Richou [118], and Xing and Žitković
[265], we expect to be able to obtain existence of a solution, but not necessarily uniquness.
Finally, one could also include into the analysis on the current chapter rewards allowing for
recursive utilities as studied in [245]. Recall these are models in which the utility at time t is not
only a function of the state variable process and the action but also of the future utility. This is,
for (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A(t, x), the reward in given by
J(t, x, ν) := EPν [Yt],
where Y is the first coordinate of the solution to the following BSVIE






Zsr · dXr, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s.,
where k is a non-anticipative functional that allows for, possibly, non-linear dependences on future
86
utilities. We highlight we have taken expectations with respect to P ∈ A(t, x) in the definition of
J(t, x, ν). As we work under a general filtration, the solution to the previous BSVIE is FX,P(x)+
and therefore the need to take expectation. Of course, the analysis would require to derive the
corresponding DPP and from it deduce the system encoding equilibria. This will be part of our
analysis in Chapter 5.
2.5 Proof of Theorem 2.2.2
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.2.2, namely we wish to obtain the correspond-
ing extended version of the dynamic programming principle. We begin with a sequence of lemmata
that will allow us to study the local behaviour of the value of the game. These results are true in
great generality and require mere extra regularity of the running and terminal rewards in the type
variable.
Throughout this section we assume there exists ν? ∈ E(x). We stress that no assumption about
uniqueness of the equilibrium will be imposed. Therefore, in the spirit of keeping track of the
notation, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X we recall we set





fr(t,X, ν?r )dr + ξ(t,X·∧T )
]
,
and (Pν?t,x)(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X denotes the unique solution to the martingale problem for (2.1.7), with initial
condition (t, x) and fixed action process ν?. Similarly, for ω = (x,w, q) ∈ Ω, {σ, τ} ⊂ T0,T , with
σ ≤ τ , and ν ∈ A(σ, x) we also set
v(σ,X)(ω) := v(σ(ω), x·∧σ(ω)), and J(σ, τ,X, ν)(ω) := J(σ(ω), τ(ω), x·∧σ(ω), ν).
Our first result consists of a one step iteration of our equilibrium definition. This is in spirit
similar to the analysis performed in a discrete-time set up in [38].
Lemma 2.5.1. Let ν? ∈ E(x) and v the value associated to ν? as in (P). Then, for (ε, `, t, σ, τ) ∈
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R?+ × (0, `ε)× [0, T ]× Tt,t+` × Tt,t+` with σ ≤ τ, and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≤ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
J(σ, σ, x, ν ⊗τ ν?),












Proof. The first inequality is clear. Indeed for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , Pν
?
σ(ω),x ∈ P(σ(ω), x) and therefore
ν? ∈ A(σ, x).
To get the second inequality note that for (ε, `, t, σ, τ) ∈ R?+ × (0, `ε) × [0, T ] × Tt,t+` × Tt,t+`
with σ ≤ τ, P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and ν ∈ A(σ, x)





fr(σ,X, (ν ⊗τ ν?)r)dr +
∫ T
τ









fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(σ, τ,X, ν?)− J(τ, τ,X, ν?)
]
− ε`,
where the last equality follows by conditioning and the Fτ -measurability of all the terms. Indeed, in
light of Lemma 2.10.3.1, an r.c.p.d. of Pν⊗τν
?
with respect to Fτ , evaluated at x, agrees with P
ν?
τ(x),x,
the weak solution to (2.1.7) with initial condition (τ, x) and action ν?, for Pν⊗τν
?
–a.e. x ∈ X . As
all the terms inside the expectation are Fτ -measurable, the previous holds for P
ν–a.e. x ∈ X .
From the previous result, we know that equilibrium models satisfy a form of ε-optimality in a
sufficiently small window of time. We now seek to gain more insight from iterating the previous
result. This will allow us to move forward the time window into consideration.
In the following, given (σ, τ) ∈ Tt,T ×Tt,t+`, with σ ≤ τ , we denote by Π` := (τ `i )i∈{1,...,n`} ⊆ Tt,T




, σ =: τ `0 ≤ · · · ≤
τ `
n`
:= τ, ∀`, and sup1≤i≤n` |τ
`
i − τ `i−1| ≤ `. We also let ∆τ `i := τ `i − τ `i−1. The previous definitions
hold ω-by-ω.
Proposition 2.5.2. Let ν? ∈ E(x) and {σ, τ} ⊂ Tt,T , with σ ≤ τ . Fix ε > 0 and some partition
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Π` with ` < `ε. Then for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X














J(τ `i , τ `i+1, X, ν?)− J(τ `i+1, τ `i+1, X, ν?)− n`ε`
]
.
Proof. A straightforward iteration of Lemma 2.5.1 yields that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X




















v(τ `2 , X) +
∫ τ`2
τ`1
fr(τ `1 , X, ν̃r)dr









fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(τ `0 , τ `1 , X, ν?)− J(τ `1 , τ `1 , X, ν?)
+ v(τ `2 , X) +
∫ τ`2
τ`1
fr(τ `1 , X, νr)dr + J(τ `1 , τ `2 , X, ν?)− J(τ `2 , τ `2 , X, ν?)− 2ε`
]
,
where the second inequality follows by applying the definition of an equilibrium at (τ `1 , X). Now,
the last step follows from [85, Theorem 4.6.], see also [190, Theorem 2.3.], which holds thanks to
[86]. Indeed, as F is countably generated and P(t, x) 6= ∅, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , [86, Lemmata
3.2 and 3.3] hold. The general result follows directly by iterating and the fact the iteration is
finite.
In the same spirit as in the classic theory of stochastic control, a natural question at this point
is whether there is, if any, an infinitesimal limit of the previous iteration and what kind of insights
on the value function we can draw from it. The next theorem shows than under a mild extra
regularity assumption on the running cost, namely Assumption A.(i), we can indeed pass to the
limit.
To ease the readability of our main theorem, for x ∈ X , {σ, ζ, τ} ⊂ T0,T with σ ≤ ζ ≤ τ ,
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where Pν?ζ,X is given by ω 7−→ Pν
?
(ζ(ω),x·∧ζ(ω)) and denotes the Fζ-kernel prescribed by the family of





σ [ξ] = EP
ν?
σ,X [ξ].
Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. Let ε > 0, 0 < ` < `ε and Π` be as in the statement of Proposition 2.5.2.
From Proposition 2.5.2 we know that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X











































fr(τ `i , X, ν?r )− fr(τ `i+1, X, ν?r )
)
dr













































where we used the definition of J and conditioned. For (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A(t, x), let Gt(s) :=∫ s












































where the last equality follows from the Fτ`i+1-measurability of the integral and Theorem 2.1.1.
































fr(τ `i , X, (ν ⊗τ`i+1 ν






Consequently, for every P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X





















fr(τ `i , X, (ν ⊗τ`i+1 ν
















The idea in the rest of the proof is to take the limit ` −→ 0 on both sides of (2.5.4). As v is
finite we can exchange the limit with the sup and study the limit inside. The analysis of all the




ε`, is carried out below. Regarding the error term,
we would like to make the following remarks as it is clear that simply letting ε go to zero will not
suffice for our purpose. As `ε is bounded and monotone in ε, see Remark 2.1.7, we consider `0 given
by `ε −→ `0 as ε −→ 0. We must consider two cases for `0: when `0 = 0 the analysis in the next
paragraph suffices to obtain the result; in the case `0 > 0, we can then take at the beginning of
this proof ` < `0 ≤ `ε, in which case all the sums in (2.5.4) are independent of ε, we then first let ε




ε` −→ 0 as ε −→ 0, and then study the limit `→ 0 as in the following.
In both scenarii the conclusion holds.
We now carry-out the analysis of the remaining terms. To this end, and in order to prevent
enforcing unnecessary time regularity on the action process, we will restrict our class of actions
to piece-wise constant actions, i.e. νt :=
∑
k≥1 νk1(%k−1,%k](t) for a sequence of non-decreasing
F–stopping times (%k)k≥0, and random variables (νk)k≥1, such that for any k ≥ 1, νk is FX%k−1-
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measurable. We will denote by Apw(t, x) the corresponding subclass of actions. By [86] the su-
premum over A(t, x) and Apw(t, x) coincide. Indeed, under Assumption A.(ii) and A.(iii), we
can apply [86, Theorem 4.2]. Assumption A.(ii), i.e. the Lipschitz-continuity of a 7−→ ft(t, x, a),
ensures the continuity of the drift coefficient when the space is extended to include the running
reward, see [86, Remark 3.8]. Without lost of generality we assume (%k)k≥0 ⊆ Π`, this is certainly
the case as we can always refine Π` so that νr = νi for τ `i ≤ r ≤ τ `i+1.
In the following, we fix ω ∈ Ω. A first-order Taylor expansion of the first summation term in




G(τ `i+1)−G(τ `i )−∆τ `i+1
(
fτ`i
(τ `i , X, νi) +
∫ τ`i+1
σ









(γ`i , X, νi)− fτ`i (τ
`




























ρf (`) + ρ∂sf (`)
) `→0−−→ 0.
The equality follows by replacing the expansion of the terms G(τ `i+1) and the fact ν is constant
between any two terms of the partition. The first inequality follows from Assumption A.(i), where
ρ and ρ∂sf are the modulus of continuity of the maps t 7−→ ft(t, x, a) and s 7−→ ∂sfr(s, x, a), for a
constant. The limits follows by bounded convergence as the last term is independent of ω. Thus,
both expressions on the first line have the same limit for every ω ∈ Ω. We claim that for a well

























where the integrals on the right-hand side are w.r.t the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ], and we recall the
term inside EP
ν?
r,X is FXr -measurable. Indeed, following McShane [182], for ` > 0 fixed there exists,
ω-by-ω, Π̂` := (τ̂ `i )i∈[n`] a partition of [σ, τ ] such that the Riemann sum evaluated at Π̂
` converges
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to the Lebesgue integral ω-by-ω. With this, we are left to argue (2.5.5). Recall that so far, our
analysis was for ω ∈ Ω fixed, therefore one has to be careful about, for instance, the measurability
of the partition Π̂`. An application of Galmarino’s test, see Dellacherie and Meyer [69, Ch. IV.
99–101], guarantees that τ̂ `i ∈ T0,T for all i, i.e. the random times τ̂ `i are in fact stopping times.
See Lemma 2.10.3.3 for details. Finally, (2.5.5) follows by the bounded convergence theorem.






















































































Combining the double integrals in (2.5.5) and the previous expression we obtain back in (2.5.4)
that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X





















Now for the reverse inequality, note that for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X , Pν
?
σ(ω),x ∈ P(σ(ω), x), i.e. ν? ∈
A(σ, x). Second, by definition









































where we also use the tower property. Proceeding similarly for s 7−→ ξ(s, x), we conclude that for
P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X




















which gives us the desired equality and the fact that ν? does attain the supremum.
Remark 2.5.3. Let us comment on the necessity of Assumption A.(iii) for our result to hold. As
commented in the proof, a crucial step in our approach is that the sup in (2.5.4) attains the same
value over A(t, x) and Apw(t, x). For this we used [86, Theorem 4.5] which holds in light of Assump-
tion A.(iii). Indeed, after inspecting the proof of [86, Theorem 4.5], one sees that [86, Assumption
1.1] guarantees pathwise uniqueness of the solution to an auxiliary SDE. From this, using classic
arguments as in Yamada and Watanabe [266], the uniqueness of the associated auxiliary martin-
gale problem follows. However, as pointed out also in Claisse, Talay, and Tan [56, Section 2.1], the
previous condition can be relaxed to weaker conditions which imply weak uniqueness. As it is not
our purpose in this work to extend their results in such a direction, we have not pursued it. Possible
generalisations of this results are certainly interesting questions worthy of further consideration.
Remark 2.5.4. A close look at our arguments in the above proof, right after Equation (2.5.4),
brings to light how to obtain Theorem 2.2.2 for strict equilibria, or regular equilibria in [120] which
are point-wise defined. Indeed, we need to control `0,t,ν , the limit ε −→ 0 of `ε,t,ν , see Remark 2.1.7.
In the case of equilibria, no extra condition was necessary as `ε is uniform in (t, ν). However,
for strict equilibria this is not the case and we could add, for instance, the condition that for





Remark 2.5.5 (Reduction in the exponential case). As a sanity check at this point, we can see what
Theorem 2.2.2 yields in the case of exponential discounting. Let, for any (t, s, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]2×X ×A
f(s, t, x, a) = e−θ(t−s)f̃(t, x, a), ξ(s, x) = e−θ(T−s)ξ̃(x),



































Now, replacing on the right side of the expression in Theorem 2.2.2 and cancelling terms we obtain
that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X






e−θ(r−σ)f̃(r,X, νr)dr + v(τ,X·∧T )
]
,
which is the classic dynamic programming principle, see [86, Theorem 3.5].
Finally, we mention that representations in the spirit of Theorem 2.2.2 have been previously
obtained, see [82, Proposition 3.2]. Nevertheless, this is an a posteriori result from a verification
type of result and follows from a direct application of Feynman–Kac’s formula.
2.6 The BSDE system
We begin this section introducing the spaces necessary to carry out our analysis.
2.6.1 Functional spaces and norms
Let (P(t, x))(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X be given family of sets of probability measures on (Ω,F) solutions to the
corresponding martingale problems with initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω. Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X
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and let G be an arbitrary σ-algebra on Ω, G := (Gr)s≤r≤T be an arbitrary filtration on Ω, X be
an arbitrary G-adapted process, P an arbitrary element in P(t, x). For any (p, q) ∈ (1,∞)2 we
introduce the space
• Lpt,x(G) (resp. L
p








• Spt,x(G) (resp. S
p
t,x(G,P)) of Y ∈ Pprog(R,G), with P(t, x)–q.s. (resp. P–a.s.) càdlàg paths on
[t, T ], with



















• Lq,pt,x(G) (resp. L
q,p
t,x(G,P)) of Y ∈ Pprog(R,G), with





















• Hpt,x(G) (resp. H
p


























We will say a family (KP)P∈P(t,x) belongs to I
p





• Mpt,x(G,P) of martingalesM ∈ Popt(R,G) which are P-orthogonal to X (that is the product XM










Due to the time-inconsistent nature of the problem, for a metric space E we let P2meas(E,G)
be the space of two parameter processes (Uτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 : ([0, T ]2 × Ω,B([0, T ]2) ⊗ G) −→ (B(E), E)
measurable.
• Lp,2t,x(G) (resp. L
p,2
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of collections (ξ(s))s∈[0,T ] of G-measurable R-valued
random variables such that the mapping ([0, T ] × Ω,B([0, T ]) ⊗ FXT ) −→ (L
p
t,x(G), ‖ · ‖Lpt,x) (resp.














• Sp,2t,x(G) (resp. S
p,2
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of processes (Uτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(R,GT ) such that
the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Spt,x(G), ‖ · ‖Spt,x) (resp. (S
p
















• Lq,p,2t,x (G) (resp. L
q,p,2
t,x (G,P)) denotes the space of processes (Uτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(R,GT ) such that
the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Lq,pt,x(G), ‖ · ‖Lq,pt,x ) (resp. (L
q,p
















• Hp,2t,x(G) (resp. H
p,2
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of processes (Vτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(Rd,GT ) such that
the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ]))→ (Hp,2t,x(G, X), ‖ ·‖Hpt,x(X)) (resp. (H
p
t,x(G, X,P)), ‖ ·‖Hp,2t,x(P))) : s 7−→
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• Mp,2t,x(G,P) denotes the space of two parameter processes (Nτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(R,GT ) such that
the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ]))→ (Mpt,x(G,P), ‖ · ‖Mpt,x(P)) : s 7−→ N






• Ip,2t,x(G,P) denotes the space of two parameter processes (Lτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(R,GT ) such that the
mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Ipt,x(G,P), ‖ · ‖Ip,ot,x ) : s 7−→ L



















will always mean L2,2t,x(G)(
resp. L2,2,2t,x (G)
)
. The spaces are Lq,p,2t,x (G) and H
p,2
t,x(G) are Hilbert spaces. For U ∈ S
p,2
t,x(G) we
highlight the diagonal process (U tt )t∈[0,T ] is well defined. Indeed, the path continuity of U s for all
s ∈ [0, T ] together with the (uniform) continuity of s 7−→ ‖U s‖S2 allows us to define a B[0, T ]⊗F-
measurable version. Finally, we will suppress the dependence on (0,x) and write Sx(G) for S0,x(G)
and similarly for the other spaces.
We now begin our study of the system
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dKPr , t ∈ [0, T ], P(x)–q.s.,









, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω.
(H)
As a motivation of the notion of solution to (H), let us note that the first equation is a 2BSDE
under the set P(x), i.e. the dynamics holds P(x)–q.s. A closer examination of Definition 2.1.6
reveals that, unlike in the classical stochastic control scenario, one needs to be able to make sense
of a solution under any P(s, x) for s ∈ [0, T ] and x outside a P(x)-polar set. Fortunately, the
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results in [210] allow us to verify that constructing the initial solution suffices, see Lemma 2.8.1.
Definition 2.6.2. Let (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , ∂Y rr be a given process and consider the equation
Y s,xt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zs,xr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dKs,x,Pr , t ∈ [s, T ]. (2.6.1)
We say (Y s,x, Zs,x, (Ks,x,P)P∈P(s,x)) is a solution to 2BSDE (2.6.1) under P(s, x) if for some p > 1,
(i) Equation (2.6.1) holds P(s, x)–q.s.







(iii) The family (Ks,x,P)P∈P(s,x) satisfies the minimality condition









∣∣FX,P′t+ ], s ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s., ∀P ∈ P(s, x).
Consistent with Definition 2.2.6, we set (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x)) = (Y 0,x, Z0,x, (K0,x,P)P∈P(x)). We
use the rest of this section to prove Theorem 2.2.8, justifying that in the setting of this section our
approach encompasses that of [35].
Proof of Theorem 2.2.8. Let P ∈ P(x) and consider (Ω,FX,P(x)+ ,P). We first verify that (Y,Z,K)
satisfies first equation in System (H). A direct application of Itô’s formula to Yt = v(t,Xt) with X
given by the SDE (2.1.7) yields that P–a.s.






























where we used (2.2.9) and the definition of H in terms of F as in (2.2.4). Next, by definition of σ̂2t
and with Kt as in the statement we obtain
Yt = YT +
∫ T
t
Fr(Xr, Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Yrr )−
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KT −Kt, P–a.s.
Next, we verify the integrability conditions in Definitions 2.2.7.(i) and 2.2.7.(ii). As σ is
bounded, it follows that for any P ∈ P(x), Xt has exponential moments of any order which
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are bounded on [0, T ], i.e. ∃C, supt∈[0,T ] EP[exp(c|Xt|1)] ≤ C < ∞, ∀P ∈ P(x), ∀c > 0, where
C depends on T and the bound on σ.
The exponential grown assumption on v and de la Vallée-Poussin’s theorem yield that for p > 1




x (FX,P(x)+ ,P(x)). To
derive the integrability of K, let P ∈ P(x) and note that
EP[KpT ] ≤Cp
(











where the inequality follows from the fact (t, x, z, a) 7−→ F (t, x, z, a, 0) is Lipschitz in z which follows
from the exponential growth assumption on f0 and the boundedness of the coefficients b and σ.
The constant Cp depends on the Lipschitz constant and the value of p as in Bouchard, Possamaï,
Tan, and Zhou [40, Lemma 2.1]. As the term on the right does not depend on P, we conclude
K ∈ Ipx((FX,P+ )P∈P(x)). Note that the previous estimate shows as a by-product that the 2BSDE in
(H) is well-posed, see [210, Theorem 4.1]. Therefore, provided K satisfies the minimality condition
by [210, Theorem 4.2], we conclude 2.2.7.(i), i.e. (Y, Z,K) is the solution to the 2BSDE in (H).
We now argue that K satisfies (2.2.8). Following [230, Theorem 5.2], we can exploit the fact
the σ is bounded and the continuity in time of X, Z and Γ for fixed x ∈ X , to show that for ε > 0,
(t, ν) ∈ [0, T ] × A(x,P) and τ ε,t := T ∧ inf{r > t : Kr ≥ Kt + ε}, there exists Pν
ε ∈ Px(t,P,FX+ )
such that kt ≤ ε, dt⊗ dPν
ε on [τ ε,t, T ]×Ω. From this the minimality condition follows. Moreover,
by assumption, we know there exists Pν? ∈ P0(0,x, ν?) where ν? maximises the Hamiltonian, i.e.
σ̂2r = (σσ>)t(Xt, ν?t ),dt ⊗ dP?–a.e. on [0, T ] × Ω, and kt = 0, Pν
?–a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus the
minimality condition is attained under Pν? , i.e. 2.2.7.(iii) holds. Moreover, note that this implies
V?(t,Xt, Zt,Γt) = V?(t,Xt, Zt), Pν
?–a.s. (2.6.2)
We are left to argue ∂Y satisfies the second equation in (H). Given the regularity of s 7−→
J(s, t, x), we can differentiate the second equation in (2.2.9). Using this, for s ∈ [0, T ] fixed and
ω = (x,w, q) ∈ Ω we can apply Itô’s formula to ∂Y st = ∂sJ(s, t,Xt) under P
ν?
t,x. This yields,











where the stochastic integral term vanished in light of the growth assumption on ∂xJ(s, t, x) and
we used (2.6.2).
2.7 Proof of Theorem 2.2.10
We recall that throughout this section, we let Assumptions A and B hold. To begin with, from
the definition of the set A(t, x), we can re-state the result of our dynamic programming principle
Theorem 2.2.2, by decomposing a control ν ∈ A(t, x) into a pair (P, ν) ∈ P(t, x)×A(t, x,P), where P
is the unique weak solution to (2.1.7) and ν. We remark that for any given P ∈ P(t, x), there could
be in general several admissible controls ν. With this we state Theorem 2.2.2 as, for ν? ∈ E(x),
σ, τ ∈ Tt,T , σ ≤ τ and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X



























The goal of this section is to show that given ν?, P?, unique solution to the martingale problem
asociated with ν?, and v(t, x), one can construct a solution to (H). To do so, we recall that given
a family of BSDEs (YP)P∈P(t,ω) indexed by P(t, ω) ⊆ Prob(Ω) with (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω, a 2BSDE
is the supremum over P(t, ω) of the P-expectation of the afore mentioned family, see [230], [210].
This together with equation (2.7.1) reveals the road map we should take.
Let us begin by fixing an equilibrium ν? ∈ E(x). For (s, t, ω,P) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, T ] × Ω × P(t, x)
we consider the FX -adapted processes

























and on (Ω,FX,P+ ,P) the BSDE
YPt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t





, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T. (2.7.3)
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Note we specify the stochastic integral w.r.t X is under the probability P. Our first step is to relate
ỸP with the solution to the BSDE (2.7.3). Namely, Lemma 2.7.1 says that ỸP corresponds to the
first component of the solution to (2.7.3).
Lemma 2.7.1. Let Assumption B hold, (t, ω,P) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×P(t, x) and (YP,ZP) be the solution
to the BSDE (2.7.3), as in Papapantoleon, Possamaï, and Saplaouras [200, Definition 3.2], and
ν̃?t := V?(t,X,ZPt ). Then
ỸPt (ω) = EP
ν̃? [YPt ]. (2.7.4)




, for t ≤ u ≤ T and ν ∈ A(t, x,P) the BSDE












Under Assumptions B.(ii) and B.(i), we know that z 7−→ ht(t, x, z, a) is Lipschitz-continuous, uni-
formly in (t, x, a), that there exists p > 1 such that ([0, T ] × Ω,FX) 3 (t, ω) 7−→ ht(t, x, 0, 0) ∈
Hp,2s,ω(F
X,P
+ ,P) is well defined, and that ∂Y ∈ Hps,x(F
X,P
+ ,P). Moreover, as for any ν, and ν̃ in
A(s, x,P), (σσ>)t(X, νt) = σ̂2t = (σσ>)t(X, ν̃t),dt⊗ dP–a.e., P is the unique solution to an uncon-
trolled martingale problem where (σσ>)t(X) := (σσ>)t(X, νt). Consequently, the martingale rep-
resentation property holds for any local martingale in (Ω,FP,P) relative to X, see Jacod and Shiry-
aev [142, Theorem 4.29]. Therefore, conditions (H1)–(H6) in [200, Theorem 3.23] hold and the above
BSDE is well defined. Its solution consists of a tuple (YP,ν ,ZP,ν) ∈ Dps,x(F
X,P
+ ,P) × Hps,x(F
X,P
+ ,P)
and for every ν ∈ A(t, x,P) and Pν is as in Remark 2.1.4 we have
EP
ν











, t ∈ [0, T ].




+ ,P) to BSDE (2.7.3) is well defined,
by Assumption B.(iii) guarantees. Furthermore, conditions (Comp1)–(Comp3) in [200, Theorem
3.25] are fulfilled, ensuring a comparison theorem holds. Indeed, as X is continuous (Comp1) is
immediate, while (Comp2) and (Comp3) correspond in our setting to B.(ii) and B.(i), respectively.
By definition, ν̃?t satisfies (σσ>)t(X, ν̃?t ) = σ̂2t ,dt ⊗ dP–a.e. on [t, T ] × X , and so, ν̃? ∈ A(t, x,P).
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By comparison, we obtain




[YP,νt ] ≤ EP
ν̃?
[YPt ].
Remark 2.7.2. (i) In the literature on BSDEs one might find the additional term
∫ T
t dN Pr in
(2.7.3), where N P is a P-martingale P-orthogonal to X. Yet, as noticed in the proof once (σσ>)t(X)
is fixed, uniqueness of the associated martingale problem guarantees the representation property
relative to X.
(ii) We remark that an alternative constructive approach to relate Ỹ to a BSDE is to consider for
any ν ∈ A(s, x,P) and t ≥ s the process




fr(r,X, νr)− ∂Y rr
)
dr.
However, as the careful reader might have noticed, this requires that for a given P ∈ P(s, x) we
introduce ν?(P) the action process attaining the sup in (2.7.2). However, the existence of an ac-
tion with such property is not necessarily guaranteed for all P ∈ P(s, x), at least without further
assumptions, which we do not want to impose here.
Remark 2.7.3. At this point we are halfway from our goal in this section. For (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, the
previous lemma defines a family (YP)P∈P(t,ω) of FX,P+ -adapted processes. Recalling our discussion
at the beginning of this section, all we are left to do is to take sup over (P(t, x))(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X . In
other words, putting together (2.7.4) and (2.7.1), we now know







In light of the previous remark and the characterisation in [210], we consider the following
2BSDE
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −KPt , t ∈ [0, T ], P(x)–q.s. (2.7.7)
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With this we are ready to prove the necessity of System (H).
Proof of Theorem 2.2.10. We begin by verifying the integrability of ∂Y , defined as in (2.7.2). From
Assumption B.(ii) we have that for any s ∈ [0, T ]
‖∂Y s‖Spx ≤ sup
P∈P(x)
EP
[∣∣∂sξ(s,X·∧T )∣∣p + ∫ T
0
∣∣∂sfr(s,X, ν?r )∣∣pdr] <∞.
Therefore, as Assumption A.(i) guarantees the continuity of the map s 7−→ ‖∂Y s‖Sp0,x(FX ,P(x)) the
result follows.
Let us construct such a solution from ν? ∈ E(x). Under Assumption B.(ii), it follows from
(2.7.6) and [210, Lemma 3.2] that v is làdlàg outside a P(x)-polar set. Therefore the process v+
given by
v+t (x) := lim
r∈Q∩(t,T ],r↓t
v(t, x),
is well defined in the P(x)–q.s. sense. Clearly v+ is càdlàg, FX,P(x)+ -adapted, and in light of [210,







+ ,P) such that
v+t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t





+KPT −KPt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s.
Moreover, the process Zt := (σ̂2t )⊕
d[v+,X]t
dt , where (σ̂
2
t )⊕ denotes the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse
of σ̂2t , aggregates the family (ZP)P∈P(x). The proof that (KP)P∈P(x) satisfies the minimality condi-
tion (2.2.8) is argued as in [210, Section 4.4]. The result follows by well-posedness of (2.7.7).
Arguing as in [210, Lemma 3.5], we may obtain that for any P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and P ∈ P(t, x)
v+t = ess supP
P̃∈P(t,P,FX+ )
Y P̃t ,
with Y P̃ as in (2.7.3). Consequently




Moreover, as for any t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , Pν
?
t,x attains equality in (2.7.6), see The-
orem 2.2.2, we deduce, in light of (2.1.4), Pν? attains the minimality condition. This is, under Pν? ,
the process KPν
?
equals 0. With this, we obtain (v+, Z, (K)PP∈P(x)) and ∂Y are a solution to (H).
Moreover, Lemma 2.7.1 implies
ν?t ∈ arg max
a∈At(x,σ̂2t (x))
ht(t,X,Zt, a), dt⊗ dPν
?–a.e.., on [0, T ]×X .
2.8 Proof of Theorem 2.2.12
This section is devoted to proof the verification Theorem 2.2.12. To do so we will need to obtain
a rigorous statement of how the processes defined by (H) relate. This is carried in the following
series of lemmata.
Lemma 2.8.1. For (x, x, s) ∈ X × X × (0, T ] consider the 2BSDEs
Yt = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dKPr , t ∈ [0, T ], P(x)–q.s.,
Y s,xt = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zs,xr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dKs,x,Qr , t ∈ [s, T ], P(s, x)–q.s.
Suppose both 2BSDEs are well-posed. Then, for any s ∈ (0, T ],
Yt = Y s,xt , s ≤ t ≤ T, P(s, x)–q.s., for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X ,
Zt = Zs,xt , σ̂2t dt⊗ dP(s, x)–q.e. on [s, T ]×X , for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X ,
KPt = K
s,x,Ps,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T, Ps,x–a.s., for P–a.e. x ∈ X , ∀P ∈ P(x).








where for an arbitrary P ∈ P(s, x), YP corresponds to the first coordinate of the solution to the
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BSDE
YPt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,ZPr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
ZPr · dXr, s ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s.
It then follows by [210, Lemmata 3.2 and 3.6] that Ŷ+, the right limit of Ŷ, is FX,P(x)+ -measurable,
P(x)–q.s. càdlàg, and for every P ∈ P(x), there is (ẐP, K̂P) ∈ Hpx(FX,P+ ,P)× I
p
x(FX,P+ ,P) such that
for every P ∈ P(x)
Ŷ+t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X, ẐPr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
ẐPr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dK̂Pr , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s.
By [149], there exists a universal process [Ŷ+, X] which coincides with the quadratic co-variation
of Ŷ+ and X under each probability measure P ∈ P(x). Thus, one can define a universal FX,P(x)+ -
predictable process Z by




Ŷ+t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X, Ẑr, σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Ẑr · dXr + K̂PT − K̂Pt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)–q.s.
By well-posedness, we have that
Ŷ+t = Yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)–q.s.; Ẑt = Zt, σ̂2dt⊗ dP(x)–q.e. on [0, T ]×X ;
K̂Pt = KPt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P–a.s., ∀P ∈ P(x),
(2.8.2)
where the latter denotes the solution to the first 2BSDE in the statement of the lemma. Thus,
as Y+ is computed ω-by-ω, we can repeat the previous argument on the time interval [s, T ] and
Ωωs = {ω̃ ∈ Ω : x̃r = xr, 0 ≤ r ≤ s}, i.e. fixing an initial trajectory. Reasoning as before, we
then find that on Ωωs , Ŷ+ is F
P(s,x)
+ -measurable and P(s, x)–q.s. càdlàg. By well-posedness of the
second 2BSDE in the statement of the lemma, this yields the analogous version of (2.8.2) between
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(Ŷ+, Ẑ, (K̂P)P∈P(s,x)) and (Y s,x, Zs,x, (Ks,x)P∈P(s,x)). It is then clear that
Yt = Y s,xt , s ≤ t ≤ T,P(s, x)–q.s., for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , s ∈ (0, T ].
The corresponding result for Z follows from (2.8.1). The relation for the family (KP)P∈P(x) holds
P-by-P for every P ∈ P(x) in light of the weak uniqueness assumption for the drift-less dynamics










, 0 ≤ s ≤ t, Ps,x–a.s.
Lemma 2.8.2. Let (Pν , ν) ∈ M(x). For (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X consider the system, assumed to hold
Pνs,x–a.s.






∂Zru · dXu, s ≤ t ≤ T,






Zru · dXu, s ≤ t ≤ T.
(D)
Let (∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ Sp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,Pνs,x) × Hp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,Pνs,x, X) be the solution to the first BSDE in
(D). Then, the mapping [0, T ] 3 s 7−→ (∂Ys, ∂Zs) ∈ Sps,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,Pνs,x) × Hps,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,Pνs,x, X)








= (YT − Ys,ZT −Zs), Pνs,x–a.s.
Furthermore, letting









, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω,












. If in addition ∂Y ∈ Sp,2x (F
X,Pνs,x
+ ), for

















Proof. We first prove the second part of the statement. Note that









Zsr · dXr, Pνs,x–a.s.,



































= J(s, s, x, ν).
The equality ∂Y ss = ∂Yss , is argued identically. Now, to obtain the last equality we use the fact
that ∂Y ∈ Sp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,Pνs,x). Indeed, the continuity of the mapping s 7−→ (∂Ys, ∂Zs) guarantees
the integral is well-defined. The equality follows from the tower property.
We now argue the first part of the statement. Again, we know the mapping [0, T ] 3 s 7−→
(∂Ys, ∂Zs) is continuous, in particular integrable. A formal integration with respect to s to the























Therefore, a natural candidate for solution to the second BSDE in (D) is (Ys,Zs,N s), solution of
the BSDE










Let (Π`)` be a properly chosen sequence of partitions of [s, T ], as in [240, Theorem 1], Π` =
(si)i=1,...,n` with ‖Π`‖ ≤ `. Recall ∆s`i = s`i − s`i−1. For a generic family process X ∈ Hp,2s,x(G), and
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I`(∂sf)t(·, x, a) :=
n∑̀
i=0
∆s`i∂sft(s`i , x, a),
and notice that for any t ∈ [0, T ]
I`(∂Y )t − (δY )t











I`(∂sf)r(·, X, νr))− (fr(T,X, νr)− fr(s,X, νr)] + σ̂rbr(X, ν)[I`(∂Z)r − (δZ)r]dr.
Thanks to the integrability of (∂Y, ∂Z) and (Y,Z), it follows that I`(∂Y )−(δY ) ∈ Hp,2s,x and similarly
for ∂Z and Z. Therefore, [40, Theorem 2.2] yields









∣∣∣I`(∂sf)r(·, X, νr))− (fr(T,X, νr)− fr(s,X, νr))∣∣∣pdr].
The uniform continuity of s 7−→ ∂sξ(s, x) and s 7−→ ∂sf(s, x, a), see Assumption C, justifies, via
bounded convergence, the convergence in Sps,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,Pνs,x) (resp Hps,x) of I`(∂Y s) to Y T −Y s (resp
I`(∂Zs) to ZT − Zs) as ` −→ 0.
Lemma 2.8.3. Let (Pν , ν) ∈M(x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X and (∂Y, ∂Z) and (Y,Z) as in (D). Then
Ytt = YTT +
∫ T
t
hr(r,X,Zrr , νr)− ∂Yttdr −
∫ T
t
Zrr · dXr, s̃ ≤ t ≤ T, Ps,x–a.s. (2.8.3)
Proof. By evaluating ∂Y at r = t in (D) we get






∂Ztr · dXr, Psx–a.s.
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We will show that for s ≤ t ≤ T , Ps,x–a.s.
ξ(T,X·∧T )− ξ(t,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t






























∂Zru · dXu dr.
Now, Assumption C.(ii) and ∂Z ∈ Hp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x


















hu(u,X,Zuu , νu)− hu(t,X,Ztu, νu)
)
du.






∣∣σ̂tZrt ∣∣2dt] p2 dr < ∞ so a stochastic Fubini’s





∂Zsu · dXudr =
∫ T
t
[Zuu − Ztu] · dXu, Pνs,x–a.s.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.12. We will first show that with ν? as in the statement of the theorem Yt(x) =
J(t, t, x, ν?) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X . To do so, let (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X and note that
Assumption C.(i) guarantees that the corresponding 2BSDE under P(s, x) is well-posed. Indeed,























The well-posedness follows by [210, Theorem 4.1]. Now, in light of lemma 2.8.1, for any s ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = Y s,xt , s ≤ t ≤ T, P(s, x)–q.s., for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X ,
Zt = Zs,xt , σ̂2t dt⊗ dP(s, x)–q.e. on [s, T ]×X , for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X ,
KPt = K
s,x,Ps,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T, Ps,x–a.s., for P–a.e. x ∈ X , ∀P ∈ P(x).
(2.8.4)
We first claim that given a solution to (H) for any (s, x) ∈ (0, T ]×X , Pν?s,x attains the minimality











= 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
As KP
ν?
0,x is a non-decreasing process, this implies KP
ν?
0,x = 0 and therefore Pν?0,x attains the min-
imality condition for the 2BSDE in (H) under P(x). This implies, together with (2.8.4), that for














∣∣∣FXs+]] = EPν?s,x[Ks,x,Pν?s,xT −Ks,x,Pν?s,xs ] = 0, Pν?s,x-a.s.,
which proves the claim. Consequently, for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = Y s,xt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zs,xr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr, s ≤ t ≤ T, Pν
?
s,x–a.s.
We note the equation on the right side prescribes a BSDE under Pν?s,x ∈ P(s, x). Moreover, given
that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ], V?t (X,Z
s,x
t ) = V?t (X,Zt),dt⊗ dPν
?
s,x–a.e. on [s, T ]× X , we
obtain









Zs,xr · dXr, s ≤ t ≤ T, Pν
?
s,x–a.s.




















Now, in light of Assumption D, there exists (∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ S2,2t,x(F
X,Pν?t,x




+ , X) such
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that for every s ∈ [0, T ]






∂Zsu · dXu, t ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T, Pν
?
t,x–a.s.



















































= J(t, t, x, ν?). (2.8.6)
Finally, arguing as in [64, Proposition 4.6], (2.8.6) yields that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and t ∈ [0, T ]







It remains to show ν? ∈ E(x). Let (ε, `, t, x, ν) ∈ R?+ × (0, `ε) × [0, T ] × Ω × A(t, x), `ε to be
chosen, and ν ⊗t+` ν? as in (2.1.12). Recall we established that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X , t ∈ [0, T ]
J(t, t, x, ν?) = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zt,xr , σ̂2r , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t




t , P(t, x)–q.s.
By computing the expectation of the stochastic integral under Pν⊗t+`ν
?
we obtain






























hr(r,X,Zt,xr , ν?r )− hr(t,X,Zt,xr , νr) + hr(t,X,Zt,xr , ν?r )− hr(r,X,Zt,xr , νr)dr
]
,




V?t (X,Zt),dt⊗ dP–a.e. on [s, T ]×X for all P ∈ P(s, x), we have the previous expression is greater



















fr(t,X, ν?r )dr +
∫ T
t+`




















We now study each remaining terms separately. First, regarding I1, by conditioning we can





ω∈Ω is an r.c.p.d. of P
ν⊗t+`ν? |FXt+`, see Lemma 2.10.3.1, together with Lemma 2.8.3.






































where the second equality follows by conditioning, see Lemma 2.10.3.1. Now, arguing as in the proof
of [232, Corollary 6.3.3], under the weak uniqueness assumption for fixed actions ,Pν?tn,xn −→ P
ν?
t,x
weakly, whenever (tn, xn) −→ (t, x).









` −→ 0. Moreover, as t 7−→ Φ(t, x) is clearly continuous and (r, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, the previous convergence
holds uniformly in (r, t). Together with bounded convergence we obtain that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X










, ` −→ 0, uniformly in (t, r).
We now argue that the above convergence holds uniformly in ν. Indeed, Assumption C.(i)
guarantees that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X the family Mxt+`(x̃) := EP
ν?
t+`,x̃ [Φ(r,X)] − EP
ν?
t,x [Φ(r,X)], is
P(t, x)–uniformly integrable. Thus, provided P(t, x) is weakly compact, an application of the
non-dominated monotone convergence theorem, see [74, Theorem 31], yields the result. In order
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to bypass the compactness assumption on P(t, x), we consider the compact set Arel(t, x), see [86,
Theorem 4.1], of solutions to the martingale problem for which relaxed action processes are allowed,
i.e. ignoring condition (iii) in the definition of P(t, x). By [86, Theorem 4.5], the supremum over





∣∣∣EPν⊗t+`ν? [Φ(r,X)]− EPν⊗tν? [Φ(r,X)]∣∣∣dr ≤ ε`.
Finally, to control I3, we see that Assumption C.(ii) guarantees there is `ε such that for all (r, x, a) ∈





|fr(r,X, νr)dr − fr(t,X, νr)|+ |fr(t,X, ν?r )− fr(r,X, ν?r )|dr
]
≤ ε`.
Combining the previous arguments, we obtain that for 0 < ` < `ε, P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and (t, ν) ∈
[0, T ]×A(t, x)
J(t, t, x, ν?)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+` ν?) ≥ −ε`.
2.9 Well-posedness: the uncontrolled volatility case
We start this section studying how System (H) reduces when no control on the volatility is
allowed. Intuitively speaking the first equation should reduce to a standard BSDE and under our
assumption of weak uniqueness for (2.1.7) we end up with only one probability measure which allows
a probabilistic representation of the second element in the system. We first study the reduction in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2.9.1. Suppose σt(x, a) = σt(x, ã) =: σt(x) for all a ∈ A, i.e. the volatility is not
controlled, then System (H) reduces to the following system which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds P–a.s.
for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t




∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t






Proof. As the volatility is not controlled there is a unique solution to the martingale problem
(2.1.6), i.e. P(x) = {P}. In addition, since (σσ>)t(x, a) = (σσ>)t(x) for all t ∈ [0, T ], then
Σt(x) = {(σσ>)t(x)} ∈ S+n (R), At(x, σt(x)) = A.
Let (Y, Z,K) be a solution to the 2BSDE in (H). As P(x) = {P}, the minimality condi-
tion implies that the process KP vanishes in the dynamics, thus (Y,Z) is a solution to the first
BSDE in (Ho). Now as the family ∂Y is defined P–a.s., Y is well-defined in the P–a.s. sense too.
Finally, P(x) = {P} guarantees that the predictable martingale representation holds for (FX,P+ ,P)-
martingales. With this, it follows that for s ∈ [0, T ], ∂Y s in (H) admits the representation in (Ho),
which holds up to a P-null set.
Remark 2.9.2 (HJB system exponential case). As a sanity check at this point we can check what
the above system leads to in the case of exponential discounting in a non-Markovian framework.
Defining f(s, t, x, a) and F (s, x) as in Remark 2.5.5, note that
J(t, x, ν) = EPν
[ ∫ T
t
e−θ(r−t)f̃(r,X, νr)dr + e−θ(T−t)F̃ (X·∧T )
]
= Y tt .
Notice that










and as it does turn out that Zrr = Zr, see Lemma 2.8.2 and Theorem 2.2.12, we get














e−θ(r−t)f̃(r,X, ν?r )dr + e−θ(T−t)F̃ (X·∧T )
∣∣∣FX,Pt+ ] = θY tt .
Thus










r · dXr, ν?t (x, z, u) := arg max
a∈A
{
hot (t, x, z, a)
}
.
In the classic Brownian filtration set up, e.g. assuming σ is non-degenerate and n = d, the above
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BSDE corresponds to the well known solution to an optimal stochastic control problem with expo-
nential discounting, see [273].
We would like to stress the fact that the existence of a solution to System (Ho) is in general
not guaranteed. Indeed, for a fixed ν one could try to find the family of BSDEs (∂Y s)s∈[0,T ],
determined by the second equation and use this solution to obtain Y . Nevertheless, this approach
becomes nonviable as a result of the coupling arising from the choice of ν in the first equation and
its appearance in the second one. The general treatment of systems as (Ho) is carried out in the
Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.15. The result is immediate from Theorem 3.3.5.
Remark 2.9.3. The general well-posedness result, i.e. in which both the drift and the volatility are
controlled remains open. In fact, as this requires to be able to guarantee the existence of a probability
measure P? under which the minimality condition (2.2.8) is attained, we believe a feasible direction
to attain this result is to go one level beyond the weak formulation, and consider and work in a
relaxed framework, see for example [86] for a precise formulation of control problems in relaxed
form.
2.10 Auxiliary results
2.10.1 Optimal investment and consumption for log utility
We provide the necessary results for Section 2.3. We start with expressions to determine the
functions a(·) and b(·). We introduce the quantities
p := 1
η
, q := 1− 1
η
, α1(t) := r +
1
2β
2p+ a(t)−p, α2(t) := (1− η)(α1(t) +
β2
2η2 (1 + η)), t ∈ [0, T ].
Under the optimal policy (c?, γ?) we have that Pν?–a.s.
dXt = Xt(r + β2η−1 + a(r)−
1
η )dt+ βη−1XtdWt,













which we can use to obtain that for P ∈ P(t, x)















By direct computation in (2.8.3) one finds that in general a must satisfy




















dudr, t ∈ [0, T ), a(T ) = 1,
where we recall α1 and α2 are actually functions of a. The boundary condition follows as YT (x) =
U(x) for all x ∈ X . The previous equation is, of course, an implicit formula that reflects the
non-linearities inherent to the general case. A general expression for b can be written down too.
We have refrained to do so here.
Nevertheless, in the particular case η = 1, which corresponds to the log utility scenario, the
expressiona involved simplify considerably, which reflects the fact that all non-linearities vanish.
Indeed, in this case p = 1, q = 0, α1 = r + β/2− a−1, α2 = 0 and one obtains








+ ϕ′(T − t)(A(T )−A(t)) + log(x)[a′(t) + ϕ(T − t) + ϕ′(T − t)],
where A(t) denotes the antiderivative of α1. To find a we set
a′(t) + ϕ(T − t) + ϕ′(T − t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), a(T ) = 1.
This determines both α and A. b is then given by setting the first line in the above expression
equal to zero together with the boundary condition b(T ) = 0.
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2.10.2 Extensions
This section contain the proofs of the results in 2.4. We begin with the proof of Lemma 2.4.2
which verifies conditions under which the additional requirement in Assumption E is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. In the case of uncontrolled volatility, the weak uniqueness assumption im-
plies that there exists a unique probability measure P and a P–Brownian motion W such that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X·∧r) · dWr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.











































The result then follows in light of the integrability of the first term, applying Hölder intequality to
the second term and the estimate
EP
[∣∣Eν⊗t′ν?t,T − Eν?t,T ∣∣2∣∣∣Ft] ≤ EP[( ∫ t′
t
|νr − ν?r |dr
)2]
≤ C|t′ − t|2.
To obtain the result in (ii), notice that by uniqueness of the strong solution Xx,ν we have
EP[fr(X
ν⊗t′ν?
































The next sequence of results build up to the proof of Theorem 2.4.3, namely we wish to obtain the
corresponding extended version of the dynamic programming principle. We begin with a sequence
of lemmata that will allow us to study the local behaviour of the value of the game. These results
are true in great generality and require mere extra regularity of the running and terminal rewards
in the type variables (s, n,m). Our first result consists of a one step iteration of our equilibrium
definition.
Lemma 2.10.1. Let ν? ∈ E(x) and v the value associated to ν?. Then, for any (ε, `, t, σ, τ) ∈
(0,∞)× (0, `ε)× [0, T ]× Tt,t+` × Tt,t+` with σ ≤ τ, and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X ,












































ξ(σ,X·∧T )− ξ(τ,X·∧T )
]
− ε`.
Proof. To get the second inequality note that for (ε, `, t, σ, τ) ∈ R?+× (0, `ε)× [0, T ]×Tt,t+`×Tt,t+`
with σ ≤ τ, P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and ν ∈ A(σ, x)















[fr(X)], (ν ⊗τ ν?)r
)
dr































































where the last equality follows by conditioning and the Fτ measurability of all the terms.
Indeed, in light of [232, Theorem 6.1.2], an r.c.p.d. of Pν⊗τν
?
|Fτ evaluated at x agrees with
Pν
?
τ(x),x, the weak solution to the martingale problem with initial condition (τ, x) and action ν?, for
Pν⊗τν
?
–a.e. x ∈ X . As all the terms inside the second expectation are Fτ -measurable the previous
holds for Pν–a.e. x ∈ X .
From the previous result, we know that equilibrium models satisfy a form of ε-optimality in a
sufficiently small window of time. We now seek to gain more insight from iterating the previous
result. This will allow us to move forward the time window into consideration.
In the following, given (σ, τ) ∈ Tt,T × Tt,t+`, with σ ≤ τ , we denote by Π` := (τ `i )i=1,...,n` ⊆ Tt,T




, σ =: τ `0 ≤ · · · ≤
τ `
n`
:= τ, ∀`, and supi≤n` |τ
`
i − τ `i−1| ≤ `. We also let ∆τ `i := τ `i − τ `i−1. The previous definitions
hold ω–by–ω.
Proposition 2.10.2. Let ν? ∈ E(x) and {σ, τ} ⊂ Tt,T , with σ ≤ τ . Fix ε > 0 and some partition
Π` with ` < `ε. Then for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X









































































Proof. A straightforward iteration of Lemma 2.10.1 yields that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X






fr(τ `0 , X,E














































fr(τ `0 , X,E




















































































fr(τ `0 , X,E
Pντ`0,x [fr(X)], νr)dr +
∫ τ`2
τ`1





























ξ(τ `0 , X)− ξ(τ `1 , X) +G(τ `0 ,E
Pντ`0,x [M?
τ`1





























ξ(τ `1 , X)− ξ(τ `2 , X) +G(τ `1 ,E
Pντ`1,· [M?
τ`2
])−G(τ `2 ,M?τ`2 )
]]
− 2ε`,
where the second inequality follows by applying the definition of an equilibrium at (τ `1 , X). Now,
to justify the last step follows we first note that as we let the reward depend on EPt,x [fr(X·∧r)] and
EPt,x [g(X·∧T )] we need a dynamic programming result for McKean–Vlasov control. This result is
recently available in [76, Theorem 3.1]. The statement of the lemma follows directly by iterating
and the fact the iteration is countable.
To ease the readability of the next result, recall that for x ∈ X , {σ, ζ, τ} ⊂ T0,T with σ ≤ ζ ≤ τ ,
121









where Pν?ζ,X is given by ω 7−→ Pν
?
(ζ(ω),x·∧ζ(ω)) and denotes the Fζ-kernel prescribed by the family of





σ [ξ] = EP
ν?
σ,X [ξ].
Proof of Theorem 2.4.3. Let ε > 0, 0 < ` < `ε and Π` be as in Proposition 2.10.2. It then follows
that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X


























































































































For (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ] × X × A(t, x), let R(s) :=
∫ s
σ fr(s,X, fr(X), νr)dr, s ∈ [σ, T ], so that for



















fr(τ `i , X,E
Pντ`
i






where we used the fact that EP
ν
ζ,· [ft(X)] = ft(X) for t ∈ [σ, ζ]. Consequently, for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X



















fr(τ `i , X,E
Pντ`
i




















































The idea in the rest of the proof is to take the limit ` −→ 0 on both sides of (2.10.1). As v is
finite we can exchange the limit with the sup and study the limit inside. The analysis of all the




ε`, is carried out below. Regarding the error term,
we would like to make the following remarks as it is clear that simply letting ε go to zero will not
suffice for our purpose. As `ε is bounded and monotone in ε, we consider `0 given by `ε −→ `0 as
ε −→ 0. We must consider two cases for `0: when `0 = 0 the analysis in the next paragraph suffices
to obtain the result; in the case `0 > 0, we can then take at the beginning of this proof ` < `0 ≤ `ε,
in which case all the sums in (2.10.1) are independent of ε, we then first let ε go to zero so that⌈
τ − σ/`
⌉
ε` −→ 0 as ε −→ 0, and then study the limit ` −→ 0 as in the following. In both scenarii
the conclusion of the theorem holds.
We now carry out the analysis of the remaining terms. To this end, and in order to prevent enfor-
cing unnecessary time regularity on the action process, we will restrict our class of actions to piece-
wise constant actions, i.e. νt :=
∑
k≥1 νk1(%k−1,%k](t) for a sequence of non-decreasing F–stopping
times (%k)k≥0, and random variables (νk)k≥1, such that for any k ≥ 1, νk is FX%k−1-measurable. We
will denote by Apw(t, x) the corresponding subclass of actions. By [77] the supremum over A(t, x)
and Apw(t, x) coincide. Indeed, under Assumption E.(iv) and E.(v), we can apply [77, Theorem
3.1 and Lemma 4.3]. Assumption E.(iv), i.e. the Lipschitz-continuity of a 7−→ ft(t, x,n, a), ensures
the continuity of the drift coefficient when the space is extended to include the running reward, see
[86, Remark 3.8]. Without lost of generality we assume (%k)k≥0 ⊆ Π`, this is certainly the case as
we can always refine Π` so that νr = νi for τ `i ≤ r ≤ τ `i+1.
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In the following, we fix ω ∈ Ω. A first-order Taylor expansion of the first summation term in




R(τ `i+1)− R(τ `i )−∆τ `i+1
(
fτ`i
(τ `i , X, fτ`i (X), νi) +
∫ τ`i+1
σ









(γ`i , X, fγ`i (X), νi)− fτ`i (τ
`












































ρf (`) + ρf(`) + ρ∂sf (`)
) `→0−−→ 0.
The equality follows by replacing the expansion of the terms R(τ `i+1) and the fact ν is constant
between any two terms of the partition. The first inequality follows from Assumption E, where
ρf , ρf and ρ∂sf are the modulus of continuity of the maps t 7−→ ft(t, x, a), t 7−→ ft(x) and s 7−→
∂sfr(s, x, a). The limits follows by bounded convergence as in light of Assumption E the constant
in the last inequality and the last term are independent of ω. Thus, both expressions on the first
line have the same limit for every ω ∈ Ω. We claim that for a well chosen sequence of partitions of

























where the integrals on the right-hand side are w.r.t the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ], and we recall
the term inside EP
ν?
r,X is FXr -measurable. Indeed, following McShane [182], for ` > 0 fixed there
exists, ω-by-ω, Π̂` := (τ̂ `i )i∈[n`] a partition of [σ, τ ] such that the Riemann sum in (2.10.2) evaluated
at Π̂` converges to the Lebesgue integral ω-by-ω. With this, we are left to argue (2.10.3). Recall
so far our analysis was for ω ∈ Ω fixed, therefore one has to be careful about, for instance, the
measurability of the partition (τ̂ `i )1≤i≤n` . An application of Galmarino’s test, see Dellacherie and
Meyer [69, Ch. IV. 99–101], guarantees that τ̂ `i ∈ T0,T for all i, i.e. the random times τ̂ `i are in fact
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stopping times. Finally, (2.10.3) follows by the bounded convergence theorem.
We now move to the second term in (2.10.1). Similarly, there are γ`i ∈ (τ `i , τ `i+1), [0, 1]-valued
random processes θi, i ∈ {0, . . . , n`}, such that for η
τ`i ,?









fr(τ `i , X,E
Pντ`
i
































































∣∣∣EPντ`i+1,·[fr(X)]− EPντ`i ,·[fr(X)]∣∣∣dr] `→0−−→ 0,
where in the first inequality we used Assumption E and the fact that EP
ν
ζ,· [ft(X)] = ft(X) for t ∈
[σ, ζ]. The same argument together with the fact that n 7−→ ft(s, x,n, a) has bounded derivatives,
which holds by Assumption E, yields the second inequality. The limit follows in light of the
continuity of x 7−→ ft(x), and of (t, x) 7−→ Pνt,x for the weak topology. Since the limits agree, we












































































































































































































∣∣∆N τ`i+1,?r ∣∣2(∂2nnf̂r(τ `i , N τ`i ,?r )− ∂2nnf̂r(τ `i , ητ`i+1,?r ))dr]∣∣∣∣






∣∣∆N τ`i+1,?r ∣∣ n`−1∑
i=0
∣∣∆N τ`i+1,?r ∣∣2dr] `→0−−→ 0,
where in the first equality we used the fact that the first order term in the expansion for n cancels.




r . Lastly, the limit follows in light of the continuity of x 7−→ ft(x) and the continuity of
(t, x) 7−→ Pνt,x for the weak topology. Therefore the limits in (2.10.6) agree.
We now study the first order term, in n, in (2.10.6) together with I2, as defined in (2.10.5).











t ] we have that there




















































































































































∣∣∣EPντ`i ,· [N τ`i+1,?r ]−N τ`i ,?r ∣∣∣2dr] `−→0−−−→ 0,
where the inequality follows again from Assumption E.(i) and the fact that θi ∈ [0, 1]. The limit
follows from Assumption E.(iii).










































































































































at last we use the fact that, by definition, n̂u,?r = 0, dt⊗ dP





























The argument for the fourth term in (2.10.1) is analogous, but simpler, to that of the third
term in (2.10.1) exploiting the corresponding properties in Assumption E.(ii)–E.(iii).
We close this section with the proof of the necessity result in the extension section, namely
Theorem 2.4.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.4. This proof is analogous to the proof in the standard case. We just have
to verify the assumptions allow us to obtain the new version of the results. Indeed, let us result
that the proof of Theorem 2.2.10 in Section 2.7 is divided into two parts.
The first part consist of an application of the comparison theorem for the BSDE with terminal
condition ξ + G(T, g(X)) and generator h for every P ∈ P(t, x). Recall that as a function of z,
h is still Lipschitz. So all we are left to verify is that the term in F outside of the sup has the
appropriate integrability, i.e. that for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , P ∈ P(t, x), ∂Y ∈ Hps,x(R,F
X,P
+ ,P)
and m̂2 ∈ Hps,x(R,F
X,P
+ ,P), recall that by assumption ∂2nnG is bounded.The first result is immediate
from Assumption F.(i). The result for m̂2 follow from the integrability assumption on g(X).
The second part of the proof is argued in the same way by introducing the regularised version
of the value function v+.
2.10.3 Auxiliary lemmata
To being with we present a result that justifies our choice of the class A(t, x) in our definition
of equilibrium.
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Lemma 2.10.3.1. Let τ ∈ Tt,T , ν ∈ A(x) and ν̃ ∈ A(t, x). Then, Pν⊗τ ν̃ = Pν ⊗τ Pν̃τ,·, ν ⊗τ ν̃ ∈
A(t, x), A(t, x, τ) = A(t, x).
Proof. The latter two results follows from the first. Let ν̃ ∈ A(t, x), we claim that Pν ⊗τ Pν̃τ,X is
well defined and solves the martingale problem associated with ν ⊗τ ν?. Indeed, by [232, Exercise
6.7.4, Theorem 6.2.2] we have that ω 7−→ Pν?τ(ω),X(τ(ω),ω)[A] is Fτ -measurable for any A ∈ F , and
Pν?τ(ω),X(τ(ω),ω)[Ω
ω
τ ] = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, Theorem 2.1.1 guarantees Pν ⊗τ(·) Pν̃τ(·),X(·) is well
defined and Pν ⊗τ(·) Pντ(·),X(·) equals P
ν on Fτ and (δω ⊗τ(ω) Pν
?
τ(ω),x)ω∈Ω is an r.c.p.d. of P
ν ⊗τ Pντ,X
given Fτ . In combination with [232, Theorem 1.2.10] this yields Mϕ is a (F,Pν ⊗τ Pν,τ,X)–local
martingale on [t, T ] with control ν ⊗τ ν?.
Lemma 2.10.3.2. Given (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , τ ∈ Tt,T , (M, M̃) ∈ M(t, x) ×M(t, x) such that





Proof. This follows from Lemma 2.10.3.1 and the fact we can commute changes of measure and
concatenation.
Lemma 2.10.3.3. For ` > 0 let (γ`i )i∈[n`] be sample points as in Theorem 2.2.2. (γ̂`i )i∈[n`] are
F–stopping times.
Proof. We study (γ̂`i )i∈[n`] as the argument for the other sequences in the proof is similar. The
result follows from a direct application of Galmarino’s test, see [69, CH. IV. 99–101], we recall it
next for completeness: Let % be FT -measurable function with values in [0, T ]. % is a stopping time
if and only if for every t ∈ [0, T ] we have that %(ω) ≤ t, (Xr,Wr,∆r[ϕ])(ω) = (Xr,Wr,∆r[ϕ])(ω̃)
for all (r, ϕ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb([0, T ]×A) implies %(ω) = %(ω̃).
Now, in the context of Theorem 2.2.2 we are given Π` = (τ `i )i∈[n`] a collection of stopping times
that partitions the interval [σ, τ ] ⊆ [0, T ]. As ` > 0 is fixed we drop the dependence of the partition
on ` and write Π = (τi)i∈[n]. Without loss of generality we consider the case of a partition of [0, T ].
For ω ∈ Ω we can use [240, Theorem 1] to obtain a sequence of sample points (%i(ω))i∈[n] of the
intervals prescribed by Π, i.e. %i(ω) ∈ [τi−1(ω), τi(ω)] for all i. We want to show %i ∈ T0,T for all i.
A close inspection to the proof of [241, Theorem 1] allows us to see that for fixed ω ∈ Ω the
choice of %i(ω) depends solely on [τi−1(ω), τi(ω)] and the application t 7−→ ft(t, x, a) for (t, x, a) ∈
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[0, T ] × X × A. We recall that as the supremum is taken over Apw(t, x) the action process is a
fix value a ∈ A over the interval [τi−1, τi]. We first note that for ω̃ ∈ Ω as above the fact that
Π ⊂ T0,T , i.e. {τi ≤ t} ∈ Ft, implies Π(ω̃) = Π(ω). Next, we observe that ft(t,X, νi)(ω) =
ft(t, x·∧t, a) = ft(t,X, νi)(ω̃) as is ft(s, x, a) is optional for every (s, a) ∈ [0, T ]×A. These two facts
imply %i(ω) = %i(ω̃) and the result follows.
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Part III
Backward stochastic Volterra integral
equations
Chapter 3
Lipschitz backward stochastic Volterra integral
equations
We saw in Chapter 2 that backward stochastic Volterra integral equations, BSVIEs for short,
appear naturally in the study of time-inconsistent stochastic control problems from a game theoretic
point of view, see Section 2.2.3 for details. This chapter is concerned with introducing a unified
method to address the well-posedness of these objects in the case of Lipschitz data.
In particular, we study a novel general class of multidimensional type-I backward stochastic
Volterra integral equations. Toward this goal, we introduce an infinite family of standard backward
SDEs and establish its well-posedness, and we show that it is equivalent to that of a type-I backward
stochastic Volterra integral equation. We also establish a representation formula in terms of non-
linear semi-linear partial differential equation of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman type. As an application,
we consider the study of time- inconsistent stochastic control from a game-theoretic point of view.
We show the equivalence of two current approaches to this problem from both a probabilistic and
an analytic point of view.
3.1 On Volterra BSDEs
In this chapter we want to build upon the strategy devised in Chapter 2 and address the well-
posedness of a general and novel class of type-I BSVIEs. We let X be the solution to a drift-less
stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short) under a probability measure P, and F be the P-
augmentation of the filtration generated by X, see Section 3.2 for details, and consider a tuple
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(Y ·· , Z ·· , N ·· ), of appropriately F-adapted processes, satisfying for any s ∈ [0, T ]
Y st = ξ(s) +
∫ T
t






dN sr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (3.1.1)
We remark that the additional process N corresponds to a martingale process which is P-
orthogonal to X. This is a consequence of the fact that we work with a general filtration F. To
the best of our knowledge, a theory for type-I BSVIEs, as general as the ones introduced above,
remains absent in the literature. Moreover, such class of type-I BSVIEs has only been mentioned
in [114, Remark 3.8] as an interesting generalisation of a classic type-I BSVIEs.
Our approach is based on the following class of infinite families of BSDEs
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
hr(X·∧r,Yr,Zr, Y rr , Zrr , ∂Y rr )dr −
∫ T
t
Z>r dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
Y st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t




>dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
∂Y st = ∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t




>dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
where (Y,Z,N , Y, Z,N, ∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) are unknown, and required to have appropriate integrability,
see Section 3.3 and Equation (S).
We first establish the well-posedness of (S), see Theorem 3.3.5. For this it is important to
be able to identify the proper spaces to carry out the analyses, see Remark 3.3.3. Moreover, we
show that, for an appropriate choice of data for (S), its well-posedness is equivalent to that of the
type-I BSVIE (3.1.1), see Theorem 3.4.3. Noticeably, our approach can naturally be specialised to
obtain the well-posedness of previous BSVIEs considered in the literrature in the classic spaces, see
Remark 3.4.4. Moreover, as our results provide an alternative approach to BSVIEs, it may allow
for the future design of new numerical schemes to solve type-I BSVIEs, which to the best of our
knowledge, remain limited to [21]. In addition, we recover classical results for this general class of
multidimensional type-I BSVIEs. We provide a priori estimates, show the stability of solutions as
well as a representation formula in terms of a semilinear PDEs, see Proposition 3.5.1. Given our
multidimensional setting, we refrained from considering comparison results, see Wang and Yong
[254] for the one-dimensional case.
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As an application of our results, we consider the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent
stochastic control problems. We recall this approach studies the problem faced by the, so-called,
sophisticated agent who aware of the inconsistency of its preferences seeks for consistent plans,
i.e. equilibria. We show that as a consequence of Theorem 3.4.3, one can reconcile two recent
probabilistic approaches to this problem. Moreover, we provide, see Proposition 3.5.3, an equivalent
result for two earlier analytic approaches, based on semi-linear PDEs. We believe this helps to
elucidate connections between the different takes on the problem available in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the stochastic basis on
a canonical space as well as the integrability spaces necessary to our analysis. Section 3.3 precisely
formulates the class of infinite families of BSDEs (S), which is the crux of our approach, and
provides the statement of its well-posedness, while the proof is deferred to Section 3.6. Section 3.4
introduces the class of type-I BSVIEs which are the main object of this paper, and establishes
the equivalence of its well-posedness with that of (S) for a particular choice of data. Section 3.5
deals with the representation formula for the class of type-I BSVIEs considered, and presents the
application of our results in the context of time-inconsistent stochastic control. Finally, Section 3.6
includes the analysis of (S).
3.2 The stochastic basis on the canonical space
As a note to the reader, we mention that in the spirit of keeping the formulation of each chapter
self-contained we will present it at the beginning of each of the remaining chapter of the thesis.
This will create a modest level of repetition.
We fix two positive integers n and m, which represent respectively the dimension of the mar-
tingale which will drive our equations, and the dimension of the Brownian motion appearing in
the dynamics of the former. We consider the canonical space X = Cn, with canonical process
X. We let F be the Borel σ-algebra on X (for the topology of uniform convergence), and we
denote by FX := (FXt )t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration of X. We fix a bounded Borel-measurable map
σ : [0, T ]× X −→ Rn×m, σ·(X) ∈ Pmeas(Rn×m,FX), and an initial condition x0 ∈ Rn. We assume
there is P ∈ Prob(X ) such that P[X0 = x0] = 1 and X is martingale, whose quadratic variation,
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〈X〉 = (〈X〉t)t∈[0,T ], is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, with density given
by σσ>. Enlarging the original probability space, see Stroock and Varadhan [232, Theorem 4.5.2],
there is an Rm-valued Brownian motion B with
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X·∧r)dBr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
We now let F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the (right-limit) of the P-augmentation of FX . We stress that we
will not assume P is unique. In particular, the predictable martingale representation property for
(F,P)-martingales in terms of stochastic integrals with respect to X might not hold.
Remark 3.2.1. We remark that the previous formulation on the canonical is by no means neces-
sary. Indeed, any probability space supporting a Brownian motion B and a process X satisfying the
previous SDE will do, and this can be found whenever that equation has a weak solution.
3.2.1 Functional spaces and norms
We now introduce our spaces. In the following, (Ω,FT ,F,P) is as in Section 3.2. We are given
a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, i.e. E = Rk for some non-negative integer k and | · | denotes
the Euclidean norm. For any (p, q) ∈ (1,∞)2, we introduce the spaces
• Lp(E) of FT -measurable, E-valued random variables ξ, with ‖ξ‖pLp := EP[|ξ|p] <∞;

























• Mp(E) of martingales M ∈ Popt(E,F) which are P-orthogonal to X (that is the product XM is








• Lp,2(E) denotes the space of families (ξ(s))s∈[0,T ] of FT -measurable E-valued random variables
such that the mapping ([0, T ]× Ω,B([0, T ])⊗ F) −→ (Lp(E), ‖ · ‖Lp) : s 7−→ ξ(s) is continuous,




• P2meas(E,FT ) of two parameter processes (U st )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 : ([0, T ]2 × Ω,B([0, T ]2) ⊗ FT ) −→
(E,B(E)) measurable.
Finally, given an arbitrary integrability space (Ip(E), ‖ · ‖I), we introduce the space
• Ip,2(E) of (U st )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(E,FT ) such that the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Ip(E), ‖ ·
‖Ip) : s 7−→ U s is continuous and ‖U‖pIp,2 := sups∈[0,T ] ‖U
s‖pIp <∞.
For example, Hp,2(E) denotes the space of (Zst )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(E,FT ), ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→
(Hp(E), ‖ · ‖Hp) : s 7−→ Zs is continuous and ‖Z‖pHp,2 := sups∈[0,T ] ‖Z
s‖pHp <∞.
Lastly we introduce the space, see Remark 3.2.2 for further details,
• Hp,2(E) of (Zst )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(E,FT ) such that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Hp(E), ‖ · ‖Hp) : s 7−→
Zs is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure1, Z ∈ H2(E), where Z :=
(Ztt )t∈[0,T ] is given by
Ztt := ZTt −
∫ T
t























Lq,p,2(E) and Hp,2(E) are Banach spaces.
In addition, we remark that the space H2(E) being closed implies Hp,2(E) is a closed subspace
of Hp,2(E) and thus a Banach space. The space Hp,2(E) allows us to define a good candidate for
(Ztt )t∈[0,T ] as an element of H2(E).2 Let Ω̃ := [0, T ]×X and ω̃ := (t, x) ∈ Ω̃. By the Radon–Nikodým
property and Fubini’s theorem, we may define
Zs(ω̃) := ZTt (x)−
∫ T
s
ðZrt (x)dr, dt⊗ dP–a.e. ω̃ ∈ Ω̃, s ∈ [0, T ],
1We recall that H2, being a Hilbert space and in particular a reflexive Banach space, has the so-called Radon–
Nikodým property, see [216, Corollary 5.45]. Thus the absolute continuity of the H2-valued mapping s 7−→ Zs is
equivalent to the existence of the density (ðZs)s∈[0,T ], which is unique for Lebesgue–a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. The fact Z is
well-defined is argued in Remark 3.2.2
2This is based on [114, Section 2.1]. The mapping s 7−→ Zs is assumed absolutely continuous, as opposed to
continuously differentiable. We are indebted to Yushi Hamaguchi for pointing out inconsistencies in the definition of
H2,2 on an earlier version of this chapter.
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so that Zs = Zs, dt⊗ dP–a.e., s ∈ [0, T ]. Lastly, as ω̃ ∈ Ω̃, s 7−→ Zs(ω̃) is continuous, we define
Ztt := ZTt −
∫ T
t
ðZrt dr, for dt⊗ dP–a.e. (t, x) in [0, T ]×X .
3.3 An infinite family of Lipschitz BSDEs
We are given jointly measurable mappings h, g, ξ and η, such that for any (y, z, u, v,u) ∈
Rd1× Rn×d1× Rd2× Rn×d2× Rd2
h : [0, T ]×X × Rd1× Rn×d1× Rd2× Rn×d2× Rd2−→ Rd1 , h·(·, y, z, u, v, u) ∈ Pprog(Rd1 ,F),
g : [0, T ]2 ×X × Rd2× Rn×d2× Rd1× Rn×d1−→ Rd2 , g·(s, ·, u, v, y, z) ∈ Pprog(Rd2 ,F),
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ Rd1 , η : [0, T ]×X −→ Rd2 .
Moreover, we work under the following set of assumptions.
Assumption G. (i) (s, u, v) 7−→ gt(s, x, u, v, y, z) (resp. s 7−→ η(s, x)) is continuously differenti-
able, uniformly in (t, x, y, z) (resp. in x). Moreover, the mapping ∇g : [0, T ]2×X ×(Rd2×Rn×d2)2×
Rd1× Rn×d1−→ Rd2 defined by
∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z) := ∂sgt(s, x, u, v, y, z) + ∂ugt(s, x, u, v, y, z)u +
n∑
i=1
∂v:igt(s, x, u, v, y, z)vi:,
satisfies ∇g·(s, ·, u, v, u, v, y, z) ∈ Pprog(Rd2 ,F);
(ii) (y, z, u, v,u) 7−→ ht(x, y, z, u, v, u) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. ∃Lh > 0, such that
for all (t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃, u, ũ, v, ṽ,u, ũ)
|ht(x, y, z, u, v, u)− ht(x, ỹ, z̃, ũ, ṽ, ũ)|
≤ Lh
(
|y − ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z − z̃)|+ |u− ũ|+ |σt(x)>(v − ṽ)|+ |u− ũ|
)
;
(iii) for ϕ ∈ {g, ∂sg}, (u, v, y, z) 7−→ ϕt(s, x, u, v, y, z) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e.
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∃Lϕ > 0, such that for all (s, t, x, u, ũ, v, ṽ, y, ỹ, z, z̃)
|ϕt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− ϕt(s, x, ũ, ṽ, ỹ, z̃)| ≤ Lϕ
(
|u− ũ|+ |σt(x)>(v − ṽ′)|+ |y − ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z − z̃)|
)
;











Remark 3.3.1. We comment on the set of requirements in Assumption G. Of particular interest
is Assumption G.(i), the other being the standard Lipschitz assumptions on the generators as well
as their integrability at zero. Anticipating the introduction of (S) below and the discussion in
Remark 3.3.3, Assumption G.(i) will allow us to identify the second BSDE in the system as the
antiderivative of the third one, see Remark 3.3.3.
We define the space (H, ‖ · ‖H), whose elements we denote h = (Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M),
where
H := S2(Rd1)×H2(Rn×d1)×M2(Rd1)× S2,2(Rd2)×H2,2(Rn×d2)×M2,2(Rd2)
× S2,2(Rd2)×H2,2(Rn×d2)×M2,2(Rd2),
















We are now ready to precise the class of systems subject to our study. Given (ξ, η, ∂sη) ∈
L2(Rd1) × (L2,2(Rd2))2, ∂sη as in Assumption G, we consider the system, which for any s ∈ [0, T ]
holds, P–a.s., for every t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







dM sr , (S)
∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








Definition 3.3.2. We say h is a solution to (S) if h ∈ H and (S) holds.
Remark 3.3.3. We now expound on our choice for the set-up and the structure of (S).
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(i) We first highlight two aspects which are crucial to establish the connection between (S) and
type-I BSVIE (3.1.1). The first is the presence of ∂U in the generator of the first equation. This
causes the system to be fully coupled but is nevertheless necessary in our methodology, this will be
clear from the proof of Theorem 3.4.3 in Section 3.4. The second relates to our choice to write
three equations instead of two. In fact, our approach is based on being able to identify ∂U as the
derivative with respect to the s variable of U in an appropriate sense and, at least formally, it is
clear that the third equation allows us to do so, see Lemma 3.6.1 for details. Alternatively, we could
have chosen not to write the third equation and consider the system which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds
P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t














s corresponds to the density with respect to the Lebesgue measure of s 7−→ U s. Never-
theless, for the proof of well-posedness of (S) that we present in Section 3.6, we have to derive
appropriate estimates for (∂U tt )t∈[0,T ], and for this it is advantageous to do the identification by
adding the third equation in (S) and work on the space (H, ‖ · ‖H).
(ii) We also emphasise that the presence of (V tt )t∈[0,T ] in the generator of the first equation requires
us to reduce the space of the solution from the classic (H, ‖ · ‖H) to (H, ‖ · ‖H) where
H := S2(Rd1)×H2(Rn×d1)×M2(Rd1)× S2,2(Rd2)×H2,2(Rn×d2)×M2,2(Rd2)
× S2,2(Rd2)×H2,2(Rn×d2)×M2,2(Rd2),
and ‖ · ‖H denotes the norm induced by H. Ultimately, this is due to the presence of (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] in
the type-I BSVIE (3.1.1). On this matter, we stress that to the best of our knowledge, our results
constitute the first comprehensive study of type-I BSVIEs as general as (3.1.1). We remark our
identification of the appropriate space to carry out the analysis is based on [114, Section 2.1]. In
the case where (V tt )t∈[0,T ] (resp. (Ztt )t∈[0,T ]
)
does not appear in the generator of the first BSDE in
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(S) (resp. type-I BSVIE (3.1.1)), Proposition 3.6.5 (resp. Remark 3.4.4) provide the arguments
for how one can adapt our approach to yield a solution in the classical space. This shows that
our methodology recovers existing results on type-I BSVIE (1.3.3) as well as the so-called extended
type-I BSVIE (1.3.5).
Remark 3.3.4. In addition, we highlight two features of (S) that will come into play in the setting
of type-I BSVIE (3.1.1), and differ from the one in the classic literature. They are related to the fact
we work under the general filtration F. The first is the fact that the stochastic integrals in (S) are
with respect to the canonical process X. Recall that σ is not assumed to be invertible (it is not even
a square matrix in general and can vanish), therefore the filtration generated by X is different from
the one generated by B. This yields more general results and it allows for extra flexibility necessary
in some applications, see Chapter 2 for an example. The second difference is the presence of the
processes (N,M, ∂M). As it was mentioned in Section 3.2, we work with a probability measure for
which the martingale representation property for F–local martingales in terms of stochastic integrals
with respect to X does not necessarily hold. Therefore, we need to allow for orthogonal martingales
in the representation. Certainly, there are known properties which are equivalent to the orthogonal
martingales vanishing, i.e. N = M = ∂M = 0, for example when P is an extremal point of the
convex hull of the probability measures that satisfy the properties in Section 3.2, see [142, Theorem
4.29].
Assumption G provides an appropriate framework to derive the well-posedness of (S). The
following is the main theorem of this section whose proof we postpone to Section 3.6.
Theorem 3.3.5. Let Assumption G hold. Then (S) admits a unique solution in (H, ‖ · ‖H). For


































where for ϕ ∈ {Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M, ξ, η, ∂sη} and Φ ∈ {h, g,∇g}
δϕ := ϕ1−ϕ2, and δ1Φt := Φ1t (Y1r ,Z1t , U1tt , V 1tt )−Φ2t (Y 1r , Z1t , U1tt , V 1tt ), dt⊗ dP–a.e. on [0, T ]×X .
Remark 3.3.6. The reader may wonder about our choice to leave out the diagonal of ∂V in the
generator of the first equation in (S). As we will argue below, this would require us to consider
an auxiliary infinite family of quadratic BSDEs. Since the main purpose of this paper is to relate
the well-posedness of (S) to that of the type-I BSVIE (3.1.1), and inasmuch as we do not need
to consider this case to establish Theorem 3.4.3, we have refrained to pursue it in this document.
Nevertheless, this case is covered as part of the study of the extension of (S) to the quadratic case
in Chapter 4. If we were to study the system, which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








and as it is clear from our analysis in Section 3.6, its well-posedness requires both having a
rigorous method to define the mapping t 7−→ ∂V tt , as well as deriving a priori estimates for the
norm of ∂V tt . In analogy with Lemma 3.6.1 and Remark 3.3.3, both tasks require us to make sense
of the family of BSDEs with terminal condition ∂ssη and generator






πiπjgt(s, x, u, v, y, z)π̃j ,
where Π :=
(




1,u, v1:, ..., vn:
)
and ∂2πiπjgt(s, x, u, v, y, z) denote the second
order derivatives of g. Even though we could add assumptions ensuring that the second order
derivatives are bounded, it is clear from the second term in the generator that we would necessarily
need to consider a quadratic framework.
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3.4 Well-posedness of Lipschitz type-I BSVIEs
We now address the well-posedness of type-I BSVIEs. Let d be a non-negative integer, and f
and ξ be jointly measurable functionals such that for any (s, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× (Rd × Rn×d)2
f : [0, T ]2 ×X × (Rd × Rn×d)2 −→ Rd, f·(s, ·, y, z, u, v) ∈ Pprog(Rd,F),
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ Rd, ξ(s, ·) is F-measurable.
To derive the main result in this section, we will exploit the well-posedness of (S). Therefore,
we work under the following set of assumptions.
Assumption H. (i) (s, y, z) 7−→ ft(s, x, y, z, u, v) (resp. s 7−→ ξ(s, x)) is continuously differenti-
able, uniformly in (t, x, u, v) (resp. in x). Moreover, the mapping ∇f : [0, T ]2×X×(Rd×Rn×d)3 −→
Rd defined by
∇ft(s, x,u, v, y, z, u, v) := ∂sft(s, x, y, z, u, v) + ∂yft(s, x, y, z, u, v)u +
n∑
i=1
∂z:ift(s, x, y, z, u, v)vi:,
satisfies ∇f·(s, ·, y, z, u, v, u, v) ∈ Pprog(Rd,F) for all s ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) for ϕ ∈ {f, ∂sf}, (u, v, y, z) 7−→ ϕt(s, x, y, z, u, v) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. ∃Lϕ >
0, such that for all (s, t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃, u, ũ, v, ṽ)
|ϕt(s, x, y, z, u, v)− ϕt(s, x, ỹ, z̃, ũ, ṽ)| ≤ Lϕ
(















Let (H?, ‖ · ‖H?) denote the space of (Y, Z,N) ∈ H? such that ‖(Y,Z,N)‖H? <∞ where





We consider the n-dimensional type-I BSVIE on (H?, ‖ · ‖H?) which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds
P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Y st = ξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t







dN sr . (3.4.1)
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We work under the following notion of solution.
Definition 3.4.1. We say (Y, Z,N) is a solution to the type-I BSVIE (3.4.1) if (Y,Z,N) ∈ H?
verifies (3.4.1).
Defining ht(x, y, z, u, v, u) := ft(t, x, y, z, u, v) − u, we may consider the system, which for any
s ∈ [0, T ], holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t







Y st = ξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t







dN sr , (Sf )
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t








Remark 3.4.2. We now make a few comments on our set-up for the study type-I BSVIE (3.4.1).
(i) The necessity of the set of assumptions in Assumption H to our approach, based on the systems
introduced in Section 3.3, is clear. Compared to the set of assumption made by recent works on
BSVIEs in the literature we notice the main difference is the regularity with respect to the s variable
we imposed on the data of the problem, i.e. Assumption H.(i). In particular, we highlight that type-
I BSVIE (1.3.5), in which the diagonal of Y , but not of Z is allowed in the generator, had been
considered in [114; 244]. In such a scenario, the authors assumed (ξ, f) ∈ L2,2(Rd) × L1,2,2(Rd),
and no additional condition is required to obtain the well-posedness of (1.3.5). As it will be clear
from Proposition 3.6.5 and Remark 3.4.4 our procedure can be adapted to work under such set of
assumptions provided the diagonal of Z is not considered in the generator.
(ii) Moreover, the spaces of the solution considered in [114; 244] also differ, echoing the absence
of the diagonal of Z in the generator. The authors work with the notion of C-solution, that is,
Y is assumed to be a jointly measurable process, such that s 7−→ Y s is continuous in L1,p(Rd),
p ≥ 2, and for every s ∈ [0, T ], Y s is F-adapted with P–a.s. continuous paths. This coincides with
our definition of the space L1,p,2(Rd). Similarly, Z belongs to the space H2,2(Rn×d). On the other
hand, [245] provides a representation formula for type-I BSVIEs for which the driver allows for
the diagonal of Z, but not of Y . More precisely, they introduce a PDE, similar to the one we will
introduce in Section 3.5, prove its well-posedness, and then a Feynman–Kac formula. Naturally, in
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this case (Y, Z) inherits the regularity of the underlying PDE.
(iii) The main contribution of our methodology to the field of BSVIEs is to be able to accommodate
type-I BSVIEs for which the diagonal of Z appears in the generator. For this, the definition of the
space (H?, ‖ · ‖H?), notably the space H2,2(Rn×d), and Assumption H.(i) play a central role. As
first noticed in Chapter 2, see Lemma 3.6.1, under this assumption one can identify the density,
with respect to the Lebesgue measure, of the H2-valued mapping s 7−→ Zs, namely the H2-valued
mapping s 7−→ ∂Zs. This allows us to define the diagonal of Z following [114, Section 2.1], and
consequently, introduce the space H2,2(Rn×d).
(iv) We highlight that Theorem 3.4.3 below guarantees a unique solution to (3.4.1) in the space
H?, for which the mapping s 7−→ Zs is assumed to be absolutely continuous, cf. [114, Section
2.1]. This allows for extra generality compare to assuming such mapping is, a priori, continuously
differentiable. Nevertheless, as a by-product of Assumption H.(i), the unique solution ensured by
Theorem 3.4.3 is automatically C1 with derivative s 7−→ ∂Zs. Moreover, not only does our approach
identify the dynamics of (∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N), but also, in the terminology of [114, Section 2.1], it does
guarantee (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] is the unique process that satisfies the (D)-property with respect to Z.
(v) Let us remark that Assumption H.(i), being an assumption on the data of the BSVIE, is easier
to verify in practice compare to the regularity required in [114]. Certainly, our results would still
hold true if we require the differentiability of data (ξ, f) with respect to the parameter s in the L2
(resp. L1,2) sense, or, even better, absolute continuity,.
(vi) Lastly, we stress that the above type-I BSVIE is defined for (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, as opposed to
0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . However, anticipating the result of Theorem 3.4.3, this could be handled by first
solving on (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2 and then consider the restriction to 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
We are now in position to prove the main result of this paper. The next result shows that under
the previous choice of data for (Sf ), its solution solves the type-I BSVIE with data (ξ, f) and vice
versa.
Theorem 3.4.3. Let Assumption H hold. Then
(i) the well-posedness of (Sf ) is equivalent to that of the type-I BSVIE (3.4.1);
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(ii) the type-I BSVIE (3.4.1) is well-posed, and for any (Y, Z,N) ∈ H? solution to type-I BSVIE












Moreover, if (Y i, Zi, N i) ∈ H? denotes the solution to type-I BSVIE (3.4.1) with data (ξi, f i) for
i ∈ {1, 2}, we have













Proof. (ii) is a consequence of (i). Indeed, (3.4.2) follows from Proposition 3.6.3, and the well-
posedness of type-I BSVIE (3.4.1) from that of (Sf ), which holds by Assumption H and The-
orem 3.3.5. We now argue (i).
Let (Y,Z,N , Y, Z,N, ∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) ∈ H be a solution to (Sf ). It then follows from Lemma 3.6.2




r dr, t ∈ [0, T ], we have that P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Y tt = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t










(Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ],Y·,Z·, (Ñt)t∈[0,T ]
)
, solves the first BSDE in (Sf ). It then
follows from the well-posedness of (Sf ), which holds by Assumption H and Theorem 3.3.5, that(
(Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ], (Ñt)t∈[0,T ]
)
= (Y·,Z·,N·) in S2(Rd)×H2(Rn×d)×M2(Rd). Consequently
Y st = ξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t







dN sr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
We are left to show the converse result. Let (Y, Z,N) ∈ H? be a solution to type-I BSVIE
(3.4.1). We begin by noticing that the processes Y := (Y tt )t∈[0,T ],Z := (Ztt )t∈[0,T ],N := (N tt )t∈[0,T ]
are well-defined. In particular, Z ∈ H2(Rn×d) is well-defined as Z ∈ H2,2(Rn×d). Moreover,


















Then, since Assumption H holds and (Y,Z, Y, Z,N) ∈ L2(Rd)×H2(Rn×d)×S2,2(Rd)×H2,2(Rn×d)×
M2,2(Rd), we obtain, from Lemma 3.6.1, there is (∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) ∈ S2,2(Rd)×H2,2(Rn×d)×M2,2(Rd)
such that for s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t













t ∈ [0, T ]. For this, we first note that in light of Lemmata 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 we have that P–a.s. for
any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t







and Ñ ∈ M2,2(Rd). We are only left to argue Y ∈ S2(Rd). Note that by Assumption H and

















































We conclude ‖h‖H <∞, h ∈ H and thus h solves (Sf ).
Remark 3.4.4. There are two noticeable differences between Theorem 3.4.3 and the results in the
literature on type-I BSVIEs (1.3.3), (1.3.4) and (1.3.5), as previously studied in Chapter 2, [269],
[245] and [114; 244], respectively. The first is the additional terms, involving the derivative with
respect to the parameter s of the data, appearing in the a priori estimates and the stability. The
second one, is the space where the solution lives. Both differences are due to the fact that we are
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handling the diagonal term for Z in the generator.
In fact, in light of Proposition 3.6.5 for the case of type-I BSVIEs (1.3.5), i.e. where only the
diagonal of Y is allowed in the generator, one can work in the more standard (compared to the
existing literature) space (H?, ‖ · ‖H?) given by













and for (Y i, Zi, N i) the solution to type-I BSVIE (1.3.5) with data (ξi, f i) for i ∈ {1, 2}, we obtain









3.5 Time-inconsistency, type-I BSVIEs and parabolic
PDEs
This section is devoted to the application of our results in Section 3.4 to the problem of time-
inconsistent control for sophisticated agents. Moreover, we also reconcile seemingly different ap-
proaches to the study of this problem.
3.5.1 A representation formula for adapted solutions of type-I BS-
VIEs
Building upon the fact that second-order, parabolic, semilinear PDEs of HJB type admit a
non-linear Feynman–Kac representation formula, we can identify the family of PDEs associated to
Type-I BSVIEs. This is similar to the representation of forward backward stochastic differential
equations, FBSDEs for short, see [255].

















, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Let f and σ be as in the preceding section, and
b : [0, T ]×X −→ Rm be bounded, b·(X) ∈ Pmeas(Rm,F) and
G
(
s, t, x, u, v, y, z, γ
)
:= v>σ(t, x)b(t, x) + 12Tr[σσ
>(t, x)γ] + f(s, t, x, u, v, y, z).
Proposition 3.5.1. Suppose ϕt(X, ·) = ϕt(Xt, ·) for ϕ ∈ {b, σ, f, ∂sf}, and ϕ(s,X) = ϕ(s,XT ) for
ϕ ∈ {ξ, ∂sξ}. For (O := [0, T )× [0, T ]× Rn =, let V ∈ Cd1,1,2([0, T ]2 × Rn) be a classical solution to
∂tV(s, t, x) +G
(
s, t, x, V(s, t, x), ∂xV(s, t, x), V(t, t, x), ∂xV(t, t, x), ∂2xxV(s, t, x)
)
= 0, (s, t, x) ∈ O,
V(s, T, x) = ξ(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
for which V(s, t, x) and ∂xV(s, t, x) have uniform exponential growth in x3, i.e.
∃C > 0,∀(s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X , |V(t, x)|+ |∂xV(t, x)| ≤ C exp(C|x|1).
Then, Y st := V(s, t,Xt), and Zst := ∂xV(s, t,Xt) define a solution to the type-I BSVIE which for
every s ∈ [0, T ] holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]











Proof. Let s ∈ [0, T ] and P as in Section 3.2. Applying Itô’s formula to Y st we find that P–a.s.


























We verify the integrability of (Y,Z). As σ is bounded, Xt has exponential moments of any
order which are bounded on [0, T ], i.e. ∃C > 0, such that supt∈[0,T ] EP[exp(c|Xt|1)] ≤ C < ∞, for
any c > 0, where C depends on T and the bound on σ. This together with the growth condition
on V(s, t, x) and ∂xV(s, t, x) yield the integrability.
Remark 3.5.2. In the previous result the type-I BSVIEs has an additional term linear in z. This
3Here, | · |1 denotes the `1 norm in Rn as in Theorem 2.2.8
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is a consequence of the dynamics of X under P, see Section 3.2. Nevertheless, as b is bounded, we











By Girsanov’s theorem Bb := B −
∫ ·
0 br(Xr)dr is a Pb–Brownian motion and






σr(Xr)dBbr, t ∈ [0, T ], Pb–a.s.,
and consequently
Y st = Y sT +
∫ T
t
fr(s,Xr, Y sr , Zsr , Y rr , Zrr )dr −
∫ T
t
Z>r dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
3.5.2 On equilibria and their value function in time-inconsistent
control problems
The game theoretic approach to time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous-
time started with the Markovian setting, and is grounded in the notion of equilibrium first proposed
in Ekeland and Pirvu [82], Ekeland and Lazrak [81], and the infinite family of PDEs, or Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman equation, provided by Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci [38], see Equation (2.2.9)
below. Soon after, Wei, Yong, and Yu [260] presented a verification argument via a one dimensional
PDE, but over an extended domain, see Equation (3.5.3) below. Both approaches have generated
independent lines of research in the community, including both analytic and probabilistic methods,
but no compelling connections have been established, as far as we know.
BSDEs and BSVIEs appear naturally as part of the probabilistic study of these problems. This
approach allows extensions to a non-Markovian framework, and to reward functionals given by
recursive utilities. Indeed, the approaches in Chapter 2 and [245] address these directions, and
can be regarded as extensions of [38] and [260], respectively. As such, it is not surprising that in
order to characterise an equilibrium and its associated value function, both Chapter 2 and [245]
lay down an infinite family of BSDEs, and a type-I BSVIEs, respectively. In fact, Theorem 2.2.8
and [245, Theorem 5.1] establish representation formulae for the analytic, i.e. PDEs, counterparts.
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Moreover, in Chapter 2 our approach through BSDEs led to the well-posedness of a BSVIE. This
is nothing but a manifestation of Theorem 3.4.3 which reconciles, at the probabilistic level, the
findings of Chapter 2 and [245]. Moreover, we also include Proposition 3.5.3 which does the same








Let A ⊆ Rp be a compact set, we introduce the mappings
f̄ : [0, T ]2 × Rn ×A −→ R, b : [0, T ]× Rn ×A −→ Rm, bounded,
with f·(s, ·, a) ∈ Pprog(R,F) and b·(·, a) ∈ Pmeas(Rm,F) for (s, a) ∈ [0, T ] × A. With this we may
define
ḡ(s, t, x, a, v) := f̄(s, t, x, a) + v · σ(t, x)b(t, x, a), H(s, t, x, v) := sup
a∈A
ḡ(s, t, x, a, v),
∇ḡ(s, t, x, a, v) := ∂sf̄(s, t, x, a) + v · σ(t, x)b(t, x, a),
and assume there is a? : [0, T ]2 ×Rn ×Rn −→ A, measurable, such that, ḡ(s, t, x, a?(s, t, x, v), v) =
H(s, t, x, v).
Following the approach of [245], let us assume that given an admissible A-valued strategy ν
over the interval [s, T ], the reward at s ∈ [0, T ] is given by the value at s of the Y coordinate of
the solution to the type-I BSVIE given by
Y νt = ξ(t,XT ) +
∫ T
t
ḡr(t,Xr, νr, Ztr)dr −
∫ T
t
Ztr · dXr, t ∈ [s, T ], P–a.s.
[245] finds that the value along the equilibrium policy coincides with the Y coordinate of the
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following type-I BSVIE











Ztr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
where the diagonal of Z appears in the generator. However, decoupling the dependence between
the time variable and the variable source of time-inconsistency, we can define for any s ∈ [0, T ],
P–a.s., for any t ∈ [0, T ]












It then follows from Theorem 3.4.3 that this approach is equivalent to that of Chapter 2 based
on the system which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]










∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,XT ) +
∫ T
t




We now move on to establish the connection of the analyses at the PDE level. The original
result of [38] is based on the semi-linear PDE system of HJB type given for
(
V (t, x),J (s, t, x)
)
∈
C1,2([0, T ]× Rn)× C1,1,2([0, T ]2 × Rn) and (s, t, x) ∈ O by
∂tV (t, x) +
1
2Tr[σσ
>(t, x)∂xxV (t, x)] +H(t, t, x, ∂xV (t, x))− ∂sJ (t, t, x) = 0,
∂tJ (s, t, x) +
1
2Tr[σσ
>(t, x)∂xxJ (s, t, x)] + ḡ
(
s, t, x, ∂xJ (s, t, x), a?
(
t, t, x, ∂xV (t, x)
))
= 0,
V (T, x) = ξ(T, x), J (s, T, x) = ξ(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd.
(3.5.2)
On the other hand, [260] considers the equilibrium HJB equation for J (s, t, x) ∈ C1,1,2([0, T ]2×Rn)
and (s, t, x) ∈ O given by
∂tV(s, t, x) +
1
2Tr[σσ
>(t, x)∂xxV(s, t, x)] + ḡ
(
s, t, x, ∂xV(t, t, x), a?
(
t, t, x, ∂xV(t, t, x)
))
= 0,
V(s, T, x) = ξ(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd.
(3.5.3)
By setting V(s, t, x) = J (s, t, x), it is immediate that a solution to (2.2.9) defines a solution to
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(3.5.3). The next proposition establishes the converse result.
Proposition 3.5.3. Suppose (3.5.2) and (3.5.3) are well-posed.
(i) Let J (s, t, x) solve (3.5.2) Then V(s, t, x) := J (s, t, x) solves (3.5.3).
(ii) Let V(s, t, x) solve (3.5.3). Then
(




V(t, t, x),V(s, t, x)
)
solves (3.5.2).
Proof. We are only left to argue (ii). It is clear
(
V (t, x),J (s, t, x)
)
∈ C1,2([0, T ]×Rn)×C1,1,2([0, T ]2×
Rn), the results follows as −∂tV (t, x) + ∂sJ (t, t, x) = −∂tV(t, t, x).
3.6 Analysis of the BSDE system
In order to alleviate notations, and as it is standard in the literature, we suppress the dependence
on ω, i.e. on X, in the functionals, and, write E instead of EP as the underlying probability measure
P is fixed. Moreover, we will write I2 instead of I2(E) for any of the integrability spaces involved,
the specific space E is fixed and understood without ambiguity.
3.6.1 Regularity of the system and the diagonal processes
In preparation to the proof of Theorem 3.3.5, we present next a couple of lemmata from which
we will benefit in the following. As a historical remark, we mention the following is in the spirit of
the analysis in Protter [211, Section 3] and Pardoux and Protter [202] of forward Volterra integral
equations.
A technical detail in our analysis is to identify appropriate spaces so that given (∂U,U, V,M)
one can rigorously define the processes
(
(U tt )t∈[0,T ], (V tt )t∈[0,T ], (M tt )t∈[0,T ], (∂U tt )t∈[0,T ]
)
. It is known
that for U ∈ S2,2, the diagonal process (U tt )t∈[0,T ] is well-defined. Indeed, this follows from the
pathwise regularity of U s for s ∈ [0, T ] and has been noticed since [114; 256] and Chapter 2. The
same argument works for (∂U,M) ∈ S2,2 × M2,2. Unfortunately, the same reasoning cannot be
applied for arbitrary V ∈ H2,2 and motives the introduction of the space H2,2 , see Remark 3.3.3.
Lemma 3.6.1. Let Assumption G hold and (Y,Z) ∈ L2 ×H2. Let (U, V,M) ∈ L2,2 ×H2,2 ×M2,2
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be a solution to
U st = η(s) +
∫ T
t







dM sr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ];
(i) there exist (∂U, ∂V, ∂M) ∈ S2,2×H2,2×M2,2 unique solution to the equation, which for s ∈ [0, T ]
holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
∂U st = ∂sη(s) +
∫ T
t







d∂M sr ; (3.6.1)







































UT − U s, V T − V s,MT −M s
)
; (3.6.3)











ε|σ>u V ru |2 + ε−1|σ>u ∂V ru |2dudr, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.6.4)
Proof. Note that in light of Assumption G.(i), for (t, s, x, u, v, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × Rd2 × Rd2×n ×
Rd1 × Rd1×n, (u, v) 7−→ ∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z) is linear. Therefore, for any s ∈ [0, T ] the second
equation defines a linear BSDE, in (∂U s, ∂V s), whose generator at zero, by Assumption G.(iii), is
in L1,2. Therefore, its solution (∂U s, ∂V s, ∂M s) ∈ S2×H2×M2 is well-defined from classic results,
see for instance Zhang [273] or [88]. The continuity of the applications s 7−→ (∂U s, ∂V s, ∂M s), e.g.
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S2, ‖ · ‖S2) : s 7−→ ∂U s, follows from the classical stability results of BSDE,
and that by assumption (U, V, Y, Z) ∈ L2,2×H2,2×L2×H2 and s 7−→ (∂sη(s),∇g̃(s)) is continuous.
This establishes (∂U, ∂V, ∂M) ∈ S2,2 ×H2,2 ×M2,2.
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(ii) follows from classic a priori estimates, but when the norms are considered over [t, T ] instead
of [0, T ]. Indeed, following the argument in [88, Proposition 2.1], applying Itô’s formula to ect|∂U st |2







∣∣∂U sr ∣∣2}+ ∫ T
t
ecr









































where in the second inequality we exploited the fact (u, v, y, z) 7−→ ∂sg(t, s, x, u, v, y, z) is Lipschitz,
see Assumption G.(iii), and C > 0 was appropriately updated.
Next, we assume (iii) and show (iv). In light of (i) and (iii), s 7−→ ∂V s is the density of
s 7−→ V s with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Arguing as in Remark 3.2.2, we obtain that we
can define
V tt := V Tt −
∫ T
t
∂V rt dr, dt⊗ dP–a.e. in [0, T ]×X . (3.6.5)
We now verify (3.6.4). By definition of V, Fubini’s theorem and Young’s inequality we have
that for ε > 0
∫ T
t



































ε|σ>u V ru |2 + ε−1|σ>u ∂V ru |2dudr.
Thus ‖V‖H2 <∞ and consequently V ∈ H2,2 . This proves (iv).
We now argue (iii). We also remark that a similar argument to the one in (i) shows that under
Assumption G U ∈ S2,2. We know the mapping [0, T ] 3 s 7−→ (∂Y s, ∂Zs, ∂M s) is continuous, in
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particular integrable. A formal integration with respect to s to (3.6.1) leads to
∫ T
s





























Fix s ∈ [0, T ] and let (Π`)` be a properly chosen sequence of partitions of [s, T ], as in van
Neerven [240, Theorem 1], Π` = (si)i=1,...,n` with ‖Π`‖ := supi |si+1− si| ≤ `. To ease the notation,







i , δφ := φT − φs, I`(∂sη(·, x)) :=
n∑
i=0
∆s`i∂sη(s`i , x), δη(x) := η(T, x)− η(s, x).
We then notice that for any t ∈ [0, T ]






∂zgu(·, U ·u, V ·u,Yu,Zu)∂V ·u
)




















I`(∂V )r − (δV )r
)>dXu − I`(∂M ·T − ∂M ·t)− δ(MT −Mt).
We now note that the integrability of (∂U, ∂V ) and (U, V ) yields I`(∂U)−(δU) ∈ S2,2 and I`(∂V )−
(δV ) ∈ H2,2. Therefore, Bouchard, Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou [40, Theorem 2.2] yields
‖I`(∂U)− (δU)‖2S2,2 + ‖I
`(∂V )− (δV )‖2H2,2 + ‖I
`(∂M)− (δM)‖2M2,2
≤ CE
[∣∣I`(∂sη(·))− δη∣∣2 + (∫ T
t
∣∣∣I`(∂sgu(·, U ·u, V ·u,Yu,Zu))− δgu(·, U ·u, V ·u,Yu,Zu)∣∣∣du)2].
To conclude, we first note that by our choice of (Π`)`, I`(∂U) converges to the Lebesgue integral
of ∂U s. In addition, the uniform continuity of s 7−→ ∂sη(s, x) and s 7−→ ∂sg(s, x, u, v, y, z), see
Assumption G.(i), justifies, via bounded convergence, the convergence in S2,2 (resp. H2,2) of I`(∂U s)
to UT − U s (resp. I`(∂V s) to V T − V s) as ` −→ 0. The result follows in virtue of the uniqueness
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of (U, V,M).
The next lemma identifies the dynamics of (U tt )t∈[0,T ].
Lemma 3.6.2. Let (Y,Z) ∈ L2×H2 and (U, ∂U, V, ∂V,M, ∂M) ∈ (L2,2)2×H2,2×H2,2×(M2,2)2
satisfy for any s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
U st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t


















V rr dXr −
∫ T
t
dM̃r, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,




r dr. Moreover, M̃ ∈M2.
Proof. We show that P–a.s., for any t ∈ [0, T ]
∫ T
t
∂U rr dr = UTT − U tt +
∫ T
t
gr(r, U rr , V rr ,Yr,Zr)dr −
∫ T
t




Indeed, note that, P–a.s., for any t ∈ [0, T ]
∫ T
t























By Fubini’s theorem, the change of variables formula for the Lebesgue integral, [212, Theorem















gu(u, Uuu , V uu ,Yu,Zu)− gu(t, U tu, V tu ,Yu,Zu)du.


















V uu − V tu)>dXu.









∂M rT − ∂M rr
)
dr = M̃T − M̃t +M tt −M tT .
We are left to verify M̃ ∈M2. Indeed, note that M̃0 = 0 and
(i) M̃ has càdlàg paths. This follows from the fact that, as F satisfies the usual conditions, there
exist a càdlàg modification of (M tt )t∈[0,T ], which, abusing notations, we still denote by (M tt )t∈[0,T ].
Indeed for t ∈ [0, T ]
M tt = MTt −
∫ T
t
∂M rt dr, P–a.s.


















∣∣Fu]dr = M tu − ∫ u
0
∂M rr dr −
∫ t
u
∂M rudr = M̃u;


















= XuM tu −Xu
∫ u
0




= XuM tu −Xu
∫ u
0
∂M rr dr −XuM tu +XuMuu
= XuM̃u,




r dr is Fu-measurable, the tower property and






























3.6.2 A priori estimates
We now establish a priori estimates for (S). To ease the readability, recall it holds for any
s ∈ [0, T ], holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








Let us introduce (Ho, ‖ ·‖Ho) and (Ho, ‖ ·‖Ho) where ‖ ·‖Ho and ‖ ·‖Ho denote the norms induced
by
Ho := L2 ×H2 ×M2 × L2,2 ×H2,2 ×M2,2 × L2,2 ×H2,2 ×M2,2,





To obtain estimates between the difference of solutions, it is more convenient to work with
norms defined by adding exponential weights. We recall, for instance, that for c ∈ [0,∞) the norm







and they are equivalent for any two values of c, since [0, T ] is compact. With this, we define the
norm ‖ · ‖Ho,c . In the following, we take the customary approach of introducing arbitrary constants
C > 0 to our analysis. These constants will typically depend on the data of the problem, e.g. the
Lipschitz constants and T and on the value of c unless otherwise stated.
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Proposition 3.6.3. Let Assumption G hold and (Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) ∈ Ho satisfy (S).
Then (Y, U, ∂U) ∈ S2 × S2,2 × S2,2. Furthermore, there exists a constant C > 0 such that for ‖ · ‖H


















Proof. We proceed in several steps. We recall that in light of Assumption G, dt⊗ dP–a.e.
|hr(Yr,Zr, U rr , V rr , ∂U rr ))| ≤ |h̃|+ Lh
(
|Yr|+ |σ>r Zr|+ |U rr |+ |σ>r V rr |+ |∂U rr |
)
,
|gr(s, U sr , V sr ,Yr,Zr))| ≤ |g̃(s)|+ Lg
(
|U sr |+ |σ>r V sr |+ |Yr|+ |σ>r Zr|
)
, (3.6.6)
|∇gr(s, ∂U sr , ∂V sr , U sr , V sr ,Yr,Zr))| ≤ |∇g̃r(s)|+ L∂sg
(




|∂U sr |+ |σ>r ∂V sr |
)
.
Step 1: we start with auxiliary estimates. By Meyer–Itô’s formula for e
c
































where L0 := L0(∂U s) denotes the non-decreasing and pathwise-continuous local time of the semi-
martingale ∂U s at 0, see [212, Chapter IV, pp. 216]. We also notice that for any s ∈ [0, T ] the last
two terms on the left-hand side are martingales, recall that ∂V s ∈ H2.
We now take conditional expectation with respect to Ft in Equation (3.6.7). We may use (3.6.6)
and the fact L0 is non-decreasing to derive that for t ∈ [0, T ] and c > 2Lg
e
c














































where L̄ := max{Lg, L∂sg}. Squaring in (3.6.8), we may use (I.1) and Jensen’s inequality to




t |2 ≤ Et
[

















Integrating the previous expression and taking expectation, it follows from the tower property







































































































































We now estimate the term V tt . In light of (3.6.2) and (3.6.4), with ectσ>t instead of σ>t , there

















































































































We emphasise that the constants (C∂u, Cu, Cv) ∈ (0,∞)3 depend only of the data of the problem
and are universal for any value of c > 4Lg.
Step 2: Let s ∈ [0, T ], we show that (Y, U, ∂U) ∈ S2× S2,2× S2,2. To alleviate the notation we
introduce
Y := (Y, U s, ∂U s), Z := (Z, V s, ∂V s), N := (N ,M s, ∂M s),
whose elements we may denote with superscripts, e.g. Y1, Y2, Y3 correspond to Y, U s, ∂U s.
By (I.1) and (3.6.6), we obtain that there exists C > 0, which may change value from line to
line, such that



































≤ 4‖V s‖2H2 . (3.6.12)
Taking supremum over t ∈ [0, T ] and expectation we obtain for s ∈ [0, T ]















Similarly, we obtain that there exists C > 0 such that for s ∈ [0, T ]












Given (η, ∂sη, g̃, ∂g̃) ∈ (L2,2)2 × (L1,2,2)2, (U, ∂U, V, ∂V,M, ∂M) ∈ (L2,2)2 × (H2,2)2 × (M2,2)2,
(3.6.13) and (3.6.14), the mapping
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S2, ‖ · ‖S2) : s 7−→ Yis is continuous for i ∈ {2, 3},























which in turn yields, in combination with (3.6.9), (3.6.10) and (3.6.11),
‖Y‖2S2 ≤ C
(




L2,2 + ‖V ‖
2

















Step 3: We obtain the estimate of the norm. To ease the notation we introduce
hr := hr(Yr,Zr, U rr , V rr , ∂U rr ), gr(s) := gr(s, U sr , V sr ,Yr,Zr),
∇gr(s) := ∇gr(s, ∂U sr , ∂V sr , U sr , V sr ,Yr,Zr).
By applying Itô’s formula to ect
(






∣∣Yit∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
ecr














2Yr · hr + 2U sr · gr(s) + 2∂U sr · ∇gr(s)− c(|Yr|2 + |U sr |2 + |∂U sr |2)
)
dr,











Indeed, the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality together with the fact that (Y, U s, ∂U s) ∈
(S2)3 shows that M is uniformly integrable, and consequently a true martingale. Moreover, we
insist on the fact that the integrals with respect to N , M s and ∂M s account for possible jumps,
see [142, Lemma 4.24].
Moreover, as (Y, U, ∂U) ∈ S2× (S2,2)2, from (3.6.6) and with Young’s inequality we obtain that
for any (ε, ε̃) ∈ (0,∞)2, there is C(ε̃) ∈ (0,∞) such that the left-hand side above is smaller than
≤ ecT
(















|σ>r Zr|2 + |σ>r V sr |2 + |σ>r ∂V sr |2 +
1
Cu
|U rr |2 +
1
Cv




































with (C∂u, Cu, Cv) as in (3.6.9)-(3.6.11). Taking expectation and letting c > 4Lg, we find there
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∣∣Yit∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
ecr



































+ (1 + ε−1 + ε̃)CI20 + ε̃C
(
‖Z‖2H2,c + ‖V ‖
2





We then let ε̃ = 1/(24C), c ≥ max{4Lg, C(ε̃)}, and take sup over t ∈ [0, T ] (resp. (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2)
to each term on the left side separately. Adding these terms up we find there is C > 0, such that





















+ ‖Z‖2H2 + ‖V ‖
2



















We can the use (3.6.17) back in (3.6.16) to find ε ∈ (0,∞) small enough so that4 ‖h‖2H ≤ CI20 .
The result in terms of the norm ‖ · ‖H follows from (3.6.11).
Proposition 3.6.4. Let (ξi, ηi, ∂sηi) ∈ L2 × (L2,2)2 and (hi, gi, ∂sgi) for i ∈ {1, 2} satisfy As-
sumption G and suppose that hi ∈ Ho is a solution to (S) with coefficients (ξi, hi, ηi, gi, ∂sηi,∇gi),
















where for ϕ ∈ {Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M, ξ, η, ∂sη} and Φ ∈ {h, g,∇g}
δϕ := ϕ1−ϕ2, and, δ1Φt := Φ1t (Y1r ,Z1t , U1tt , V 1tt )−Φ2t (Y1r ,Z1t , U1tt , V 1tt ), dt⊗dP–a.e. in [0, T ]×X .
Proof. Note that by the Lipschitz assumption on h and g there exist bounded processes with
4Recall the norm ‖ · ‖H is the norm induced by the space H as defined in Remark 3.3.3.(ii)
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appropriate dimensions (αi, βi, γi, εi), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ρ and % such that for every s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
t ∈ [0, T ]











δ1hr + γ1r δYr + α1>r σ>r δZr + β1r δU rr + ε1>r σ>r δV rr
)
dr
δU st = δη(s)−
∫ T
t








δ1gr(s) + β2r δU sr + ε2>r σ>r δV sr + γ2r δYr + α2>r σ>r δZr
)
dr,












δ1∇gr(s) + ρrδ∂U sr + %rδ∂V sr + β3r δU sr + ε3>r σ>r δV sr + γ3r δYr + α3>r σ>r δZr
)
dr.
We can therefore apply Proposition 3.6.3 and the result follows.
When the data of the system is chosen so as to study the class of type-I BSVIEs considered in
Section 3.4, our approach can be specialised so as to enlarge the initial space and simplify the a
priori estimates obtained in Proposition 3.6.3. We let (H?,o, ‖ · ‖H?,o) be
H?,o := L2 ×H2 ×M2 × L2,2 ×H2,2 ×M2,2,











Proposition 3.6.5. Let Assumption H hold and consider (Y,Z,N , Y, Z,N) ∈ H?,o solution to the
system which for any s ∈ [0, T ], holds P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]













Y st = ξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t







dN sr , t ∈ [0, T ],
(Sof )
with ∂Y given as in Lemma 3.6.1. Then (Y, Y ) ∈ S2 × S2,2 and there exist C > 0 such that







Proof. We first note that Y ∈ S2,2 follows as in Proposition 3.6.3. Thus, in light of Lemma 3.6.1,
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there exists (∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) ∈ S2,2 × H2,2 × M2,2 solution to the BSDE with data (∂sξ, ∂f), and,(
(Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ]
)
∈ S2 ×H2 are well-defined. Moreover, ∂Y rr is well-defined as an element of
L1,2, i.e. dt ⊗ dP–a.e. on [0, T ] × X , as a consequence of the path-wise continuity of ∂Y s· . With
this, we conclude Y ∈ S2.
Let us now note that given (Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] and (∂Y tt )t∈[0,T ], the first equation, being a
Lipschitz BSDE, admits a unique solution (Y,Z,N ). In addition, for Ñ as in Lemma 3.6.2 we
obtain




















(Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ], (Ñt)t∈[0,T ]
)
in S2 ×H2 ×M2 and we obtain
Yt = ξ(t) +
∫ T
t







dN tr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (3.6.19)
With this equation we can simplify our estimates. Let us introduce the system
Yt = ξ(t) +
∫ T
t







dN tr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
Y st = ξ(s) +
∫ T
t







dN sr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
(A)
Then, following the same reasoning of Proposition 3.6.3, i.e. applying Itō’s formula to ect
(
|Yt|+|Y st |)








3.6.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3.5
Before we present the proof of Theorem 3.3.5 we recall that in light of Proposition 3.6.3 and
Proposition 3.6.4 once the result is obtained for Ho the existence of a unique solution in H follows
immediately.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.5. Note that uniqueness follows from Proposition 3.6.4. To show existence,
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let us define the map
T : Ho −→ Ho
(y, z, n, u, v,m,u, v,m) 7−→ (Y, Z,N,U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M),
with (Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) given for any s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ] by
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








Step 1: We first show T is well defined. Let (y, z, n, u, v,m,u, v,m) ∈ Ho.
(i) Let us first consider the tuples (U, V,M) and (∂U, ∂V, ∂M). Let us first consider the second
equation. Given (y, z) ∈ S2 × H2 and Assumption G, this equation is a standard Lipschitz BSDE
whose well-posedness follows by classical arguments, see [273; 88]. This yields (U s, V s,M s) ∈
S2 ×H2 ×M2 for all s ∈ [0, T ].
Let us argue the continuity of ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (L2, ‖ · ‖L2) : s 7−→ U s. Let (sn)n ⊆
[0, T ], sn
n→∞−−−→ s0 ∈ [0, T ] and define for ϕ ∈ {U, V, η}, ∆ϕn := ϕsn − ϕs0 . From the classic















We conclude ‖U‖L2,2 <∞ and U ∈ L2,2. Given (U s, V s) ∈ L2×H2 together with (y, z) ∈ S2×H2,
the argument for (∂U s, ∂V s, ∂M s) for fixed s ∈ [0, T ] is identical.
(ii) We now show that (V, ∂V,M, ∂M) ∈ (H2,2)2 × (M2,2)2. Again, the argument for (∂V, ∂M) is
completely analogous. Applying Itō’s formula to |U sr |2 we obtain
|U st |2 +
∫ T
t
|σ>r V sr |2dr +
∫ T
t
d[M s]r = |η(s)|2 + 2
∫ T
t









U sr− · dM sr .
First note U s ∈ S2 guarantees that the last two terms are true martingale for any s ∈ [0, T ].
To show that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H2, ‖ · ‖H2)
(
resp. (M2, ‖ · ‖M2)
)





continuous, let (sn)n ⊆ [0, T ], sn




























Since the first term on the right-hand side is finite from Assumption G, we obtain ‖V ‖H2,2 +
‖M‖M2,2 <∞.
We are left to argue V ∈ H2,2 . Applying Lemma 3.6.1 to the system, which for any s ∈ [0, T ]
satisfies P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]
U st = η(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








we obtain s 7−→ V s is absolutely continuous with density s 7−→ ∂V s. Consequently, we may define
the diagonal of V , denoted by V := (V tt )t∈[0,T ], as in Equation (3.6.5), with
V tt := V Tt −
∫ T
t
∂V rt dr, dt⊗ dP–a.e. in [0, T ]×X .
The fact ‖V‖H2 <∞ follows as in Lemma 3.6.1.(iv). This yields V ∈ H2 and we conclude V ∈ H2,2 .
(iii) We derive an auxiliary estimate. Recall (U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) satisfy (3.6.3). Now, in light of
Assumption G and (ii), we may find, as in Step 1 in Proposition 3.6.3, a universal constant C > 0
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hr(yr, zr, U rr , V rr , ∂U rr )dr
∣∣∣∣Ft], is a square integrable F-martingale.
Indeed, under Assumption G, h is uniformly Lipschitz in (y, z, u), so (3.6.20) yields for any
























Integrating the above expression, Fubini’s theorem implies that Ỹ ∈ L2, thus the predictable
martingale representation property for local martingales guarantees the existence of a unique
(Z,N ) ∈ H2×M2 such that (Y,Z,N ) satisfies the correct dynamics and Doob’s inequality implies
Y ∈ S2, where
Y := Ỹ − E
[ ∫ ·
0
hr(yr, zr, U rr , V rr , ∂U rr )dr
]
.
All together, we have shown that T(y, z, n, u, v,m, ∂u, ∂v, ∂m) ∈ Ho.
Step 2: We show T is a contraction under the equivalent norm ‖ · ‖Ho,c , for some c > 0 large
enough. Let (yi, zi, ni, ui, vi,mi) ∈ Ho, hi = T(yi, zi, ni, ui, vi,mi, ∂ui, ∂vi, ∂mi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. We
first note that by Lemma 3.6.2












dM̃ir, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
where
(U i,V i,M̃i, ∂U i) :=
(
(U itt )t∈[0,T ], (V itt )t∈[0,T ], (M̃ it )t∈[0,T ], (∂U itt )t∈[0,T ]
)
,
and M̃ i as in Lemma 3.6.2 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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To ease the readability we define dt⊗ dP–a.e.
δhr := hr(y1r , z1r ,U1r ,V1r , ∂U1r )− hr(y2r , z2r ,U2r ,V2r , ∂U2r ),
δĝr := gr(r,U1r ,V1r , y1r , z1r )− ∂U1r − gr(r,U2r ,V2r , y2r , z2r ) + ∂U2r ,
δgr(s) := gr(s, U1sr , V 1sr , y1r , z1r )− gr(s, U2sr , V 2sr , y2r , z2r ),
δ∇gr(s) := ∇gr(s, ∂U sr 1, ∂V sr 1, U sr 1, V sr 1, ysr1, z1r )−∇gr(s, ∂U sr 2, ∂V sr 2, U sr 2, V sr 2, ysr2, z2r ),
and
δY := (δY, δU , δU s, δ∂U s), δZ := (δZ, δV, δV s, δ∂V s), δN := (δN , δM̃, δM s, δ∂M s),
whose elements we may denote with superscripts, e.g. δY1, δY2, δY3, δY4 correspond to δY, δU ,
δU s, δ∂U s.
(i) In light of (3.6.3), as in Step 1 in Proposition 3.6.3, we may find that for c > 4Lg there exists




















(ii) Applying Itô’s formula to ecr
(
|δYr|2 + |δUr|2 + |δU sr |2 + |δ∂U sr |2
)
and noticing that





∣∣δYit∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
ecr













2δYr · δhr + 2δU sr · δgr(s) + 2δ∂U sr · δ∇gr(s)− c
(













ecr−δYir− · d δNir.
Again, the fact that (δY, δU , δU, δ∂U) ∈ (S2)2 × (S2,2)2 guarantees, via the Burkholder–Davis–
170
Gundy inequality, that M̃s is a uniformly integrable martingale, and thus a true martingale for all
s ∈ [0, T ].
Additionally, under Assumption G.(ii) and G.(iii), dt⊗ dP–a.e.
|δhr| ≤ Lh(|δyr|+ |σ>t δzr|+ |δUr|+ |σ>r δVr|+ |δ∂Urr |),
|δĝr| ≤ Lg(|δyr|+ |σ>t δzr|+ |δUr|+ |σ>r δVr|) + |δ∂Urr |,
|δgr(s)| ≤ Lg
(





|δU sr |+ |σ>r δV sr |+ |δyr|+ |σ>r δzr|
)
+ Lg(|δ∂U sr |+ |σ>r δ∂V sr |).
In turn, this implies together with Young’s inequality and (3.6.21), that for any c > 4Lg there





∣∣δYit∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
ecr


































































∣∣δYit∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
ecr






















We conclude T has a fixed point as it is a contraction for c large enough.
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Chapter 4
Quadratic backward stochastic Volterra integral
equations
We now want to build upon the strategy devised in Chapter 3 and address the well-posedness
of a general class of multidimensional type-I BSVIEs with quadratic generators.
The setting is, up to growth condition of the generator, identical to that of Chapter 3. Never-
theless, for the reader’s convience we briefly recall it. We let X be the solution to a drift-less SDE
under a probability measure P, and F be the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by X. We
consider a tuple (Y ·· , Z ·· , N ·· ), of appropriately F-adapted processes, which satisfy for any s ∈ [0, T ],
P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ], the equation
Y st = ξ(s) +
∫ T
t






dN sr . (4.0.1)
We will consider both the case of linear (in Y ) quadratic (in Z) and fully quadratic generators.
To be able to cover type-I BSVIEs as general as (4.0.1), following the ideas in Chapter 3, our
approach is based on the following class of infinite families of BSDEs
Yt = ξ(T ) +
∫ T
t







Y st = η(s) +
∫ T
t







∂Y st = ∂sη(s) +
∫ T
t








where (Y,Z,N , Y, Z,N, ∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) are unknown, and required to have appropriate integrability.
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4.1 Practical motivations
(i) The first motivation builds upon the treatment presented in [246] of scalar continuous-time
dynamic risk measures as introduced in [88]. By studying multidimensional type-BSVIEs one
could extend these ideas to the more realistic situation where the risky portfolio is vector-valued.
In the static case, Jouini, Meddeb, and Touzi [144] provides a notion of multidimensional coherent
risk measure that renders a convenient extension of the real-valued risk measures intially introduced
in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath [13]. Building upon these ideas, Kulikov [160] presents a
model that takes into account risks of changing currency exchange rates and transaction costs. In
particular, exploiting the cone structure induced by a given partial ordering, the author introduces
multidimensional coherent risk measures tail V@R, and weighted V@R.
(ii) Systems of the nature of (4.0.2) are known to appear naturally in problems in behavioural
economics and applications in contract theory. An immediate practical motivation behind studying
systems of the form prescribed by (4.0.2) in a quadratic framework comes from the study of time-
inconsistent control problems. In this kind of problems the idea of optimal controls is incompatible
with the underlying agent’s preferences and thus one approach that leads to a successful concept
of solution is that of consistent plans or equilibria, as initially introduced in Ekeland and Lazrak
[80, 81]. In Chapter 2, we established this connection via a extended dynamic principle for the
problem faced by a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent, i.e. one seeking for an equilibria among
the players prescribed by her future preferences. However, their analysis was limited to a standard
Lipschitz assumptions on the data of the problem.
To motivate the results of this document, we specialised to the Markovian framework and precise
the dynamics of the controlled process X. This is, we let bt(x, a) := a−xt−T , σt(x) := σt bounded, and
A := [a1, a2] so that









σrdWαr , t ∈ [0, T ], Pα–a.s.
for some A-valued process α which the agent controls. Pα denotes a probability measure governing
the distribution of the canonical process X which the agent controls and for simplicity we assume
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one dimensional. Wα denotes a Pα–Brownian motion. Let us recall that Pα is guaranteed to exists
as the previous Lipschitz SDE has a unique strong solution. Moreover, at t = T , we have that
XT = αT ∈ [a1, a2].
Now, for real valued k, F , and G with appropriate measurability, we let the reward of an agent
performing the A-valued action α from time t onwards, with initial condition x ∈ X , be given by
J(t, x, α) := EPα
[ ∫ T
0
kr(t,Xr, αr)dr + F (t,XT )
∣∣∣∣Ft]+G(t,EPα[XT ∣∣Ft]),
where EPα [·|Ft] denote the classic conditional expectation operator under Pα. The noticeable
features of this type of rewards are: (i) the dependence of k, F and G on t which besides the case
of exponential discounting is a source of time-inconsistency; (ii) the possible non-linear dependence
of G on a conditional expectation of g(XT ), another source of time-inconsistency, which would allow
for mean–variance type of criteria. We remark that we have refrained ourselves to the Markovian
setting for the purpose of illustrating the result in this chapter.
Following the analysis in Chapter 2, let ξ(T, x) := F (T, x) + G(T, g(x)), η(s, x) := ∂sF (s, x),
gt(s, x, z, a) := kt(s, a) + bt(x, a) · σ>t z, ∇gt(s, x, v, a) := ∂skt(s, a) + bt(x, a) · σ>t v,
Ht(x, z, u, n, z) := sup
a∈A
{
gt(t, x, z, a)
}





t z ∂2nnG(t, n),
and denote by a?(t, x, z) the A-valued measurable mapping attaining the sup in H. Then, we
will find that agent’s value function associated to an equilibrium action α? correspond to Y and
a?(t,Xt,Zt), respectively, given by
Yt = ξ(T,XT ) +
∫ T
t




∂Y st = ∂sη(s,XT ) +
∫ T
t




Ñt = XT +
∫ T
t




We highlight that it follows from the definition that H is quadratic in z and it is quadratic
in n if, for instance, G(s, n) = φ(s)n2. Moreover, having access to a well-posedness result for the
previous system would guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium. This becomes particularly
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important in light of the recent results in [164], where the authors presents an example, stemming
from a mean–variance investment problem, in which uniqueness of the equilibrium fails. In light
of the dynamics specified above for X we have that terminal conditions of the previous system
are bounded. Morever, if in addition x 7−→ (ξ(t, x), ∂sη(s, x)) is monotone and continuous this
bound is determined by a1, a2. All in all, we will find that the previous system is well-posed and
therefore there is a unique equilibrium associated to the time-inconsistent control problem faced
by a sophisticated agent.
(iii) Lastly, even in the case G = 0 the reward of the agent can be represented via a standard
type-I BSVIE. This is due to the time-inconsistency arising from k and F . In complete analogy to
the case of a classic time-consistent agent, the need for the understanding of multidimensional BS-
VIEs such as (4.0.1) would arise in applications to nonzero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic differential
game, El Karoui and Hamadène [84] and [133]; financial market equilibrium problems for several
interacting agents, Bielagk, Lionnet, and Dos Reis [29], Espinosa and Touzi [96], [103], [102]; price
impact models, [158] [157]; and principal agent contracting problems with competitive interacting
agents in Élie and Possamaï [90] to mention just a few.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 The stochastic basis on the canonical space
For the reader’s convenience, we recall the formulation on the canonical space.
We take two positive integers n and m, which represent respectively the dimension of the
martingale which will drive our equations, and the dimension of the Brownian motion appearing in
the dynamics of the former. We consider the canonical space X = Cn, with canonical processX. We
let FX be the Borel σ-algebra on X (for the topology of uniform convergence), and FX = (FXt )t∈[0,T ]
is the natural filtration of X. We fix a bounded Borel-measurable map σ : [0, T ] × X −→ Rn×m,
σ·(X) ∈ Pmeas(Rn×m,FX), and an initial condition x0 ∈ Rn. We assume there is P ∈ Prob(X )
such that P[X0 = x0] = 1 and X is martingale, whose quadratic variation, 〈X〉 = (〈X〉t)t∈[0,T ], is
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, with density given by σσ>. Enlarging the
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original probability space, see Stroock and Varadhan [232, Theorem 4.5.2], there is an Rm-valued
Brownian motion B with
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X·∧r)dBr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
We now let F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the (right-limit) of the P-augmentation of FX . We stress that we
will not assume P is unique. In particular, the predictable martingale representation property for
(F,P)-martingales in terms of stochastic integrals with respect to X might not hold.
Remark 4.2.1. We remark that the previous formulation on the canonical is by no means neces-
sary. Indeed, any probability space supporting a Brownian motion B and a process X satisfying the
previous SDE will do, and this can be found whenever that equation has a weak solution.
4.2.2 Functional spaces and norms
We now introduce the spaces of interest for our analysis. In the following, (Ω,FT ,F,P) denotes
the filtered probability space as defined in the introduction. We are given a non-negative real
number c and (E, | · |) a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, i.e. E = Rd̃ for some non-negative
integer d̃ and | · | denotes the L2-norm. We also introduce the L∞-norm which for an arbitrary
E-valued random variable ζ is given by ‖ζ‖∞ := inf{C ≥ 0 : |ζ| ≤ C, P–a.s.} as well as the spaces
• L∞,c(E) of ξ ∈ Pmeas(E,FT ) P-essentially bounded, such that ‖ξ‖L∞,c := ‖e
c
2T ξ‖∞ <∞;























































• M2,cBMO(E) of càdlàg martingales N ∈ Popt(E,F), P-orthogonal to X (that is the product XN is
an (F,P)-martingale), with N0 = 0 and ‖N‖2M2,cBMO
:=
∥∥N∥∥2BMO2,c <∞;







• P2meas(E,FT ) of two parameter processes (U st )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 : ([0, T ]2 × Ω,B([0, T ]2) ⊗ FT ) −→
(E,B(E)) measurable.
• L∞,2,c(E) denotes the space of collections η := (η(s))s∈[0,T ] ∈ P2meas(E,F) such that the mapping




• Given a Banach space (Ic(E), ‖·‖Ic), we define (I2,c(E), ‖·‖I2,c) the space of U ∈ P2meas(E,FT ) such
that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Ic(E), ‖·‖Ic) : s 7−→ U s is continuous and ‖U‖I2,c := sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖U s‖I <∞.
For example, L1,∞,2,c(E) denotes the space of U ∈ P2meas(E,FT ) such that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→
(L1,∞,c(E), ‖ · ‖L1,∞,c) : s 7−→ U s is continuous and ‖U‖L1,∞,2,c := sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖U s‖L1,∞,c <∞;
• H2,2(E) of (Zst )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(E,FT ) such that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Hp(E), ‖ · ‖Hp) : s 7−→
Zs is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,2 Z ∈ H2,c(E), where Z :=
(Ztt )t∈[0,T ] is given by
Ztt := ZTt −
∫ T
t





• H2,2BMO(E) of (Zst )(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(E,FT ) such that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H
p
BMO(E), ‖·‖HpBMO) :
s 7−→ Zs is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, Z ∈ H2,cBMO(E), where
Z := (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] is given by
Ztt := ZTt −
∫ T
t




1We remark the use of [ · ] instead of 〈 · 〉 as N is only assumed to be càdlàg
2We recall that H2, being a Hilbert space and in particular a reflexive Banach space, has the so-called Radon–
Nikodým property, see [216, Corollary 5.45]. Thus the absolute continuity of the H2-valued mapping s 7−→ Zs is
equivalent to the existence of the density (ðZs)s∈[0,T ], which is unique for Lebesgue–a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. The fact Z is
well-defined is argued in Remark 4.2.2
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Remark 4.2.2. (i) We remark that the first set of spaces in the previous list, but M2,cBMO(E), are the
corresponding weighted version of the classic spaces in the literature for BSDEs, which are recovered
by taking c = 0. Such weighted spaces are known to be more suitable to handle existence results.
Moreover, given our assumption of finite time horizon these spaces are known to be isomorphic for
any value of c.
(ii) The second set of these spaces are weighted versions of suitable extensions of the classical ones,
whose norms are tailor-made to the analysis of the systems we will study. Some of these spaces
have been previously considered in the literature on BSVIEs, see Chapter 3 , [267] and [245].Of
particular interest are the spaces H2,2(E) and H2,2BMO(E). Indeed, the space H2,c(E) being closed
implies H2,2,c(E) is a closed subspace of H2,2,c(E) and thus a Banach space. Let us recall that the
space H2,2,c(E) allows us to define a good candidate for (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] as an element of H2,c(E). Let
Ω̃ := [0, T ]×X , ω̃ := (t, x) ∈ Ω̃ and
Zs(ω̃) := ZTt (x)−
∫ T
s
∂Zrt (x)dr, dt⊗ dP–a.e. ω̃ ∈ Ω̃, s ∈ [0, T ],
so that the Radon–Nikodým property and Fubini’s theorem imply Zs = Zs,dt⊗ dP–a.e., s ∈ [0, T ].
Lastly, as for ω̃ ∈ Ω̃, s 7−→ Zs(ω̃) is continuous, we may define
Ztt := ZTt −
∫ T
t
∂Zrt dr, for dt⊗ dP–a.e. (t, x) in [0, T ]×X .
(iii) Lastly, we comment on our choice to introduce the spaces M2,cBMO(E) and M
2,2,c
BMO(E). Those
familiar with the theory of BSDEs would recognise the integrability in M2,c(E) as the typical one for
orthogonal martingales. However, given the setting of this paper, one might argue whether it would
be more natural to require a BMO-type of integrability, as the space M2,cBMO(E) does. This had been
noticed since [238]. Therefore, a natural question is how requiring one specific type of integrability
would quantitatively affect our well–posedness results.
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4.2.3 Auxiliary inequalities
Finally, to ease the readability we recall a particularly useful inequality in our setting. It
is obtained from the so–called energy inequality, see Meyer [185, Chapter VII. Section 6]. For a
positive integer p and a potentialX, i.e. a positive right-continuous super-martingale s.t. E[Xt] −→





where A is the increasing, right–continuous process appearing in the Doob–Meyer decomposition
of X. The p–energy inequality states that
ep(Xt) ≤ Cp, whenever |Xt| ≤ C.
In the context of this document, we can use it to obtain the following auxiliary inequalities, whose
proof is available in Section 4.7.1.
Lemma 4.2.3. Let d̃ be a positive integer.





















εecu|σ>u Zru|2 + ε−1ecu|σ>u ∂Zru|2dudr, t ∈ [0, T ].





















4.3 The BSDE system
For a fixed integers d1 and d2 we are given jointly measurable mappings h, g, ξ and η, such that
for any (y, z, u, v,u) ∈ Rd1× Rn×d1× Rd2× Rn×d2× Rd2
h : [0, T ]×X × Rd1× Rn×d1× Rd2× Rn×d2× Rd2−→ Rd1 , h·(·, y, z, u, v, u) ∈ Pprog(Rd1 ,F),
g : [0, T ]2 ×X × Rd2× Rn×d2× Rd1× Rn×d1−→ Rd2 , g·(s, ·, u, v, y, z) ∈ Pprog(Rd2 ,F),
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ Rd1 , η : [0, T ]×X −→ Rd2 .
Moreover, throughout this section we assume the following condition on (η, g).
Assumption I. (s, u, v) 7−→ gt(s, x, u, v, y, z) (resp. s 7−→ η(s, x)) is continuously differentiable,
uniformly in (t, x, y, z) (resp. in x). Moreover, ∇g·(s, ·,u, v, u, v, y, z) ∈ Pprog(Rd2 ,F), s ∈ [0, T ]
where the mapping ∇g : [0, T ]2 ×X × (Rd2× Rn×d2)2× Rd1× Rn×d1−→ Rd2 is defined by
∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z) := ∂sgt(s, x, u, v, y, z) + ∂ugt(s, x, u, v, y, z)u +
n∑
i=1







h·(·,0, 0), g·(s, ·,0), ∂sg·(s, ·,0)
)
, for 0 := (u, v, y, z)|(0,...,0).
To ease the readability, in the rest of the document we will remove the dependence of the
previous spaces on the underlying Euclidean spaces where the processes take value, i.e. we will
write S∞,c for S∞,c(Rd1).
Given FT -measurable (ξ, η) and h and g, with ∂sη and ∇g given by Assumption I, which we
will refer as the data, we consider the following infinite family of BSDEs defined for s ∈ [0, T ],
P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ] by
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







dM sr , (S)
∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t








Under the above assumption, we are interested in studying the well-posedness of (S). For c > 0,
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we define the space (Hc, ‖·‖Hc), whose elements we denote h = (Y,Z,N,U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M), where
Hc := S∞,c ×H2,cBMO ×M
2,c × S∞,2,c ×H2,2BMO ×M
2,2,c × S∞,2,c ×H2,2,cBMO ×M
2,2,c
and ‖ · ‖Hc denotes the respective induced norm.
Remark 4.3.1. (i) We highlight that system (S) is fully coupled. This means that a solution to
the system has to be determined simultaneously. Moreover, the reader might notice our choice
to preven the generator of the first BSDE to depend on the diagonal of ∂V . This is due to
our interest, as in Chapter 3, to establish the connection between these systems and type-I
BSVIEs (4.0.1). For this, the presence of the diagonal ∂U plays a key role. It should be clear
from our arguments and Lemma 4.2.3 that these can be easily extended to accommodate this
case.
(ii) We remark that for any c ≥ 0, the space (Hc, ‖ · ‖Hc) is a Banach space. Indeed, it is clearly
a normed space. Moreover, the fact that the spaces S∞,c and M2,c are complete is classical
in the literature. The completeness of the spaces H2,cBMO and M
2,c
BMO, which are endowed with
BMO-type norms, follows from Dellacherie and Meyer [70, CH. VII, Theorem 88]. Indeed, a




(iii) We also remark that implicit in the definition of Hc is the fact that ∂V coincides, dt⊗dP–a.e.,
with the density with respect to the Lebesgue measure of the application s 7−→ V s which appears
in the definition of the space H2,2BMO. This is for any s ∈ [0, T ]
V s − V 0 =
∫ s
0
∂V rdr, in H2,cBMO.
This contrasts with the result in the Lipschitz case obtained in Chapter 3 where this was a
consequence of the result, see also the remark after Definition 3.4.1. The reason for this is
that the quadratic growth of the generator is incompatible with the contraction specified in the
proof of Theorem 3.4.3.
We now state precisely what we mean by a solution to (S).
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Definition 4.3.2. A tuple h = (Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) is said to be a solution to (S) with
terminal condition (ξ, η) and generators (f, g) under P, if h satisfies (S) P–a.s., and, h ∈ Hc for
some c > 0.
For c > 0 and R > 0, we define BR ⊆ Hc to be the subset of Hc of processes (Y,Z,N,U, V,M) ∈
Hc such that
‖(Y,Z,N,U, V,M)‖2Hc ≤ R2.
The need to introduce BR is inherent to the quadratic growth nature of (S). Systems of the type
of (S) were studied in a Lipschitz framework in Chapter 2. By choosing a weight c large enough,
and exploiting the fact that all weighted norms are equivalent, in Chapter 2 we obtained the well-
posedness of (S) in the space H2 := S2 × H2 ×M2 × S2,2 × H2,2 ×M2,2 × S2,2 × H2,2 ×M2,2. In
the setting of this paper, the Lipschitz assumption for the generators is replaced by some kind of
local quadratic growth. As a consequence, one cannot recover a contraction by simply choosing
a weight large enough. In fact, as noticed in [238] and [153], given our growth assumptions,
our candidate for providing a contractive map is no longer Lipschitz-continuous, but only locally
Lipschitz-continuous. The idea, initially proposed in [238], is then to localise the usual procedure
to a ball, thus making the application Lipschitz continuous again, and then to choose the radius
of such a ball so as to recover a contraction. The crucial contribution of [238] is to show that such
controls can be obtained by taking the data of the system small enough in norm.
Our procedure is inspired by this idea and incorporates it into the strategy devised in Chapter 3
to address the well–posedness of this kind of systems. We have decided to work on weighted spaces
as, in our opinion, it does significantly simplify the arguments in the proof. We also mention that we
tried to estimate the greatest ball, i.e. the largest radius R, for which such a localisation procedure
leads to a contraction. Details are found in the proof. As we work on weighted spaces, we will find
c > 0 large enough so that, given data with sufficiently small norm, (S) has a unique solution in
BR ⊆ Hc. In words, throughout the proof, we will accumulate conditions on any candidate value
for c that allows to verify the necessary steps to obtain the result. As such, an appropriate value
of c must satisfy all such conditions. This should be clear from the statement of the result.
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4.3.1 The Lipschitz–quadratic case
Assumption J. (i) ∃c̃ ∈ (0,∞) such that (ξ, η, ∂sη, f̃ , g̃,∇g̃) ∈ L∞,c̃ × L∞,2,c̃ × L1,∞,c̃ × L1,∞,2,c̃.
(ii) ∃(Ly, Lu, Lu) ∈ (0,∞)3 s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, u, ũ,u, ũ, z, v, v) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × (Rd1)2 × (Rd2)4 ×
Rn×d1 × (Rn×d2)2
|ht(x, y, z, u, v, u)− ht(x, ỹ, z, ũ, v, ũ)|+ |gt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− gt(s, x, ũ, v, ỹ, z)|
+ |∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z)− gt(s, x, ũ, v, ũ, v, ỹ, z)| ≤ Ly|y − ỹ|+ Lu|u− ũ|+ Lu|u− ũ|;
(iii) ∃(Lz, Lv, Lv) ∈ (0,∞)3, φ ∈ H2,c̃BMO s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, u, u, z, z̃, v, ṽ, v, ṽ) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × Rd1 ×
(Rd2)2 × (Rn×d1)2 × (Rn×d2)4
|ht(x, y, z, u, v, u)− ht(x, y, z̃, u, ṽ,u)− (z − z̃)>σr(x)φt|
+ |gt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− gt(s, x, u, ṽ, y, z̃)− (v − ṽ)>σr(x)φt|
+ |∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z)−∇gt(s, x,u, ṽ, u, ṽ, y, z̃)− (v− ṽ)>σr(x)φt|
≤Lz
∣∣|σ>r (x)z|+|σ>r (x)z̃|∣∣|σ>r (x)(z − z̃)|+Lv∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v − ṽ)|
+Lv
∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v− ṽ)|.
Remark 4.3.3. We now comment on the previous set of assumptions. Assumption J.(i) imposes
integrability on the data of the system. We highlight that in our setting we require the integral with
respect to the time variable of the generators (f̃ , g̃,∇g̃) to be bounded. This is in contrast to re-
quiring the generators itself to be bounded. On the other hand, Assumption J.(ii) imposes a classic
uniformly Lipschitz growth assumption on the (Y, U, ∂U) terms for the system. Finally, Assump-
tion J.(iii) imposes a slight generalisation of a local Lipschitz–quadratic growth, this corresponds
to the presence of the process φ, and is similar to the one found in [238]. This property is almost
equivalent to saying that the underlying function is quadratic in z. The two properties would be
equivalent if the process φ was bounded. Here we allow something a bit more general by letting φ be
unbounded but in H2BMO. As we will see next, since this assumption allow us to apply the Girsanov
transformation, we do not need to bound the processes and BMO type conditions are sufficient.
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Lastly, we also remark that φ is common for the three generators and do not depend on s. This is
certainly a limitation in terms of the system (S). Yet, as we are working towards establishing the
well-posedness of the BSVIE (4.4.1) we will see in Section 4.4, namely (Sf ), that will chose h and
g so that such condition is sensible.
As a preliminary to our analysis, we note that Assumption J.(iii) can be simplified. This is
the purpose of the next lemma. Therefore, without lost of generality in the rest of this section we
assume φ = 0.
Lemma 4.3.4. Let
ĥt(x, y, z, u, v, u) := ht(x, y, z, u, v, u)− z>σr(x)φt,
ĝt(s, x, u, v, y, z) := gt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− v>σr(x)φt,
∇ĝt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z) := gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z)− v>σr(x)φt.
Then (Y, Z,N,U, V,N) is a solution to (S) with terminal condition (ξ, η) and generator (f, g) under
P if and only if (Y, Z,N,U, V,N) is a solution to (S) with terminal condition (ξ, η) and generator








Proof. We first verify that Q above is well-defined. Indeed, from the fact that φ ∈ H2,cBMO(Rm) we
have that the process defined above is a uniformly integrable martingale and Girsanov’s theorem
holds, see [152, Section 1.3]. To verify the assertion of the lemma we note, for instance, that
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t










dNr, t ∈ [0, T ], Q–a.s.
To ease the presentation of our result in the Lipschitz–quadratic case we introduce some nota-
tion. For (γ, c, R) ∈ (0,∞)3, εi ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, ..., 11}, and κ ∈ N, we define




+ ε3‖h̃‖2L1,∞,c+ (ε4 + ε5)‖g̃‖
2
L1,∞,2,c+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε6)‖∇g̃‖
2
L1,∞,2,c ,











u+ ε8+ ε9+ ε10,









2Lu + (ε1 + ε2)TL2u + ε−19 L2y + ε11, 8Ly + 2TLy + 2TLuLy,
4Lu + 2TLu + 2TLuLu
}
.
Remark 4.3.5. Let us mention that the previous expressions arise in the analysis given our goal
of finding the largest ball over which we can guarantee a contraction. In particular, for this reason
there are several degrees of freedom, εi’s, that determine cε. In particular, let us mention that there
are many simplifying choices that can be made, at the risk of loosing some flexibility. For instance,
letting ε̃i ∈ (0,∞)5, i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, ε1 = ε2 = ε6 = ε̃1, ε3 = ε̃2, ε4 = ε5 = ε̃3, ε7 = ε11 = ε̃4 and
ε8 = ε9 = ε10 = ε̃5 we only need to choose 5 variables and






















2Lu + 2ε̃1TL2u + ε̃−15 L2y + ε̃4, 8Ly + 2TLy + 2TLuLy, 4Lu + 2TLu + 2TLuLu}.
Assumption K. Let (γ, c, R) ∈ (0,∞)3, εi ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, . . . , 11}, κ ∈ N. We say Assumption K
holds for κ if
(
√
ε1 + ε2 + 3κ+
√
3κ)2 ≤ 28κ, Iε0 ≤ γR2/κ, R2 < U(κ), c ≥ cε.
Theorem 4.3.6. Let Assumption J holds. Suppose Assumption K holds for κ = 10. Then, there






Remark 4.3.7. Before we proceed with the proof, we would like to comment on both the qualitative
and quantitative statements in Theorem 4.3.6.
(i) As a result of our procedure, and consistent with the results available in the literature, we require
the data of (S) to be sufficiently small in order to obtain the well–posedness of (S). We stress this
property on the data is influenced not only by the value of γ and R, but also, by the the value of c
which determines the norms.
(ii) In addition, we introduced Assumption K which depends on a parameter κ ∈ N. This parameter
is related with the number of processes for which we have to keep track of the integrability of. In
particular, we mention that, in the proof we present below, in addition to the 9 elements that
prescribe a solution to the system we control the norm of the diagonal process (V tt )t∈[0,T ] which
appears in the definition of H2,2. An alternative line of reasoning is available by leaving out the norm
of process (V tt )t∈[0,T ] in the definition of H2,2 and exploit the inequality derived in Lemma 4.2.3.
(iii) We also want to point out that we tried to obtain the largest ball for which the whole procedure
goes through. This can be appreciated in Equation (4.5.8) which introduces an upper bound on R
for which our candidate map is well-defined. A word of caution nonetheless, since our bound of R
cannot be directly compared to the ones obtained in [238] or [153]. Indeed, we recall that the norms
involved depend on our choice of c. As such, the radius of the ball, BR ⊆ Hc, in Theorem 4.3.6
depends on the choice of c. Consequently, if we were to exploit the equivalence between all the spaces
Hc the radius would have to be appropriately adjusted.
Remark 4.3.8. Alternative versions of Theorem 4.3.6 are available. These are related to the
orthogonal martingales.
(i) We first highlight that we are able to show, a posteriori, that the (N ,M, ∂M) part of the solution
to system (S) in Hc actually has a finite BMO-type norm. This is proved in Theorem 4.3.9. We
recall that in this quadratic setting with bounded terminal condition, this might be considered as a
more natural type of integrability for the martingale part of the solutions.
(ii) Furthermore, one could wonder about how the statement of Theorem 4.3.6 changes in the case
where (N ,M, ∂M) are required, a priori, to have finite BMO-norm. This would allow, for instance,
to keep a control on the BMO-norm inside the resulting ball. We cover this in Theorem 4.3.10.
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(iii) Finally, we consider the case when the representation property for (F,P)-martingales in terms
of stochastic integrals with respect to X holds. This is the case, for example, if P is an extremal point
of the convex hull of the set of probability measures satisfying the requirements in Section 4.2.1, see
[142, Theorem 4.29]. In such a scenario, we have that N = M = ∂M = 0. This case is covered in
Theorem 4.3.10.






We now the address the well-posedness of (S) in the following two scenarii




BMO, i.e. (N ,M, ∂M) are required to have finite
BMO-norm;
(ii) when the predictable martingale representation property for (F,P)-martingales in term of
stochastic integral with respect to X hold, i.e. both N , M and ∂M vanish.
For this, let us introduce the spaces (Ĥc, ‖ · ‖Ĥc) and (H
c
, ‖ · ‖Hc) for c > 0 where









Hc := S∞,c ×H2,cBMO × S
∞,2,c ×H2,2,cBMO × S∞,2,c ×H
2,2,c
BMO.
and ‖ · ‖Ĥc and ‖ · ‖Hc denote the associated norms. Moreover, B̂R ⊆ Ĥ
c
(
resp. BR ⊆ H
c ) denotes
the ball of radius R for the norm ‖ · ‖Ĥc
(
resp. ‖ · ‖Hc
)
.
Theorem 4.3.10. Let Assumption J hold. If in addition
(i) Assumption K holds for κ = 11, then, there exists a unique solution to (S) in B̂R ⊆ (Ĥc, ‖·‖Ĥc);
(ii) Assumption K holds for κ = 8, and the predictable martingale representation property for
(F,P)-martingales in term of stochastic integral with respect to X hold. Then, there exists a unique
solution to (S) in BR ⊆ (H
c
, ‖ · ‖Hc).
4.3.2 The quadratic case
Our approach allows us to consider also the case of quadratic generators as follows.
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Assumption L. (i) ∃c̄ > 0 s.t (ξ, η, ∂η, f̃ , g̃,∇g̃) ∈ L∞,c̄ × L∞,c̄,2 × L∞,c̄,2 × L1,∞,c̄ × L1,∞,c̄,2 ×
L1,∞,c̄,2.
(ii) ∃(Ly, Lu, Lu) ∈ (0,∞)3, s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, u, ũ,u, ũ, z, v, v) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × (Rd1)2 × (Rd2)4 ×
Rn×d1 × (Rn×d2)2









|gt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− gt(s, x, ũ, v, ỹ, z)|+ |∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z)−∇gt(s, x, ũ, v, ũ, vỹ, z)|
≤Lu|u− ũ|
∣∣|u|+ |ũ|∣∣+ Lu|u− ũ|∣∣|u|+ |ũ|∣∣+ Ly|y − ỹ|∣∣|y|+ |ỹ|∣∣;
(iii) ∃(Lz, Lv, Lv) ∈ (0,∞)3, φ ∈ H2,c̃BMO s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, u, u, z, z̃, v, ṽ, v, ṽ) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × Rd1 ×
(Rd2)2 × (Rn×d1)2 × (Rn×d2)4
|ht(x, y, z, u, v, u)− ht(x, y, z̃, u, ṽ,u)− (z − z̃)>σr(x)φt|
+ |gt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− gt(s, x, u, ṽ, y, z̃)− (v − ṽ)>σr(x)φt|
+ |∇gt(s, x,u, v, u, v, y, z)−∇gt(s, x,u, ṽ, u, ṽ, y, z̃)− (v− ṽ)>σr(x)φt|
≤Lz
∣∣|σ>r (x)z|+|σ>r (x)z̃|∣∣|σ>r (x)(z − z̃)|+Lv∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v − ṽ)|
+Lv
∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v− ṽ)|.
Remark 4.3.11. In the previous set of assumptions we have allowed the generators to have quad-
ratic growth in all of the terms, with the exception of h on the term u. The reason for this are
twofold: (i) for the kind of systems that motivate our analysis the term (∂U tt )t∈[0,T ] always appears
linearly in the generator, (ii) when making the connection with the type-I BSVIE (4.0.1) (∂U tt )t∈[0,T ]
plays the auxiliary role of keeping track of the diagonal processes (U tt )t∈[0,T ] and (V tt )t∈[0,T ] and for
this it suffices that it appears linearly in the generator. This is, the Lipschitz assumption on this
variable will suffice for the purposes of our results and the problems that motivated our study.
As before, we need to introduce some auxiliary notation. For (γ, c, R) ∈ (0,∞)3, εi ∈ (0,∞),
i ∈ {1, ..., 6}, and κ ∈ N, we let Iε0 be as in Section 4.3.1 and define
L? := max{Ly, Lu, Lu, Lz, Lv, Lv}, cε := max{ε−11 7TL2u, ε
−1
2 7T, 2Lu},U(κ) :=
1
336κL2? max{2, T 2}
.
188
Assumption M. Let (γ, c, R) ∈ (0,∞)3, εi ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, and κ ∈ N. We say Assump-
tion M holds for κ if
(
√
ε1 + ε2 + 3κ+
√
3κ)2 ≤ 56κ, Iε0 ≤ γR2/κ, R2 < U(κ), c ≥ cε.
Theorem 4.3.12. Let Assumption L holds. Suppose Assumption M holds for κ = 10. Then, there
exists a unique solution to (S) in BR ⊆ Hc with
R2 <
1
336κL2? max{2, T 2}
.
Remark 4.3.13. We remark that the best way to appreciate the previous result is by contrasting
it with our well-posedness result in the linear–quadratic case. For simplicity, let us assume Ly =
Lu = Lu = Lz = Lv = Lv. Regarding the constraint on the weight parameter of the resulting
norm, the result is pretty much in the same order of magnitude. Nevertheless, the most noticeable
feature is that by allowing the system to have quadratic growth the greatest radius under which our
argument is able to guarantee the well-posedness of the solution decreases by a factor 2 max{2, T 2}.
This quantity can be significant in light of its dependence on the time horizon T .
4.4 Muldimensional quadratic type-I BSVIEs
We now address the well-posedness of multidimensional linear–quadratic and quadratic type-I
BSVIEs. Let d be a non-negative integer, and f and ξ be jointly measurable functionals such that
for any (s, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× (Rd × Rn×d)2
f : [0, T ]2 ×X × (Rd × Rn×d)2 −→ Rd, f·(s, ·, y, z, u, v) ∈ Pprog(Rd,F),
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ Rd, ξ(s, ·) is F-measurable.
The main result in this section follows exploiting the well-posedness of (S). Therefore, we work
under the following set of assumptions.
Assumption N. (s, y, z) 7−→ ft(s, x, y, z, u, v) (resp. s 7−→ ξ(s, x)) is continuously differentiable,
uniformly in (t, x, u, v) (resp. in x). Moreover, ∇f·(s, ·, y, z, u, v, u, v) ∈ Pprog(Rd,F), s ∈ [0, T ],
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where the mapping ∇f : [0, T ]2 ×X × (Rd × Rn×d)3 −→ Rd is defined by
∇ft(s, x,u, v, y, z, u, v) := ∂sft(s, x, y, z, u, v) + ∂yft(s, x, y, z, u, v)u +
n∑
i=1







f·(·,0, 0), f·(s, ·,0), ∂sf·(s, ·,0)
)
, for 0 := (u, v, y, z)|(0,...,0).
Let (H?,c, ‖ · ‖H?,c) denote the space of (Y,Z,N) ∈ H?,c such that ‖(Y, Z,N)‖H?,c <∞ where
H?,c := S∞,2,c ×H2,2BMO ×M
2,2,c








We consider the n-dimensional type-I BSVIE on (H?, ‖ · ‖H?), which for any s ∈ [0, T ] satisfies
Y st = ξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t







dN sr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (4.4.1)
We work under the following notion of solution.
Definition 4.4.1. We say (Y,Z,N) is a solution to the type-I BSVIE (4.4.1) if (Y,Z,N) ∈ H?
verifies (4.4.1).
We may consider the system, given for any s ∈ [0, T ] by













Y st = ξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t







dN sr , (Sf )
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t








Remark 4.4.2. Let us briefly comment that our set-up for the study type-I BSVIE (4.4.1) is
based on the systems introduced in Section 4.3. As such, the necessity of the set of assumptions in
Assumption N is clear.
We are now in position to prove the main result of this paper. The next result shows that under
the previous choice of data for (Sf ), its solution solves the type-I BSVIE with data (ξ, f) and vice
versa in both the linear–quadratic and quadratic case. For this we introduce the following set of
assumptions.
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Assumption O. (i) ∃c̃ ∈ (0,∞) such that (ξ, η, ∂sη, f̃ , g̃,∇g̃) ∈ L∞,c̃ ×L∞,2,c̃ × L1,∞,c̃ × L1,∞,2,c̃;
(ii) ∃(Ly, Lu, Lu) ∈ (0,∞)3 s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, u, ũ,u, ũ, z, v, v) ∈ [0, T ]2×X×(Rd)6×Rn×d×(Rn×d)3
|ft(s, x, y, z, u, v)− ft(s, x, ỹ, z, ũ, v)|+ |∇ft(s, x,u, v, y, z, u, v)−∇ft(s, x, ũ, v, ỹ, z, ũ, v)|
≤Ly|y − ỹ|+ Lu|u− ũ|+ Lu|u− ũ|;
(iii) ∃(Lz, Lv, Lv) ∈ (0,∞)3, φ ∈ H2,c̃BMO s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, u, u, z, z̃, v, ṽ, v, ṽ) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × (Rd)3 ×
(Rn×d)6
|ft(s, x, y, z, u, v)− ft(s, x, y, z̃, u, ṽ)− (z − z̃)>σr(x)φt|
+ |∇ft(s, x,u, v, y, z, u, v)−∇ft(s, x,u, ṽ, y, z̃, u, ṽ)− (v− ṽ)>σr(x)φt|
≤Lz
∣∣|σ>r (x)z|+|σ>r (x)z̃|∣∣|σ>r (x)(z − z̃)|+Lv∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v − ṽ)|
+Lv
∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v− ṽ)|.
Assumption P. (i) ∃c̃ ∈ (0,∞) such that (ξ, η, ∂sη, f̃ , g̃,∇g̃) ∈ L∞,c̃ ×L∞,2,c̃ × L1,∞,c̃ × L1,∞,2,c̃.
(ii) ∃(Ly, Lu, Lu) ∈ (0,∞)3 s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, u, ũ,u, ũ, z, v, v) ∈ [0, T ]2×X×(Rd)6×Rn×d×(Rn×d2)3
|ft(s, x, y, z, u, v)− ft(s, x, ỹ, z, ũ, v)|+ |∇ft(s, x,u, v, y, z, u, v)−∇ft(s, x, ũ, v, ỹ, z, ũ, v)|
≤Ly|y − ỹ|
∣∣|y|+ |ỹ|∣∣+ Lu|u− ũ|∣∣|u|+ |ũ|∣∣+ Lu|u− ũ|∣∣|u|+ |ũ|∣∣;
(iii) ∃(Lz, Lv, Lv) ∈ (0,∞)3, φ ∈ H2,c̃BMO s.t. ∀(s, t, x, y, u, u, z, z̃, v, ṽ, v, ṽ) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X × (Rd)3 ×
(Rn×d)6
|ft(s, x, y, z, u, v)− ft(s, x, y, z̃, u, ṽ)− (z − z̃)>σr(x)φt|
+ |∇ft(s, x,u, v, y, z, u, v)−∇ft(s, x,u, ṽ, y, z̃, u, ṽ)− (v− ṽ)>σr(x)φt|
≤Lz
∣∣|σ>r (x)z|+|σ>r (x)z̃|∣∣|σ>r (x)(z − z̃)|+Lv∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v − ṽ)|
+Lv
∣∣|σ>r (x)v|+|σ>r (x)ṽ|∣∣|σ>r (x)(v− ṽ)|.
Theorem 4.4.3. Let Assumption N hold. Then, the well-posedness of (Sf ) is equivalent to that
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of the type-I BSVIE (4.4.1) if either:
(i) Assumption O holds and Assumption K holds for κ = 7. In such case, there exists a unique





(ii) Assumption P holds and Assumption M holds for κ = 7. In such case, there exists a unique
solution to the type-I BSVIE (4.4.1) in BR ⊆ H?,c with
R2 <
1
336κL2? max{2, T 2}
.
Proof. Let us first note that the second part of the statements in (ii) and (iii) are a direct con-
sequente of Theorem 4.3.6 and Theorem 4.3.12, respectively.
Let us first argue why it suffices to have Assumption K and Assumption M hold for κ = 7
instead of 10. This follows from the specification of data for (Sf ). Indeed, following the notation
of the proof of Theorem 4.3.6 in this case we have that Y = U , Z = V and N =M so the auxiliary
equation introduced in step 1 (ii) is not necessary and, as from (4.5.6), the argument in the proof
holds with 7 instead on 10.
We are only left to argue the equivalence of the solutions. Let us argue (i), the argument for
(ii) is analogous. For this we follow Theorem 3.4.3. Let (Y,Z,N , Y, Z,N, ∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) ∈ BR ⊆ Hc
be a solution to (Sf ). It then follows from Lemma 3.6.2 that













dÑr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,




r dr, t ∈ [0, T ], and Ñ ∈ M2,c. As in Theorem 4.3.9, we obtain that
Ñ ∈ M2,cBMO. This shows that
(
(Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ],Y·,Z·, (Ñt)t∈[0,T ]
)
, solves the first BSDE in
(Sf ). It then follows from the well-posedness of (Sf ), which holds by Assumption N, P, M and
Theorem 4.3.6, that
(
(Y tt )t∈[0,T ], (Ztt )t∈[0,T ], (Ñt)t∈[0,T ]
)




We show the converse result. Let (Y,Z,N) ∈ BR ⊆ H?,c be a solution to type-I BSVIE (4.4.1).
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It is clear that the processes Y := (Y tt )t∈[0,T ],Z := (Ztt )t∈[0,T ],N := (N tt )t∈[0,T ] are well-defined.





we can apply Lemma 3.6.1 and obtain the existence of (∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) ∈ S2,2,c ×H2,2,c ×M2,2,c such
that for s ∈ [0, T ]
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t














Let us claim that h := (Y,Z, Ñ , Y, Z,N, ∂Y, ∂Z, ∂N) is a solution to (Sf ), where Ñt := N tt −∫ t
0 ∂N
r
r dr, t ∈ [0, T ]. For this, we first note that in light of Lemma 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 we have that
Yt = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t






dÑr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
Now, Ñ ∈ M2,2,cBMO follows as in Theorem 4.3.9. As in step 1 (iii) in the proof of Theorem 4.3.6,
we obtain that Y ∈ S2,c. We are only left to argue ‖h‖ ≤ R. This follows readily following step 1






4.5 Proof of the linear–quadratic case
Proof of Theorem 4.3.6. For c > 0, let us introduce the mapping
T : (BR, ‖ · ‖Hc) −→ (BR, ‖ · ‖Hc)
(y, z, n, u, v,m, ∂u, ∂v, ∂m) 7−→ (Y,Z,N,U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M),
with (Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) given for any s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ] by
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t









Step 1: We first argue that T is well-defined.




































∣∣∣∣2 + 10L2z∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
|zt|2dt









































Therefore, by Theorem 3.3.5, T defines a well-posed system of BSDEs with unique solution in the
space H2. We recall the spaces involved in the definition of H2, and their corresponding norms,
were introduced in Section 4.2.2.
(ii) Arguing as in Lemma 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, we may use Assumption J and v ∈ H2,2BMO, i.e. ∂v is the
density with respect to the Lebesgue measure of s 7−→ vs, to obtain that (U ,V,M) ∈ S2×H2×M2
given by
Ut := U tt , Vt := V tt , Mt := M tt −
∫ t
0
∂M rr dr, t ∈ [0, T ],
satisfy the equation












dMr, t ∈ [0, T ],P–a.s.
(iii) We show (Y,U) ∈ S∞,c × S∞,c and ‖U‖S∞,2,c + ‖∂U‖S∞,2,c <∞.
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To alleviate the notation we introduce
hr := hr(Yr, zr,Ur, vrr , ∂U rr ), gr := gr(r,Ur, vrr ,Yr, zr)− ∂U rr ,
gr(s) := gr(s, U sr , vsr ,Yr, zr), ∇gr(s) := ∇gr(s, ∂U sr , ∂vsr , U sr , vsr ,Yr, zr),
and
Y := (Y,U , U s, ∂U s), Z := (Z,V, V s, ∂V s), Z := (N ,M,M s, ∂M s),
whose elements we may denote with superscripts, e.g. Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4 correspond to Y,U , U s, ∂U s.
In light of Assumption J, dr ⊗ dP–a.e.
|hr| ≤ Ly|Yr|+ Lz|σ>r zr|2 + Lu|Ur|+ Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + Lu|∂U rr |+ |h̃r|,
|gr| ≤ Lu|Ur|+ Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + Ly|Yr|+ Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |∂U rr |+ |g̃r|,
|gr(s)| ≤ Lu|U sr |+ Lv|σ>r vsr |2 + Ly|Yr|+ Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |g̃r(s)|,
|∇gr(s)| ≤ Lu|∂U sr |+ Lv|σ>r ∂vsr |2 + Lu|U sr |+ Lv|σ>r vsr |2 + Ly|Yr|+ Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |∇g̃r(s)|.
(4.5.1)











|Yt|+ |Ut|+ |U st |+ |∂U st |
)























where L̂0t := L̂0t (Y,U , U s, ∂U s) denotes the non-decreasing and pathwise-continuous local time of
the semimartingale (Y,U , U s, ∂U s) at 0, see [212, Theorem 70], and, we introduced the martingale













2 r− sgn(Yr−) · dZir, t ∈ [0, T ].
Again, we take conditional expectations with respect to Ft in Equation (4.5.2) and exploit the
fact L̂0T is non-decreasing. Moreover, in combination with (4.5.1) and Lemma 4.7.1, we obtain back
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+ (T + LuT )
(
















where we recall the notation L? = max{Lz, Lv, Lv}. Thus, for
c ≥ 2 max{4Ly + TLy + TLuLy, 2Lu, 2Lu + TLu + TLuLu, Lu}










2 t|U st |, e
c






|Yt|+ |Ut|+ |U st |+ |∂U st |
)
















(iv) We show (Z,V,N ,M)∈
(
H2,cBMO







Applying Itô’s formula to ect
(











ecr−dTr[Zi]r + M̃t − M̃T
= ecT
(





















ecrZirYir · dXr +
∫ t
0
ecr−Yir− · dZir, t ∈ [0, T ].
Indeed, Burkholder–Davis–Gundy’s inequality and the fact that (Y,U , Z,V, U, ∂U, V, ∂V ) ∈ (S2)2×















≤ CecT ‖Yi‖S2‖Zi‖H2 , i ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
which guarantees each of the processes in M̃ is an uniformly integrable martingale. Thus, taking





























, t ∈ [0, T ].
From (iii), Assumption J.(ii) and J.(iii), together with Young’s inequality, yield that, for any













u + ε−110 L2y we have
2Yr · hr − c|Yr|2 ≤ (C̃ε1,7 − c)|Yr|2 + 2‖Y‖S∞,c
(
Lz|σ>r zr|2 + Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + |h̃r|
)
+ ε1(7T )−1|∂U rr |2 + ε7|Ur|2,
2Ur · gr − c|Ur|2 ≤ (C̃ε2,8 − c)|Ur|2 + 2‖U‖S∞,c
(
Lz|σ>r zr|2 + Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + |g̃r|
)
+ ε2(7T )−1|∂U rr |2 + ε8|Yr|2,
2U sr · gr(s)− c|U sr |2 ≤ (C̃ε9 − c)|U sr |2 + 2‖U‖S∞,2,c
(
Lv|σ>r vsr |2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |g̃r(s)|
)
+ ε9|Yr|2,
2∂U sr · ∇gr(s)− c|∂U sr |2 ≤ (C̃ε10,11 − c)|∂U sr |2 + ε11|U sr |2 + ε10|Yr|2
+ 2‖∂U‖S∞,c,2
(




These inequalities in combination with Lemma 4.7.1, and Young’s inequality, show that if we
define Cε1 := C̃ε1,7 + ε8 + ε9 + ε10 + (ε1 + ε2)TL2y, Cε2 := C̃ε2,8 + ε7, Cε3 := C̃ε9 + ε11 + (ε1 + ε2)TL2u,






























ecr|∂U sr |2(c− Cε4)dr
]






















































































We now let τ ∈ T0,T . In light of (4.5.3), for




u + ε8 + ε9 + ε10,




y, 2Lu + ε1TL2u + ε2TL2u + ε−19 L2y + ε11,





























(ε1 + ε2 + ε13 + ε15 + ε17 + ε19)‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO




















































L1,∞,c + (ε4 + ε5)‖g̃‖
2
L1,∞,2,c
+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε6)‖∇g̃‖2L1,∞,2,c + 2L
2
?(ε1 + ε2 + ε12 + ε14 + ε16 + ε18)‖z‖4H2,cBMO
+ 2L2?(ε1 + ε2 + ε13 + ε15 + ε17 + ε19)‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO










































+ ‖M‖2M2,2,c + ‖∂M‖
2
M2,2,c <∞.
At this point, we can highlight a crucial step in this approach. It is clear from (4.5.6) that the
norm of T does not have a linear growth in the norm of the input. In the following, we will see
that choosing the data of the system small enough and localising T will bring us back to the linear
growth scenario. For this, we observe that if we define
Cε := min
{










































17 ) ∈(0, 1],






20 ) ∈(0, 1], and for some γ ∈ (0,∞),
Iε0 ≤ γR2/10,
we obtain back in (4.5.6)






(ε1 + ε2 + ε12 + ε14 + ε16 + ε18)‖z‖4H2,cBMO
+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε13 + ε15 + ε17 + ε19)‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO






(ε1 + ε2 + ε12 + ε14 + ε16 + ε18)‖z‖2H2,cBMO
+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε13 + ε15 + ε17 + ε19)‖v‖2H2,2,cBMO












Therefore, to obtain T(BR) ⊆ BR, that is to say that the image under T of the ball of radius
R is contained in the ball of radius R, it is necessary to find R2 such that the term in parentheses
above is less or equal than Cε, i.e.
R2 ≤ 120L2?
Cε − γ




Clearly, there are many choices of ε’s so that the above holds. Among such, we wish to choose
γ, εi, so that the expression to the right in (4.5.7) is maximal. In light of Lemma 4.7.2, we have
that ‖(Y, Z,N,U, V,M)‖Hc ≤ R provided that
R2 <
1
25 · 3 · 52 · 7 · L2?
. (4.5.8)
(v) Lastly, we are left to argue (U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) ∈ S∞,2,c×H2,2,cBMO×M2,2,c×S∞,2,c×H
2,2,c
BMO×
M2,2,c. The argument for (U, V,M) is analogous to that of (∂U, ∂V, ∂M), thus we argue the con-
tinuity of the applications ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S∞,c, ‖ · ‖S∞,c)
(




: s 7−→ ϕs for ϕ = U s (resp. V s,M s).
Recall ρg denotes the modulus of continuity of g. Let (sn)n ⊆ [0, T ], sn
n→∞−−−→ s0 ∈ [0, T ] and
define for ϕ ∈ {U, V,M, u, v, η}, ∆ϕn := ϕsn−ϕs0 . Applying Itô’s formula to ect|∆Unt |2, proceeding
as in Step 1 (iv) we obtain
‖∆Un‖2S∞,c + ‖∆V n‖2H2,cBMO
+ ‖∆Mn‖2M2,c ≤ 4
(
‖∆ηn‖2L∞,c + 4L2v‖∆vn‖4H2,cBMO
+ ρg(|sn − s0|)2
)
.
We conclude, T(BR) ⊆ BR for all R satisfying (4.5.8).
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Step 2: We now argue that T is a contraction in BR ⊆ H for the norm ‖ · ‖Hc .
Let (Y i, Zi, N i, U i, V i,M i, , U i, V i,M i) := T(yi, zi, ni, ui, vi,mi) for (yi, zi, ni, ui, vi,mi, ∂ui,
∂vi, ∂mi) ∈ BR, i = 1, 2.
For ϕ ∈ {y, z, n, u, v,m, ∂u, ∂v, ∂m,Y,Z,N ,U ,V,M, U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M}, we denote δϕ :=
ϕ1 − ϕ2 and























t ) + ∂U
2,t
t ,





























































t ) + ∂U
2,t
t ,






































Applying Itô’s formula to ect
(
|δYt|2 + |δUt|2 + |δU st |2 + |δ∂U st |2
)

































Lu|δUr|+ Ly|δYr|+ |δ∂U rr |+ |δg̃r|
)
− c|δUr|2
+ 2|δU sr |
(
Lu|δU sr |+ Ly|δYr|+ |δg̃r(s)|
)
− c|δU sr |2
+ 2|δ∂U sr |
(
Lu|δ∂U sr |+ Lu|δU sr |+ Ly|δYr|+ |δ∇g̃r(s)|
)
− c|δ∂U sr |2
)
dr,
where δM̃ denotes the corresponding martingale term. Let τ ∈ T0,T , as in Lemma 4.7.1 we obtain
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We now take conditional expectation with respect to Fτ in the expression above. In addition,
we use Assumption J in combination with (4.5.9), exactly as in Step 1 (iv). We then obtain from
Young’s inequality that for any ε̃i ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, ..., 11}, and


























≤ ε̃−13 ‖δY ‖
2















ecr|δ∇gr(s, 0, ∂vsr , 0, vsr , 0, zr)|dr
]∣∣∣∣2 (4.5.11)































ecr|δ∇gr(s, 0, ∂vsr , 0, vsr , 0, zr)|dr











|σ>r ∂v1r |+ |σ>r ∂v2r |
)
+ Lv|σ>r δvsr |
(











































































]∣∣∣∣2, ∣∣∣∣Eτ[ ∫ T
τ
ecr|δg̃r(s)|dr






















≤ ε̃−13 ‖δY ‖
2























If we define, for ε̃i > 10, i ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, Cε̃ := min
{




‖(δY, δZ, δN, δU, δV, δM, δ∂U, δ∂V, δ∂M)‖2Hc
≤ 10C−1ε̃ L2?R2
(






















By minimising the previous upper bound for ε̃1 and ε̃2 fixed, see Lemma 4.7.3, and in light of
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(4.5.8) and (4.5.10), we find that letting
R2 <
1
25 · 3 · 52 · 7 · L2?
, and













u + ε̃−110 L2y},
we have that
‖(δY, δZ, δN, δU, δV, δM, δ∂U, δ∂V, δ∂M)‖2Hc
<
20
23 · 3 · 7 · 102 3(
√











30 + (ε̃1 + ε̃2) +
√
30)2








Thus, letting choosing (
√
30 + (ε̃1 + ε̃2) +
√
30)2 ≤ 22 · 7 · 10, T is contractive, i.e





Step 3: We consolidate our results. To begin with, we collect the constraints of the weight of
the norms. In light of (4.5.5) and (4.5.10), c must satisfy




u + ε8 + ε9 + ε10,




y2Lu + ε1TL2u + ε2TL2u + ε−19 L2y + ε11,













u + (ε̃1 + ε̃2)TL2y,




u + ε̃−110 L2y,
8Ly + 2TLy + 2TLuLy, 4Lu + 2T 2Lu + 2T 2LuLu}




u + ε8 + ε9 + ε10,









y + ε−111 L2u,
8Ly + 2TLy + 2TLuLy, 4Lu + 2TLu + 2TLuLu},
(4.5.13)
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where the equality follows from the choice εi = ε̃i, i ∈ {1, 2, 7, ..., 11}.
All together we find that given γ ∈ (0,∞), εi ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, ..., 11}, c ∈ (0,∞), such that




30)2 − 30, T is a well–defined contraction in BR ⊆ Hc for the norm ‖ · ‖Hc
provided: (i) γ, εi, i ∈ {1, ..., 6}, and the data of the problem satisfy Iε0 ≤ γR2/10; (ii) c satisfies
(4.5.13).
Proof of Theorem 4.3.9. We show for ‖∂M‖2BMO2,2,c < ∞, the argument for (N ,M) being com-
pletely analogous. Without lost of generality we assume c = 0, see Remark 4.2.2. In light of
Assumption J, we have that dr ⊗ dP–a.e.
|∇gr(s, ∂U sr , ∂V sr , U sr , V sr ,Yr,Zr)| ≤Lu|U sr |+ Lv|σ>r V sr |2 + Lu|U sr |+ Lv|σ>r V sr |2 + Ly|Yr|
+ Lz|σ>r Zr|2 + |∇g̃r(s)|.
















|σ>r ∂V sr |2dr
]
.












∣∣∣∣2 + |∂U sτ−|2 + T ∫ T
τ−




Lv|σ>r ∂V sr |2dr
∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
τ−
Lv|σ>r V sr |2dr
∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
τ−
Lz|σ>r Zr|2dr























Proof of Theorem 4.3.10. Upon close inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.3.6, we see that the only
stages of the argument where both the presence and the norm of (N ,M, ∂M) plays a role are in
(4.5.6), (4.5.7) and (4.5.12). We address each of them in the following. We consider the case (i).
The argument for (ii) follows similarly.
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If we were to require BMO-norms on (N ,M, ∂M) we see that
(i) In (4.5.6), the presence of the ess supP in the BMO-norm would require us to consider the
estimate right before (4.5.6) for each of the 9 processes that define the solution to (S). Thus we
obtain a factor 11 instead of 10. This yields
Cε := min
{









































(ii) As a consequence of the previous observation (4.5.7) would be replace by
R2 ≤ 124L?
Cε − γ





23 · 3 · 7 · 112 · L?
= U(11).
where the upper bound comes from the optimisation procedure, i.e. Lemma 4.7.2.
(iii) Likewise, with Cε̃ as in the proof, (4.5.12) is now given by
‖(Y,Z,N,U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M)‖2Ĥc




















where the second inequality follows from the new version of the optimisation procedure, i.e.
Lemma 4.7.3.
All things considered, Step 3 will lead to require Assumption K for κ = 11. By assumption
the result follows.
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4.6 Proof of the quadratic case
Proof of Theorem 4.3.12. For c > 0, let us introduce the mapping
T : (BR, ‖ · ‖Hc) −→ (BR, ‖ · ‖Hc)
(y, z, n, u, v,m, ∂u, ∂v, ∂m) 7−→ (Y,Z,N,U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M),
with H = (Y,Z,N , U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M) given for any s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ] by
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t







U st = η(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t








Step 1: We first argue that T is well-defined.






≤ T‖u‖2S∞,2,c . (4.6.1)




































∣∣∣∣2 + 17L2y∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
|yt|2dt
∣∣∣∣2 + 17L2z∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
|zt|2dt































∣∣∣∣2 +7L2u∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
|∂ust |2dt














+ 17L2yT 2‖y‖4S∞,c + 34L2z‖z‖4H2,cBMO
+ 17L2uT 2‖u‖4S∞,2,c + 24L
2
v‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO




Therefore, by Theorem 3.4.3, T defines a well-posed system of BSDEs with unique solution in the
space H2. We recall the spaces involved in the definition of H2, and their corresponding norms,
were introduced in Section 4.2.2.




r dr, t ∈ [0, T ], (U ,V,M) ∈ S2 × H2 ×M2 and
satisfy the equation












dMr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
(iii) (Y,U) ∈ S∞,c × S∞,c and ‖U‖S∞,2,c + ‖∂U‖S∞,2,c <∞.
In light of Assumption L, dr ⊗ dP–a.e.
|hr| ≤ Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + Lu|urr|2 + Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + Lu|∂U rr |+ |h̃r|,
|gr| ≤ Lu|urr|2 + Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |∂U rr |+ |g̃r|,
|gr(s)| ≤ Lu|usr|2 + Lv|σ>r vsr |2 + Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |g̃r(s)|, (4.6.2)
|∇gr(s)| ≤ Lu|∂usr|2 + Lv|σ>r ∂vsr |2 + Lu|usr|2 + Lv|σ>r vsr |2 + Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |∇g̃r(s)|.




|Yt| + |Ut| + |U st | + |∂U st |
)
and take conditional
expectations with respect to Ft as in Equation (4.5.2). Moreover, in combination with (4.6.2) and






























































+ (T + LuT )
(
‖∂sη‖L∞,2,c + ‖∇g̃‖L1,∞,2,c + TL?
(







































2 t|U st |, e
c
2 t|∂U st |
}


































From (iii), Assumption J.(ii) and J.(iii), together with Young’s inequality, yield that, for any
εi > 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, and defining Cε1 := ε−11 7TL2u, and Cε2 := ε
−1
2 7T , we have
2Yr · hr − c|Yr|2 ≤ 2‖Y‖S∞,c
(
Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + Lu|urr|2 + Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + |h̃r|
)
+ ε1(7T )−1|∂U rr |2 + (C̃ε1 − c)|Yr|2,
2Ur · gr − c|Ur|2 ≤ 2‖U‖S∞,c
(
Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |urr|2 + Lv|σ>r vrr |2 + |g̃r|
)
+ ε2(7T )−1|∂U rr |2 + (C̃ε2 − c)|Ur|2,
2U sr · gr(s)− c|U sr |2 ≤ 2‖U‖S∞,2,c
(
Lu|usr|2+Lv|σ>r vsr |2+Ly|yr|2+Lz|σ>r zr|2+|g̃r(s)|
)
− c|U sr |2,
2∂U sr · ∇gr(s)− c|∂U sr |2 ≤ 2‖∂U‖S∞,c,2
(




Ly|yr|2 + Lz|σ>r zr|2
)
− c|∂U sr |2.
These inequalities in combination with the analogous version of Lemma 4.7.1 (which holds for
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|ξ|2 + |η(T )|2 + |η(s)|2 + |∂sη(s)|2
)]






+ (ε1 + ε2)
(
L?T


































































∣∣∣∣2 + ε4∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
ecr|g̃r|dr
∣∣∣∣2]+ ε5∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
ecr|g̃r(s)|dr




+ (ε7 + ε11 + ε15 + ε19)L?T 2‖y‖4S∞,c+ (ε9 + ε13 + ε17 + ε21)L?T 2‖u‖4S∞,2,c+ ε23L?T
2‖∂u‖4S∞,2,c
















We now let τ ∈ T0,T . In light of (4.5.3), for
c ≥ max {ε−11 7TL2u, ε
−1

















+ (ε4 + ε5)‖g̃‖2L1,∞,2,c+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε6)‖∇g̃‖
2
L1,∞,2,c
+ L2?T 2(ε1 + ε2 + ε7 + ε11 + ε15 + ε19)‖y‖4S∞,c + L2?T 2(ε1 + ε2 + ε9 + ε13 + ε17 + ε21)‖u‖4S∞,2,c
+ L2?T 2(ε1 + ε2 + ε23)‖∂u‖4S∞,2,c + 2L
2
?(ε1 + ε2 + ε8 + ε12 + ε16 + ε20)‖z‖4H2,cBMO
+ 2L2?(ε1 + ε2 + ε10 + ε14 + ε18 + ε22)‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO
















































































+ (ε4 + ε5)‖g̃‖2L1,∞,2,c+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε6)‖∇g̃‖
2
L1,∞,2,c
+ L2?T 2(ε1 + ε2 + ε7 + ε11 + ε15 + ε19)‖y‖4S∞,c
+ L2?T 2(ε1 + ε2 + ε9 + ε13 + ε17 + ε21)‖u‖4S∞,2,c
+ L2?T 2(ε1 + ε2 + ε23)‖∂u‖4S∞,2,c + 2L
2
?(ε1 + ε2 + ε8 + ε12 + ε16 + ε20)‖z‖4H2,cBMO
+ 2L2?(ε1 + ε2 + ε10 + ε14 + ε18 + ε22)‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO





























































+ ‖M‖2M2,2,c + ‖∂M‖
2
M2,2,c <∞.
Defining Cε analogously and if for some γ ∈ (0,∞)
Iε0 ≤ γR2/10, (4.6.5)
we obtain back in (4.6.4)
‖(Y,Z,N,U, V,M, ∂U, ∂V, ∂M)‖2Hc
≤ C−1ε
(
10Iε0 + 10L2? max{2, T 2}
(
(ε1 + ε2 + ε7 + ε11 + ε15 + ε19)‖y‖4S∞,c
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+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε9 + ε13 + ε17 + ε21)‖u‖4S∞,2,c
+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε23)‖∂u‖4S∞,2,c + (ε1 + ε2 + ε8 + ε12 + ε16 + ε20)‖z‖
4
H2,cBMO
+ (ε1 + ε2 + ε10 + ε14 + ε18 + ε22)‖v‖4H2,2,cBMO




γ + 10L2? max{2, T 2}R2
(






Therefore, to obtain T(BR) ⊆ BR, that is to say that the image under T of the ball of radius
R is contained in the ball of radius R, it is necessary to find R2 such that the term in parentheses
above is less or equal than Cε, i.e.
R2 ≤ 110L2? max{2, T 2}
Cε − γ




which after optimising the choice of ε’s renders
R2 <
1
26 · 3 · 52 · 7 · L2? ·max{2, T 2}
. (4.6.6)
(v) The continuity of the applications ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S∞,c, ‖ · ‖S∞,c)
(
resp. (H2,cBMO, ‖ ·
‖H2,cBMO), (M
2,c, ‖ · ‖M2,c)
)
: s 7−→ ϕs for ϕ = U s, ∂U s (resp. V s, ∂V s,M s, ∂M s) follows analogously
as in the proof Theorem 4.3.6.
We conclude, T(BR) ⊆ BR for all R satisfying (4.6.6).
Step 2: We now argue that T is a contraction in BR ⊆ H for the norm ‖ · ‖Hc . Let





























t ) + ∂U
2,t
t ,
































































































|δ∂U rr |+ |δg̃r|
)






where δM̃ denotes the corresponding martingale term. Let τ ∈ T0,T , as in Lemma 4.7.1 we obtain

















We now take conditional expectation with respect to Fτ in the expression above and use As-
sumption J in combination with (4.6.7). We then obtain from Young’s inequality that for any
ε̃i ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, 2}, and
c ≥ max {ε̃−11 3TL2u, 3T ε̃
−1












≤ ε̃−13 ‖δY ‖
2


















































|∂u1,sr |+ |∂u2,sr |
)
+ Lv|σ>r δ∂vsr |
(




|u1,sr |+ |u2,sr |
)
+ Lv|σ>r δvsr |
(


















































































|σ>r z1r |+ |σ>r z2r |
)2dr]
















































]∣∣∣∣2, ∣∣∣∣Eτ[ ∫ T
τ
ecr|δg̃r(s)|dr




≤ 4L2?R2 max{2, T 2}
(
‖δy‖2S∞,c + ‖δz‖2H2,cBMO
















≤ ε̃−13 ‖δY ‖
2





















+ ‖δy‖2S∞,c + ‖δz‖2H2,cBMO
)
+ 4(ε̃3 + ε̃4 + ε̃5)L2?R2 max{2, T 2}
(
‖δy‖2S∞,c + ‖δz‖2H2,cBMO





If we define, for ε̃i > 10, i ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, Cε̃ := min
{




‖δH‖2Hc ≤ 20C−1ε̃ L2?R2 max{2, T 2}(3ε̃1 + 3ε̃2 + 2ε̃3 + 2ε̃4 + 2ε̃5 + 3ε̃6)‖δh‖Hc . (4.6.10)
Minimising for ε̃1 and ε̃2 fixed, we find that letting
R2 <
1
26 · 3 · 52 · 7 · L2? ·max{2, T 2}










24 · 3 · 7 · 102 3(
√





30 + (ε̃1 + ε̃2) +
√
30)2
23 · 7 · 10 ‖δh‖H
c .
Thus, letting choosing (
√
30 + (ε̃1 + ε̃2) +
√
30)2 ≤ 23 · 7 · 10, T is contractive.
Step 3: We consolidate our results.. In light of (4.6.3) and (4.6.8), taking εi = ε̃i, i ∈ {1, 2}, c
must satisfy




1 3TL2u, 3T ε̃
−1




2 7T, 2Lu} (4.6.11)
All together we find that given γ ∈ (0,∞), εi ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, 2}, c ∈ (0,∞), such that




30)2 − 30, T is a well-defined contraction in BR ⊆ Hc for the norm ‖ · ‖Hc
provided: (i) γ, εi, i ∈ {1, 2}, and the data of the problem satisfy (4.6.5); (ii) c satisfies (4.6.11).
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4.7 Auxiliary results
4.7.1 Proofs of Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.2.3. First note that for Z ∈ H2BMO(Rn×d̃), Z • Xt :=
∫ t
0 ZdXr is a continuous
local martingale, thus we have that














Therefore, letting Xt := E[〈e
c
2Z •X〉T − 〈e
c
2Z •X〉t|Ft], we have:
(i) |Xt| ≤ ‖Z •X‖BMO2,c = ‖Z‖2H2,cBMO
,
(ii) A = 〈e
c







∣∣Ft]− 〈e c2Z •X〉t.










To obtain the second part of the statement, recall that by definition of H2,2(Rn×d̃), s 7−→ ∂Zs
is the density of s 7−→ Zs with respect to the Lebesgue measure and Z is given as in Remark 4.2.2.
By definition of Z, Fubini’s theorem and Young’s inequality we have that for ε > 0
∫ T
t



































εecu|σ>u Zru|2 + ε−1ecu|σ>u ∂Zru|2dudr.
































≤ 6((1 + T 2)‖Z‖4H2,2,cBMO
+ T 2‖∂Z‖4H2,2,cBMO
).
The inequality for the H2 norm is argued similarly taking expectations.
4.7.2 Proofs of Section 4.5
We next sequence of lemmata helps derive appropriate auxiliary estimates of the terms U tt and
∂U tt as defined by T in Section 4.5.
Lemma 4.7.1. Let ∂U satisfy the equation
∂U st = ∂sη(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t






































































Proof. By Meyer–Itô’s formula for e c2 t|∂U st |, see Protter [212, Theorem 70]
e
c


























dr, t ∈ [0, T ],
where L0 := L0(∂U s) denotes the non-decreasing and pathwise-continuous local time of the semi-
martingale ∂U s at 0, see [212, Chapter IV, pp. 216]. We also notice that for any s ∈ [0, T ] the last
two terms on the left-hand side are martingales, recall that ∂V s ∈ H2 by Theorem 3.4.3.
In light of Assumption J, letting ∇gr(s) := ∇gr(s, ∂U sr , ∂vsr , U sr , vsr , Yr, zr), we have that dt ⊗
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dP–a.e.
|∇gr(s)| ≤Lu|∂U sr |+ Lv|σ>r ∂vsr |2 + Lu|U sr |+ Lv|σ>r vsr |2 + Ly|Yr|+ Lz|σ>r zr|2 + |∇g̃r(s)|. (4.7.2)
We now take conditional expectation with respect to Ft in Equation (4.7.1). We may use (4.7.2)
and the fact L̃0 is non- decreasing to derive that for c > 2Lu and t ∈ [0, T ]
e
c











|∇g̃r(s)|+ Lv|σ>r ∂vsr |2 + Lu|U sr |
















































By integrating the previous expression and taking conditional expectation with respect to Ft,

































































































































































Evaluating at s = t in (4.7.3) and integrating with respect to t we derive the second estimate.




α(ε3, ε12, ε13), α(ε4, ε14, ε15), α(ε5, ε16, ε17), α(ε6, ε18, ε19, ε20)
}
− γ
ε1 + ε2 +
∑20
i=12 εi




13 ) ∈ (0, 1],




15 ) ∈ (0, 1],




17 ) ∈ (0, 1],






20 ) ∈ (0, 1],
γ ∈ (0,∞); εi ∈ (0,∞),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} ∪ {12, . . . , 20}.
Proof. We begin by noticing that as a function of (γ, ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5, ε6) the objective is bounded
by the value when (γ, ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5, ε6) −→ (0, 0, 0,∞,∞,∞,∞). Thus, we will maximise
min{1− 10(ε−112 + ε
−1

















From this we observe that the optimal value is positive. Indeed, one can find a feasible solution
with positive value, and the min in the objective function does not involve common εi terms, so
the minima is attained at one of the terms. Since the value function is symmetric in each of the
variables inside each term of the mean we can assume with out lost of generality
ε12 =ε13 = 2α1, ε14 = ε15 = 2α2, ε16 = ε17 = 2α3, ε18 = ε19 = ε20 = 3α4, {α1, α2, α3, α4}∈(0,∞)4.
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So we can write the objective function as
min{1− 10α−11 , 1− 10α
−1
2 , 1− 10α
−1
3 , 1− 10α
−1
4 }
4α1 + 4α2 + 4α3 + 9α4
.






s.t. α1 ≤ min{α2, α3, α4}, 1− 10α−1i ∈ (0, 1], αi ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
Now, as the objective function is decreasing in α2, α3, α4, and α1 ≤ min{α2, α3, α4},we must have





s.t. 1− 10α−11 ∈ (0, 1], α1 ∈ (0,∞).




= 0, yields, α1 ∈ {0, 20}.
By inspecting the sign of the derivative, one sees that α1 = 0 corresponds to a minima and α1 = 20





= 123 · 3 · 5 · 7 .
We conclude the maxima happens when (ε12, ε13, ε14, ε15, ε16, ε17, ε18, ε19, ε20) = (40, 40, 40, 40,
40, 40, 60, 60, 60). Evaluating the value function in these values and letting (γ, ε1, ε3, ε8, ε9, ε10, ε11)
−→ (0, 0, 0,∞,∞,∞,∞), we obtain this bound. This is, f does not attain its maximum value, but
in the feasible region it can get as close as possible.
Lemma 4.7.3 (Minimal bound for Contraction). (OPT2) = 3(
√






















s.t. 1− 10ε̃−1i ∈ (0, 1], ε̃i ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}.
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s.t. ε̃8 ≤ min{ε̃4, ε̃5, ε̃6}, 1− 10ε̃−13 ∈ (0, 1], ε̃i ∈ (0,∞) i ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}.
As the value function is increasing in (ε̃4, ε̃5, ε̃6), ε̃3 ≤ min{ε̃4, ε̃5, ε̃6} implies we must have
ε̃3 = ε̃4 = ε̃5 = ε̃6. Thus, we minimise
f(ε̃) := 33ε̃
2 + ε̃(ε̃1 + ε̃2)
ε̃− 10 .
First order analysis gives
∂ε̃f(ε̃) =
9ε̃− 180ε̃− 30(ε̃1 + ε̃2)
ε̃− 10 = 0, yields, ε̃
± = 10± 16
√
602 + 120(ε̃1 + ε̃2).
The minimum occurs at ε̃? = 10 + 16
√
602 + 120(ε̃1 + ε̃2), and
f(ε̃?) = 3(
√
30 + (ε̃1 + ε̃2) +
√
30)2.
We conclude the minima occurs when (ε̃3, ε̃4, ε̃5, ε̃6) = (20, 20, 20, 20). Evaluating the value
function in these values and letting (ε̃1, ε̃2) −→ (0, 0), we obtain this bound. This is, f does not





Time-inconsistent contract theory for sophisticated
agents
This chapter is devoted to put together all our efforts of Part II and Part III in order to address
the moral hazard problem in finite horizon with lump-sum payments, involving a time-inconsistent
sophisticated agent and a standard utility maximiser principal. Our main contribution consists
of a characterisation of the moral hazard problem faced by the principal. In particular, it shows
that under relatively mild technical conditions on the data of the problem, the supremum of the
principal’s expected utility over the restricted family of contracts is equal to the supremum over
all feasible contracts. Nevertheless, this characterisation yields, as far as we know, a novel class of
control problems that involve the control of a forward Volterra equation via constrained Volterra
type controls. Despite the inherent challenges of these class of problems, we study the solution
to this problem under three different specifications of utility functions for both the agent and the
principal and draw qualitative implications from the form of the optimal contract. The general
case remains the subject of future research.
5.1 Problem statement
Let us recall the formulation. We take two positive integers n and m, which represent respect-
ively the dimension of the process controlled by the agent, and the dimension of the Brownian
motion driving this controlled process. We consider the canonical space X = Cn, endowed with the
sup norm and with canonical process X, and whose generic elements we denote x. We reserve the
notation x and x to denote R-valued variables.
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We let FX be the Borel σ-algebra on X (for the topology of uniform convergence), and FX =
(FXt )t∈[0,T ] is the natural filtration of X. We let A be a compact subspace of a finite-dimensional
Euclidean space (typically A is a subset of Rk for some positive integer k), where the controls will
take values.
5.1.1 Controlled state equation
We fix a bounded Borel-measurable map σ : [0, T ] × X −→ Rn×m, and an initial condition
x0 ∈ Rn, and assume that there is a unique solution, denoted by P, to the martingale problem
for which X is an (FX ,P)–local martingale, such that X0 = x0 with probability 1, and d〈X〉t =
σt(X·∧t)σ>t (X·∧t)dt. Enlarging the original probability space if necessary (see Stroock and Varadhan
[232, Theorem 4.5.2]), we can find an Rm-valued Brownian motion B such that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σs(X·∧r)dBr, t ∈ [0, T ].
We now let F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the P–augmentation of FX which we assume is right-continuous.
We recall that uniqueness of the solution to the martingale problem implies that the predictable
martingale representation property holds for (F,P)-martingales, which can be represented as sto-
chastic integrals with respect to X (see Jacod and Shiryaev [142, Theorem III.4.29]). We also
mention that the right continuity assumption on F guarantees that (P,F) satisfies the Blumenthal
zero–one law.
We can then introduce our drift functional b : [0, T ] × X × A −→ Rm, which is assumed
to be Borel-measurable with respect to all its arguments. Let us recall that for any A-valued,















∥∥bs(X·∧s, αr)∥∥2dr)] <∞, (5.1.1)






















dr is an Rm-valued, (F,Pα)–
Brownian motion and we have






σr(X·∧r)dBαr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
Let us emphasise that we are working under the so-called weak formulation of the problem.
This means that the state process X is fixed and, in contrast to the typical strong formulation, the
Brownian motion and the probability measure are not fixed. Indeed, the choice of α corresponds
to the choice of probability measure Pα and thus the distribution of process X.
5.1.2 The agent’s problem
We aim to cover various specifications of time-inconsistent utility functions for the agent. To
motivate our formulation, let us start with an informal discussion on the typical nature of the
reward functionals assigned to the agent in contract theory. In general terms, and at the formal
level, given a contract ξ the value received by a time-inconsistent agent at the beginning of the
problem from choosing an action α typically takes the form
VA0 (ξ, α) := EP
α[UA(0, ξ, Cα0,T )], with Cαt,T := ∫ T
t
cr(t,X·∧r, αr)dr,
where UA : [0, T ]×R×R −→ R, (t, x, c) 7−→ UA(t, x, c) denotes the agent’s utility function, ξ is
a real-valued random variable representing the final payment prescribed by the contract and Cαt,T
denotes the cumulative cost functional. We highlight that the generic dependence of both UA and
c on t accounts for the sources of time-inconsistency. In the classic literature, utilities are usually
classified under two categories, namely
(i) separable utility functions, i.e. UA(t, x, c) = UA(t, x)− c,
(ii) non-separable utility functions, i.e. UA(t, x, c) = UA(t, x − c).
For instance, in the separable case the agent’s value takes the familiar form










which we recall satisfies VA0 (ξ, α) = Y
0,α
0 , for Y
0,α
0 the initial value of the first component of
(Y 0,α, Z0,α) solution to the BSDE









Z0,αr · dXr, P–a.s.
Moreover, in the (time-consistent) case in which the agent discounts exponentially with constant
factor ρ, i.e. UA(t, x) = e−ρ(T−t)UA(x) and ct(s, x, a) = e−ρ(t−s)ct(x, a), it holds that









Z0,αr · dXr, P–a.s.
The previous representation corresponds to a so-called recursive utility particularly known as
standard additive utility, see Epstein and Zin [95]. Let us remark that an analogous argument holds
in the case of the non-separable exponential utility and refer to El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez [88] for
more examples on recursive utilities. Intuitively, a recursive utility can be viewed as an extension
of the classic separable or non-separable utilities in which the instantaneous utility depends on the
instantaneous action αt and the future utility via Y 0,αt . Extrapolating these ideas, we may arrive
at considering rewards functionals of the form VA0 (ξ, α) = Y
0,α
0 where the pair (Y α, Zα) satisfies
the BSVIE














Zt,αr · dXr, P–a.s., t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.1.2)
By letting both UA and h depend on t we allow for general discounting structures and incorpor-
ate time-inconsistency into the agent’s preferences. Moreover, the previous discussion shows that
this formulation encompasses time-inconsistent recursive utilities too.
Remark 5.1.1. In a Markovian framework, the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent
agents whose reward is given by (5.1.2) has been considered in Wei, Yong, and Yu [260], Wang
and Yong [245] and Hamaguchi [114]. In these works, the dynamics of the controlled state process
are given in strong formulation and each considered a refinement of the notion of equilibrium in
[82] that was suitable in their setting. In this work, we use BSVIEs to model the agent’s reward and
build upon the results in Part III to extend the non-Markovian framework proposed in Chapter 2.
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Let us now present this formulation properly. We define the set of admissible actions, recall A
is compact, as
A := {α ∈ Ppred(A,F) : (5.1.1) holds},
and assume we are given jointly measurable mappings h : [0, T ] × X × R × Rn × A −→
R, h·(·, y, z, a) ∈ Pprog(R,F) for any (y, z, a) ∈ R × Rn × A, and UA : [0, T ] × R −→ R satis-
fying the following set of assumptions.
Assumption Q. (i) For every s ∈ [0, T ], x 7−→ UA(s, x) is invertible, i.e. there exists a mapping
U(−1)A : [0, T ]× R −→ R such that U
(−1)
A (s,UA(s, x)) = x;
(ii) (s, y, z) 7−→ ht(s, x, y, z, a) (resp. s 7−→ UA(s, x)) is continuously differentiable. Morevoer,
∇h·(s, ·, u, v, y, z, a) ∈ Pprog(R,F) for all s ∈ [0, T ], where ∇h : [0, T ]2 × X × (R × Rn)2 −→ R is
defined by
∇ht(s, x, u, v, y, z, a) := ∂sht(s, x, y, z, a) + ∂yht(s, x, y, z, a)u+
n∑
i=1
∂ziht(s, x, y, z, a)vi;
(iii) for ϕ ∈ {h, ∂sh}, (y, z, a) 7−→ ϕt(s, x, y, z, a) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous with linear
growth, i.e. there exists some C > 0 such that ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃, a, ã),
|ϕt(s, x, y, z, a)− ϕt(s, x, ỹ, z̃, ã)| ≤ C
(
|y − ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z − z̃)|+ |a− ã|
)
,
|ϕt(s, x, y, z, a)| ≤ C
(
1 + |y|+ |σt(x)>z|
)
.
Remark 5.1.2. Let us comment of the previous assumptions. The first condition guarantees we can
identify units of utility with contract payments. Indeed, the utility UA(s, ξ) is sufficient to identify,
via U(−1)A , the contract payment ξ. The second assumption guarantees sufficient regularity, with
respect to the variable source of inconsistency, of the data prescribing the agent’s reward
We assume the agent has a reservation utility R0 ∈ R below which he refuses to take the
contract. The agent is hired at time t = 0, and the contracts ξ offered by the principal, for which
she can only access the information about the state process X, are assumed to provide the agent
with a compensation at the terminal time T . Thus, we specify the set of admissible contracts, see
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Section 5.3.1 for the definition of the integrability spaces, as
C :=
{
ξ : R-valued and FT -measurable,
(







If hired, the agent chooses an effort strategy α ∈ A, and at any time t ∈ [0, T ], his value, from time
t onwards, from performing α is given by
VAt (ξ, α) := Y
t,α
t
where the pair (Y α, Zα) satisfies the BSVIE (5.1.2). We recall VA(ξ, α) is commonly referred to in
the literature as the continuation utility. We always interpret VA(ξ, α) as a map from [0, T ] × X
to R.
Given the choice of reward, the problem of the agent is time-inconsistent. We, therefore, assume
the agent is a so-called sophisticated time-inconsistent agent who, aware of his inconsistency, can
anticipate it, thus making his strategy time-consistent. Consequently, the problem of the agent
can be interpreted as an intra-personal game in which he is trying to balance all of his preferences
searches for sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. We recall the definition of an equilibrium strategy
introduced in Chapter 2, see further comments in Remark 5.1.5. Let {α?, α} ⊆ A, t ∈ [0, T ], and
` ∈ (0, T − t], we define ν ⊗t+` ν? := ν1[t,t+`) + ν?1[t+`,T ].
Definition 5.1.3. Let α? ∈ A. For ε > 0, define
`ε := inf
{
` > 0 : ∃α ∈ A, P
[{







If for any ε > 0, `ε > 0 then α? is an equilibrium. Given ξ ∈ C, we call E(ξ) the set of all equilibria
associated to ξ.
As such, the agent’s goal is, given a contract ξ that is guaranteed by the principal, to choose
an effort that aligns with his sophisticated preferences, i.e. to find α? ∈ E(ξ). In contrast to the
case of a classic time-consistent utility maximiser, for a time-inconsistent sophisticated agent, there
could be more than one equilibria with potentially different rewards, see for instance [164]. In this
work, we will restrict our attention to the set for which all equilibria provide the same value to the
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agent. See additional comments about this point in the following remark.
Definition 5.1.4. Co denotes the family of contracts ξ ∈ C such that for any {α?, α∗} ⊆ E(ξ),
VAt (ξ, α?) = VAt (ξ, α∗), t ∈ [0, T ].
All in all, for ξ ∈ Co we can now define
VAt (ξ) := VAt (ξ, α?), α? ∈ E(ξ).
Remark 5.1.5. (i) In the non-Markovian framework, the strategy devised in Chapter 2 builds
upon the approach in [38] to study rewards given by conditional expectations of non-Markovian
functionals. This approach is based on decoupling the sources of inconsistency in the agent’s reward
and requires to introduce the terms ∂sUA and ∇h into the analysis, see Section 5.5 for details. We
also mention that Theorem 5.5.3 generalises the extended dynamic programming principle obtained
in Chapter 2 for the case of rewards given by (5.1.2) and equilibrium actions as in Definition 5.1.3.
(ii) The previous definition of equilibrium can be regarded as a reformulation of the classic defin-
ition, in [82], via the lim inf. Indeed, it follows from Definition 5.1.3 that given (ε, `) ∈ (0,∞) ×
(0, `ε), ∃X̃ ⊆ X , P[X̃ ] = 1, such that
VAt (ξ, α?)(x)−VAt (ξ, α⊗t+` α?)(x) ≥ −ε`, ∀(t, x, α) ∈ [0, T ]× X̃ × A.
(iii) Lastly, we also expand on the necessity to focus our attention on contracts for which all
equilibria provide the same value to the agent. The need for said restriction is inherent to contract
theory models involving a game-theoretic formulation at the level of the agent. Indeed, in either
the case of a finite number of competitive interacting agents seeking for a Nash equilibrium, see
Élie and Possamaï [90], or a continuum of players seeking for a mean-field equilibrium, see Élie,
Mastrolia, and Possamaï [91], it is generally possible for multiple equilibria to exist. In such cases,
the existence of a Pareto-dominating equilibrium, one for which all agents receive no worse reward if
deviating from a current equilibrium, is by no means guaranteed. In the context of contract theory,
this means that there is no clear rule, at the level of the problem of the agent, to decide which
equilibria should be taken for any two equilibria providing different values to different players. As
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giving control on this decision to the principal makes little practical sense, one way to bypass this
is to assume that all possible equilibria yield the same value, as we did here.
Anticipating our analysis in Section 5.3.1, we highlight that, in the Lipschitz setting of this
paper, we can identify conditions on the data of the problem under which this is the case for any
ξ ∈ C, see Assumption R and Remark 5.3.2. As such, this is not such a stringent assumption in our
context. Moreover, in all the examples considered in Section 5.4 the agent’s participation constraint
is saturated, i.e. it is held to the reservation level R0. Hence, one suspects this might be a more
general phenomenon beyond this document’s scope.
5.1.3 The principal’s problem




ξ ∈ Co : VA0 (ξ) ≥ R0
}
.
In such manner, any contract ξ ∈ Ξ is implementable, that is, there exists at least one equilibrium
strategy, namely α ∈ E(ξ), for the agent’s problem. Even though in the previous section we focused
our attention on equilibria for which the agent gets the same value, we still need a rule for whenever
there are more than one such equilibria. Following the standard convention in the literature, we
assume that if there is more than one such action, for which the agent is indifferent by assumption,
he implements the one that is best for the principal.







Remark 5.1.6. We point out that we have assumed the principal is a standard utility maximiser.
This is because, in our opinion, the crux of the problem lies in identifying a proper description of
the problem of the principal when contracting a time-inconsistent sophisticated agent. In the case
of a time-consistent agent, [64] identifies this description as a standard stochastic control problem
with an additional state variable. Therefore, in the case of a classic time-consistent agent and a
time-inconsistent principal, following [64], one expects the problem of the principal to boil down to
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a non-Markovian time-inconsistent control problem with an additional state variable. As studied in
Chapter 2, these problems are characterised by an infinite family of BSDEs, analogue to the PDE
system in [38] in the Markovian case.
5.2 The first-best problem
In the first-best, or risk-sharing, problem, the principal chooses both the effort and the con-
tract for the agent, and she is simply required to satisfy the participation constraint. To provide
appropriate characterisations of the solution to several examples, we will focus on a particular class
of reward functionals for the agent. We recall that our goal is to study the second-best problem
introduced in the previous section. As such, despite its inherent interest, the results in the cur-
rent section serve mainly as a reference point for the general analysis we conduct in Section 5.3.
Moreover, the following specification is covered by the general formulation presented in Section 5.1,
see Remark 5.2.1, and it is yet rich enough to cover examples of both separable and non-separable
utilities.
Let us assume the agent has a given increasing and concave utility function UoA : R −→ R
and Borel-measurable discount functions g, and f defined on [0, T ], taking values in (0,+∞), with
g(0) = f(0) = 1, which are assumed to be continuously differentiable with derivatives g′, and f ′.
Lastly, we have Borel-measurable functionals k and c, defined on [0, T ]×X ×A and taking values
in R+.
For any (t, α) ∈ [0, T ]×A, we then specify the agent’s continuation utility by
VAt (ξ, α) = EP
α
[











g(r − s)kr(X·∧r, αr)dr
)
, (s, t, α) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×A.
Regarding the principal, we assume she has her own utility function UoP : R −→ R, which we
231





where Γ : Rn −→ R denotes a mechanism by which the principal collects the values of the n different
coordinates of the state process X.
Remark 5.2.1. (i) As commented above, the previous type of rewards are indeed covered by the
formulation via BSVIEs (5.1.2) and satisfy Assumption Q. Indeed, it corresponds to the choice
UA(s, x) = f(T − s)UoA(g(T − s)x), ∂sUA(s, x) = −f ′(T − s)UoA(g(T − s)x) − f(T − s)g′(T −
s)∂xUoA(g(T − s)x), and
ht(s, x, y, z, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · z − f(t− s)ct(x, a) + g(t− s)kt(x, a)y,
∇ht(s, x, u, v, y, z, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · v + f ′(t− s)ct(x, a)− g′(t− s)kt(x, a)y + g(t− s)kt(x, a)u.
Regarding the principal, our specification corresponds to UP(x, x) = UoP(Γ(xT )−x). Let us mention
that, to facilitate the resolution of the following examples, we assumed that UP depends only on
the terminal value of xT . This allow us to use the dynamics of X as given in Section 5.1.1. We
highlight this assumption is not necessary in general analysis for the second-best problem we present
in Section 5.3.
We now move on to characterise the solution to the first-best problem in the case of a time-
inconsistent agent with both separable and non-separable utility functions. Anticipating the result,
we highlight that in the first-best problem, the problem of the principal reduces to solving a standard
stochastic control problem.
5.2.1 Non-separable utility
We recall that the CARA utility function, commonly known as the exponential utility, consti-





, UoA(x) := −
e−γAx
γA
, x ∈ R, γA > 0, γP > 0,
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kt(x, a) = γAkot (x, a) and assume a 7−→ kot (x, a) is convex for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X . We then have
that





g(T − t)ξ −Kt,αt,T
)∣∣∣Ft], for Ks,αt,T := ∫ T
t
g(r − s)kor(X,αr)dr. (5.2.2)













Note that, the concavity (resp. convexity) of both UoA and UoP (resp. a 7−→ kot (x, a)) and the
fact (A, C) is a convex set, imply that VPFB is a concave optimisation problem. The Lagrangian
associated to this problem, where ρ ∈ R+ denotes the multiplier of the participation constraint, is
given, for any (α, ξ, ρ) ∈ A× C × R+, by
L(α, ξ, ρ) := EPα
[












For convenience of the reader, we recall that the dual problem VP,dFB , which is an unconstrained









L(α, ξ, ρ) =: VP,dFB , (5.2.3)
where we used the convention sup∅ = −∞. As it is commonplace for convex problems, the next
result exploits the absence of duality gap, i.e. VPFB = V
P,d
FB , to compute the value of VPFB. It uses
the following notations
γ̄ := γAγPg(T )
γAg(T ) + γP











































Suppose Vcont <∞ and for any (α, ρ) ∈ A× R+, ξ?(ρ, α) ∈ C where
ξ?(ρ, α) := 1
g(T )γA + γP
(












Moreover, if α? is an optimal control for Vcont, then an optimal contract is given by ξ?(ρ?, α?).
Proof. Let (ρ, α) ∈ R+ ×A be fixed and optimise the mapping C 3 ξ 7−→ L(α, ξ, ρ) ∈ R. An upper
bound of this problem is given by optimising x-by-x. This leads us to define, for any (α, ρ) ∈ A×R+
fixed, the candidate
ξ?(ρ, α) = 1
g(T )γA + γP
(





To show the upper bound induced by ξ?(ρ, α) is attained it suffices to note that ξ?(ρ, α) ∈ C by






















If Vcont <∞, as the above function is a strictly convex function of ρ, first order conditions gives
ρ? as in the statement.
We are only left to show that VPFB = V
P,d
FB , i.e. that there is no duality gap. For this, it suffices





































































We consider the case k = 0 and g = 1 in (5.2.1), and assume a 7−→ c(t, x, a) is convex for any
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X . The agent’s reward from time t ∈ [0, T ] onwards is given, for any (t, α, ξ) ∈
[0, T ]×A× C, by

























The Lagrangian associated to this problem is given, for any (α, ξ, ρ) ∈ A× C × R+, by
L(α, ξ, ρ) := EPα
[










Proposition 5.2.3. (i) Suppose UoA and UoP are such that mapping ξ?(x, ρ) given as the solution
to
−∂xUoP(Γ(x)− ξ?(x, ρ)) + ρf(T )∂xUoA(ξ?(x, ρ)) = 0, (x, ρ) ∈ Rn × R+,



























− ρR0 + Vcont(ρ)
}
.
Moreover, suppose the pair
(
α?(ρ?), ξ?(XT , ρ?)
)
is feasible for the primal problem, where α?(ρ)
(resp. ρ?) denote the maximiser in Vcont(ρ) (resp. the above problem), which we assume to exist.





the optimal contract is given by ξ?(XT , ρ?).
(ii) If UoP(x) = UoA(x) = x, for α ∈ A let
Ĉ(α) =
{














Then, the problem of the principal is given by the solution to the standard control problem
VPFB = −
R0














Moreover, for α? ∈ A an optimal control of this problem, Ĉ(α?) contains all the optimal contracts
for the principal.e.g. the deterministic contract
ξ? := R0














Proof. We argue (i). Let (ρ, α) ∈ R+×A be fixed and optimise the mapping C 3 ξ 7−→ L(α, ξ, ρ) ∈
R. An upper bound of this problem is given by optimising x-by-x. This defines the mapping
ξ?(x, ρ). As before, the fact that ξ?(ρ, α) ∈ C guarantees the upper bound is indeed attained.
Replacing in L(ρ, α, ξ) we obtain Vcont(ρ) and the corresponding equality for VP,dFB . Now, to obtain
the absence of duality gap we must verify that there exists a solution to the dual problem that is
primal feasible. This is exactly the additional assumption in the statement.













Let us note that for fixed α ∈ A the principal’s reward is linear and strictly decreasing in EPα [ξ]
and therefore she is indifferent between contracts that have the same expectation. Therefore, she
optimises over the feasible contracts that have the same expectation. Now, for fixed α ∈ A any
feasibility contract satisfies
EP













Therefore, our previous comment implies that for given α the principal is indifferent between











Plugging this back into the principal’s utility, we get the expression for VPFB in the statement.
Remark 5.2.4. We remark that the assumption on the utility functions in Proposition 5.2.3 is
relatively reasonable. Indeed, it is immediately satisfied, for instance, in either of the following
scenarii
(i) UoP(x) = x and UoA(x) is strictly increasing;




∂xϕ(x) =∞, limx→∞ ∂xϕ(x) = 0.
5.3 The second-best problem: general scenario







We will exploit the theory of type-I BSVIEs, revisited in Part III. We first introduce suitable
integrability spaces.
5.3.1 Integrability spaces and Hamiltonian
Following Part III, to carry out the analysis we introduce the spaces

























To make sense of the class of systems considered in this paper we introduce some extra spaces.
• Given a Banach space (I, ‖ · ‖I) of E-valued processes, we define (I2, ‖ · ‖I2) the space of U ∈




e.g., S2,2 denotes the space of Y ∈ P2meas(R,F) such that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S2(R), ‖ · ‖S2) :
s 7−→ Y s is continuous and ‖Y ‖S2,2 := sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Y s‖S2 <∞;
next, we introduce the space
• H2,2 of (Zτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P2meas(Rn,F) such that ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H2, ‖ · ‖H2) : s 7−→ Zs
is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure with density ∂Z, and ‖Z‖2H2,2 :=
‖Z‖2H2,2 + ‖Z‖
2
H2 <∞, where Z := (Z
t
t )t∈[0,T ] ∈ H2 is given by




Lastly, we introduce the space H := S2 ×H2 × S2,2 ×H2,2 × S2,2 ×H2,2.
Remark 5.3.1. Building upon our analysis in Part II and Part III, we recall that the second
set of these spaces are suitable extensions of the classical ones, whose norms are tailor–made to
the analysis of the systems we will study. Some of these spaces have been previously considered
in the literature on BSVIEs, e.g. [245]. Of particular interest is the space H2,2, introduced in
Chapter 3, which allows us to define a good candidate for (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] as an element of H2. Indeed,
let Ω̃ := [0, T ]×X , ω̃ := (t, x) ∈ Ω̃ and
Zs(ω̃) := ZTt (x)−
∫ T
s
∂Zrt (x)dr, dt⊗ dP–a.e. ω̃ ∈ Ω̃, s ∈ [0, T ],
so that the Radon–Nikodým property and Fubini’s theorem imply Zs = Zs,dt⊗ dP–a.e., s ∈ [0, T ].
Lastly, as for ω̃ ∈ Ω̃, s 7−→ Zs(ω̃) is continuous, we may define
Ztt := ZTt −
∫ T
t
∂Zrt dr, for dt⊗ dP–a.e. (t, x) in [0, T ]×X .
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5.3.2 Characterising equilibria and the BSDE system
Building upon the results in Chapter 2, where only the case of an agent with separable utility
was considered, we wish to obtain a characterisation of the equilibria that are associated to any
ξ ∈ Ξ. For this we must introduce the Hamiltonian functional H : [0, T ]×X ×R×Rn −→ R given
by
Ht(x, y, z) := sup
a∈A
ht(t, x, y, z, a), (t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× Rn.
Our standing assumptions on H are the following.
Assumption R. (i) For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , the map R × Rn 3 (y, z) 7−→ Ht(x, y, z) is uni-
formly Lipschitz-continuous with linear growth, i.e. there is C > 0 such that for any (t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃) ∈
[0, T ]×X × R2 × (Rn)2
∣∣Ht(x, y, z)−Ht(x, ỹ, z̃)∣∣ ≤ C(|y− ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z− z̃)|), ∣∣Ht(x, y, z)∣∣ ≤ C(1 + |y|+ |σt(x)>z|);
(ii) there exists a unique Borel-measurable map a? : [0, T ]×X × R× Rn −→ A such that
Ht(x, y, z) = ht
(
t, x, y, z, a?(t, x, y, z)
)
, ∀(t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× Rn.
(iii) For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , the map R × Rn 3 (y, z) 7−→ a?(t, x, y, z) is uniformly Lipschitz-
continuous with linear growth, i.e. there is C > 0 such that for any (t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃) ∈ [0, T ] × X ×
R2 × (Rn)2.
∣∣a?(t, x, y, z)− a?(t, x, ỹ, z̃)∣∣ ≤ C(|y− ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z− z̃)|), ∣∣a?(t, x, y, z)∣∣ ≤ C(1 + |y|+ |σt(x)>z|);
























s, x, u, v, y, z, a?(r, x, y, z)
)
.
Remark 5.3.2. Let us comment on the previous set of assumptions. Even in the non-Markovian
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setting of this document, the problem faced by a sophisticated agent is related to a system of equa-
tions instead of just one, see Chapter 2. This raises many issues, among which is the possibility
for multiplicity of equilibria with different values. Assumption R.(i), R.(iii) guarantee that for a
given ξ ∈ Ξ any equilibria α? ∈ E(ξ) provide the agent with the same value, and all correspond
to maximisers of the Hamiltonian. Ultimately, Assumption R.(ii) guarantees that there is only
one maximiser of the Hamiltonian. Let us mention that the existence of a? is guaranteed under
Assumption Q.(iii) by Schäl [221, Theorem 3]. This conciliates our focus on contracts for which
any equilibria provides the same value as we stated in Section 5.1.2.
Under this set of assumptions we are able to show, see Section 5.5, that for any ξ ∈ Ξ
E(ξ) =
{







come from the solution to the following infinite family of
BSDEs which for any s ∈ [0, T ] satisfies, P–a.s.
























Zsr (ξ) · dXr, (5.3.1)











∂Zsr (ξ) · dXr.
Moreover, we have that
VAt
(
ξ, a?(·, X·, Y·(ξ), Z·(ξ))
)
= Yt(ξ) = Y tt (ξ), t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
Zt(ξ) = Ztt (ξ), dt⊗ dP–a.e.
(5.3.2)




s, Y sT (ξ)
)
= ξ = U(−1)A
(
u, Y uT (ξ)
)
, P–a.s., (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]2. (5.3.3)
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Remark 5.3.3. (i) We recall that the diagonal process (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] is well-defined for elements in
H2,2, see Section 5.3.1.
(ii) Links between time-inconsistent control problems and a broader class of BSVIEs have been
identified in the past. The first mention of this links appears, as far as we know, in the concluding
remarks of Wang and Yong [255]. The link was then made rigorous independently by Chapter 2
and Wang and Yong [245]. In our setting, in light of (5.3.2), such an equation appears as the one
satisfied by the reward of the agent along the equilibrium. As such, the pair
(
Y st (ξ), Zst (ξ)
)
(s,t)∈[0,T ]2
solves a so-called extended Type-I BSVIE, which for any s ∈ [0, T ] satisfies










Zsr (ξ) · dXr, P–a.s. (5.3.4)
We highlight that this BSVIE involves the diagonal processes
(
Y tt (ξ), Ztt (ξ)
)
(s,t)∈[0,T ]2 and that in
light of Theorem 3.4.3 the well-posedness of (5.3.1) is equivalent to that of (5.3.4).
5.3.3 The family of restricted contracts
In light of our previous observation, namely (5.3.3), in the following, we will introduce a family
of restricted contract payments which we will denote Ξ. For any contract in this family, we can
solve the associate time-inconsistent control problem faced by the agent. Moreover, we will show
that any admissible contract available to the principal admits a representation as a contract in Ξ.
Consequently, the principal’s optimal expected utility is not reduced if she restricts herself to offer
contracts in this family and optimises.
In order to define the family of restricted contracts, we introduce next the process Y y0,Z which,
for a suitable process Z, will represent the value of the agent. This is a preliminary step based on
the observation, see (5.3.3), that the value of the agent at the terminal time T coincides with the
payment offered by the contract. To alleviate the notation let us set I := {y0 ∈ C11 : y00 ≥ R0}.
Definition 5.3.4. We denote by H2,2 the collection of processes Z ∈ H2,2 satisfying:
‖Y y0,Z‖S2,2 <∞, where for y0 ∈ I, Y y0,Z := (Y s,y0,Z)s∈[0,T ] satisfies for every s ∈ [0, T ],




























, P–a.s., (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]2. (5.3.6)





, (y0, Z) ∈ I ×H2,2.
The main novelty of our argument, compared to that in the time-consistent case, is the fact
that (5.3.6) imposes a constraint on the elements Z ∈ H2,2. We note that in light of 3.4.3 we have
that H2,2 6= ∅.
Remark 5.3.5. (i) The process Y y0,Z denotes a solution to a so-called forward Volterra integral
equation (FSVIE, for short). These objects have been studied since Berger and Mizel [23, 24], Prot-
ter [211], Pardoux and Peng [201]. However, this is not a classic FSVIE in the sense that, in




t∈[0,T ] appears in the generator. For complete-
ness, Proposition 5.6.4 below presents a suitable well-posedness result.





P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
(iii) As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we chose to work with a representation for the
agent’s value as opposed to the value of the contract itself. This determines the form of the contracts
in the definition of Ξ and provides a quite general and comprehensive approach. For instance,
one could have chosen to represent the value of the contract ξ directly for an agent with a time-
inconsistent exponential utility. This would have produced a version of (5.3.1) whose generators
have quadratic growth in Z and whose well-posedness is more delicate than in the Lipschitz case.
See for instance, Briand and Hu [42], Kobylanski [155] and Tevzadze [238] for the study of quadratic
BSDEs. We recall that in light of [42], taking that approach in the time-consistent scenario requires,
at the very least, to assume the contracts have exponential moments of sufficiently large order. Our
approach prevents this given our growth assumptions in Assumption Q. However, one cannot expect
to avoid such restrictions for problems that are inherently quadratic.
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In light of our previous remark, as a preliminary step, we must verify that (5.3.5) uniquely defines
Y y0,Z . At the formal level, the following auxiliary lemma says that the integrability condition on
Y y0,Z guarantees this.
Lemma 5.3.6. Let Assumption Q and Assumption R hold. Given (y0, Z) ∈ I × H2,2 there exist
unique processes (Y Z , ∂Y ) ∈ S2,2 × S2,2 such that Y y0,Z satisfies (5.3.5) and ∂Y y0,Z satisfies




















∂Zsr · dXr. (5.3.7)
Proof. Let us first argue the result for Y y0,Z . Note that the integrability of Z ∈ H2,2, Assump-













The result follows from Proposition 5.6.4. The second part of the statement is a consequence of
Proposition 5.6.5.
We are now ready to state our main result, in words it guarantees that there is no loss of
generality for the principal in offering contracts of the form given by Ξ.
Theorem 5.3.7. (i) We have Ξ = Ξ. Moreover, for any contract ξ ∈ Ξ, associated to (y0, Z) ∈













, VA0 (ξ) = y00.




















Proof. We first argue Ξ ⊆ Ξ. Let ξ ∈ Ξ. In light of Assumption Q, Theorem 3.3.5 guarantees
that for ξ ∈ C there exists (Y (ξ), Z(ξ)) ∈ S2,2 ×H2,2 solution to (5.3.4) and a process ∂Y (ξ) ∈ S2,2
satisfying that the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S2, ‖ · ‖S2) : s 7−→ ∂Y s(ξ) is the derivative of
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S2, ‖ · ‖S2) : s 7−→ Y s(ξ). Moreover, Assumption Q.(i) guarantees (5.3.6)
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holds. Moreover, (5.3.2) implies Y0(ξ) = VA0
(
ξ, a?(·, X·, Y·(ξ), Z·(ξ))
)
≥ R0, recall ξ ∈ Ξ. From this,
taking y0(ξ) = Y0(ξ) we have that (y0(ξ), Z(ξ)) ∈ I ×H2,2. Thus ξ ∈ Ξ.




, where, in light
of Lemma 5.3.6, Y y0,Z denotes the unique process, induced by (y0, Z) ∈ I × H2,2, such that
‖Y y0,Z‖S2,2 <∞ and (5.3.6) holds. In particular,
Y s,y0,ZT = UA
(
s, ξ̄), P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, for any s ∈ [0, T ]


















Zsr · dXr, P–a.s. (5.3.9)
We now show ξ̄ ∈ C, as in Definition 5.1.4. We first show ξ̄ ∈ C, recall (5.1.3). It is immediate
to see that
‖UA(·, ξ̄)‖2L2,2 = sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣UA(s, ξ̄)∣∣2] = sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Y s,y0,ZT ∣∣2] ≤ ‖Y y0,Z‖2S2,2 <∞.
Now, given Y y0,Z solution to (5.3.5) and ∂Z by definition of Z ∈ H2,2 , Lemma 5.3.6 guarantees there
exists ∂Y y0,Z ∈ S2,2 such that the pair (∂Y Z , ∂Z) satisfies (5.3.7). Moreover, by Proposition 5.6.5
for any s ∈ [0, T ]
∂Y s,ZT = ∂sU
A(s, ξ̄), P–a.s.
Thus, ‖∂sUA(·, ξ̄)‖2L2,2 ≤ ‖∂Y
y0,Z‖2S2,2 <∞. This shows ξ̄ ∈ C.
Let us argue ξ̄ ∈ Co, i.e. that any α? ∈ E(ξ̄) provide the agent the same value. In light of
Theorem 5.5.4 and Theorem 5.5.5, it suffices to establish (5.3.1) has at most one solution. In light












∣∣∇h?r(s,X·∧r, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)∣∣dr)2] <∞,
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and Theorem 3.3.5, (5.3.1) is well-posed with solution
(

















To conclude ξ̄ ∈ Ξ, note that by Theorem 5.5.5, VA0 (ξ̄) = y00, so that y00 ≥ R0 guarantees the
participation constraint is satisfied.
The problem of the principal involves controlling, via Z ∈ H2,2, of the processes (X,Y Z). The
dynamics of X are given, in weak formulation, by















, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (5.3.10)












dr is a P?(Z)–Brownian motion. The second state variable,
(Y t,y0,Zt )t∈[0,T ], is the first component of the solution to the system




























































In the general situation, it is unclear—at least to us—how to address this class of problems. In
fact, the previous system provides two possible representations for the term Y T,y0,ZT appearing in
the reward of the principal, each coming with its own challenges:
(i) If we choose to focus on the dynamics of Y t,y0,Zt as given by the first equation, one can ex-
ploit the fact that the action of the control Z is only through the diagonal (Ztt )t∈[0,T ]. Moreover,
given (∂Y t,y0,Zt )t∈[0,T ], the first equation implies (Y
t,y0,Z
t )t∈[0,T ] is an Itô process. Nevertheless,
as (∂Y t,y0,Zt )t∈[0,T ] is not given, there is no direct access to the dynamics of (∂Y
t,Z
t )t∈[0,T ] that is
amenable to the analysis, i.e. that would allow us to use Itô calculus. Moreover, this process is
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neither Markov nor a semi-martingale and does not satisfy a flow property

























(ii) Alternatively, suppose we choose the representation through the second equation. In that
case, the problem of the principal involves the control of the family of FSVIEs Y s,y0,Zt , where
the controls consist of a constrained family of processes Z ∈ H2,2 that impacts the dynamics via
((Ztt )t∈[0,T ], (Zst )t∈[0,T ]). The fact that the dependence is through both arguments makes the recent
approach in Viens and Zhang [243] for controlled FSVIEs inoperable. Moreover, in general, this
seems to be quite a challenging problem. Therefore, we will for now concentrate our attention on
simpler examples.
As a motivation for our approach in the following examples, we recall that for classic separable
utilities, as in Chapter 2, it is known that in the case of exponential discounting with parameter
ρ, it holds that ∂Y = ρY , in which case the second and third equations are redundant. Indeed,
the first equation suffices to describe the dynamics of (Y tt )t∈[0,T ]. This motivates the study of H2,2
under particular specifications of utility functions for both the agent and the principal, hoping to
be able to
(a) reduce the complexity of the set H2,2;
(b) exploit its particular structure to formulate an ansatz to the problem of the principal.
This is exactly what we do in the following sections. The general case remains subject of further
research.
5.4 The second-best problem: examples
5.4.1 Agent with discounted utility reward
As an initial example, let us consider the scenario in Section 5.2.1 under the additional choice
g = 1, which implies Ks,αt,T does not depend on s ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, for any (t, α, ξ) ∈ [0, T ] × A × Ξ,
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we have






)∣∣∣Ft], Kαt,T := ∫ T
t
kor(X·∧r, αr)dr. (5.4.1)
Under this specification, (5.3.1) reduces significantly. Indeed
ht(s, x, y, z, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · z + γAkot (x, a)y,
∇ht(s, x, u, v, y, z, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · v + γAkot (x, a)u,
UoA(s, x) = f(T − s)UoA(x), ∂sUoA(s, x) = −f ′(T − s)UoA(x).
Remark 5.4.1. (i) We highlight that the absence of accumulative cost in the agent’s reward func-
tional, i.e. c = 0, together with the choice g = 1 makes the driver in the second family of BSDEs
independent of the variable s, i.e. ∇h = h. Moreover, it coincides with the functional maximised
in the Hamiltonian H.
(ii) We remark that in this scenario, the non-exponential discount factor, i.e. the time-inconsistent
preferences, does not add much to the problem. Even though the agent’s continuation utility changes
by a factor, the optimal/equilibrium control state pair coincides for both problems. Our aim in
presenting it is to illustrate how the technique presented in Section 5.3.3 is compatible with the
results known in the case of a time-consistent agent.
The next result provides a drastic simplification of the infinite dimensional system introduced
in Section 5.3.2. This is due to the particular form of the reward of the agent (5.4.1).

















Zr(ξ)·dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
(ii) Let Z ∈ H2,2. Then (Y t,y0,Zt )t∈[0,T ] solves the BSDE























Zrr ·dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
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(iii) H2,2 = H2, where H2 denotes the family of Z ∈ H2 satisfying ‖Y y0,Z‖S2 <∞ where, for any
y0 ∈ (R0,∞),
























T ) : (y0, Z) ∈ (R0,∞)×H2
}
. Moreover, for any ξ ∈ Ξ
E(ξ) =
{
(a?(t,X·∧t, Y y0,Zt , Zt)t∈[0,T ]
}
, VA0 (ξ) = y0.
Proof. It is immediate from (5.3.1) that, P–a.s.







∂Y st (ξ) = −EP
?(ξ)
[




Y tt (ξ) = Yt(ξ).
Thus
Y st (ξ) =
f(T − s)
f(T − t)Yt(ξ), P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ], ∂Y
t
t (ξ) = −
f ′(T − t)
f(T − t) Y
t
t (ξ) = −
f ′(T − t)
f(T − t) Yt(ξ), P–a.s.,
and, for any (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]2
U(−1)A
(














u, Y uT (ξ)
)
, P–a.s.
All together, this shows that (5.3.1) reduces to the equation in the statement. The result then
follows as we can trace back the argument and construct a solution to (5.3.1) starting from a
solution to the BSDE in the statement.
We now argue (ii). Let Z ∈ H2,2. Then, there is (ys0)s∈[0,T ] such that (5.3.6) holds and




















Let us note that (5.3.6) implies Y s,y0,ZT = f(T − s)Y
T,y0,Z
T . Since
ht(s, x, y, z, a) = ht(u, x, y, z, a), (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]2,
we obtain






















Y s,y0,Zt = EP
?(Z)
[






?(X·∧r, Y r,y0,Zr , Zrr )dr
)∣∣∣∣Ft],
∂Y t,y0,Zt = −
f ′(T − t)
f(T − t) Y
t,y0,Z
t .
Note that (Y t,y0,Zt )t∈[0,T ] ∈ S2. Thanks to Theorem 5.3.7, the result follows replacing ∂Y
t,y0,Z
t in
the first equation of (5.3.1).
We are left to argue (iii) as (iv) is argued as in Theorem 5.3.7. H2,2 ⊆ H2 follows by (ii).
Indeed, there is y00 such that




































?(X·∧r, Y y0,Zr , Zr)dr
)∣∣∣∣Ft],
∂Y s,y0,Zt := −
f ′(T − s)
f(T − t) Y
y0,Z
t ,
the martingale representation theorem, which holds in light of (S) and the integrability of
(Y y0,Z , Z), guarantees the existence of (Z̃, ∂Z̃) ∈ H2,2 ×H2,2 such that, as elements of H2,
Z̃s = Z̃0 +
∫ s
0
∂Z̃rdr, and Z̃tt = Zt,dt⊗ dP–a.e.
It then follows that (Z̃s)s∈[0,T ] ∈ H2,2.
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5.4.1.1 Principal’s second-best solution
In the following, we will exploit the so-called certainty equivalent, i.e. the relation ξ =
UoA(−1)
(
V AT (ξ, α)
)
between the the contract and the terminal value of the value function. The
benefits of this are twofold: it lays down an expression that can be replaced directly into the
principal’s criterion, and it removes Y y0,Z from the generator of the expression representing the
contract in exchange for a term which is quadratic in Z. For this we need to introduce some extra
notation.
Let Ĥ : [0, T ]×X × Rn −→ R be given by
Ĥt(x, z) := sup
a∈A
ĥt(x, z, a), (t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rn,
with ĥt(x, z, a) := σt(x)bt(x, a) · z − kot (x, a). The mapping [0, T ] × X × Rn 7−→ â?(t, x, z) ∈ A
is defined, as before, by the relation Ĥt(x, z) = ĥt(x, z, â?(t, x, z)), and λ?t (x, z), ko?t (x, z) are also
defined.
















where P?(Z) := Pa?(·,X·,Ẑ·) and Ŷ y0,ZT is given by the terminal value of
































Proof. We first note that in light Lemma 5.4.2, we may replace the optimisation over H2,2 with H2.





Remark 5.4.4. (i) Let us highlight the main message behind Proposition 5.4.3. When the agent’s
reward is given by (5.4.1), the principal’s second-best problem reduces to a standard control problem.
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This is a drastic simplification of the result in Theorem 5.3.7 and a consequence of the particular
form of the agent’s reward.
(ii) In a Markovian setting in which the dependence of the data on the path X is via the current
value, we see from the controlled dynamics for X and Ŷ y0,Z that the problem boilds down to solving
V . Employing the standard dynamic programming approach we obtain that the relevant term for
this problem is given for (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R by
∂tV (t, x, y) + H
(




H(t, x, y, p,M) := sup
z∈Rn
{





r (x)z|2 − Ĥr(x, z) +
1
γA












 ∈ Rn × R, M :=
Mxx Mxy
Mxy Myy
 ∈ S+n+1(R), Mxx ∈ S+n (R), Myy ∈ S+1 (R), and
Mxy ∈Mn,1(R).
In the following proposition, whose proof is available in Section 5.7, we study the case n = 1,
so that







XT − Ŷ y0,ZT
))]
.
This result is equivalent to solving the HJB equation in Remark 5.4.4.
Proposition 5.4.5. Let principal and agent have exponential utility with parameters γP and γA,
respectively. Let Cy := − 1γP e
−γP(x0−y), R̂0 := UoA(−1)(R0), and assume that
(i) the maps σ, λ? and ko? do not depend on the x variable;






t (1− z)|2 has a unique





































Remark 5.4.6. To close this section we present a few remarks:
(i) Comparing the results in Proposition 5.4.5 and Proposition 5.2.2 we see that, as expected, in
general the solution to the second-best and first-best problem are not equal.
(ii) If we bring ourselves back to the setting of [130], i.e. bt(x, a) = a/σ, σt(x) = σ, kot (x, a) =
ka2/2, we have
z?(t) = 1 + σ
2γPk
1 + σ2k(γA + γP)




1 + σ2k(γA + γP)
) .
This recovers the result for the case of a risk-neutral principal, i.e. γP = 0, presented in [130]. The
optimal contract and the respective rewards differ by a factor which depends on the discount factor
and agent’s risk aversion parameter.
(iii) Following up on the previous comment, we add that the optimal contract takes the form of a
Markovian rule. Moreover, it is linear. This is consistent with the seminal work of [130] and the
conclusion of [45] in which the robustness of these policies was studied. Nevertheless, as we will see
in Section 5.4.3, this appears to be a consequence of the simplicity of the source of time-inconsistency
considered in this section.
5.4.2 Agent with separable utility
We consider the scenario in Section 5.2.2, i.e.











∣∣∣∣Ft], (t, α, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]×A× Ξ,
and we have UA(s, x) = f(T − s)UoA(x), ∂sUA(s, x) = −f ′(T − s)UoA(x),
ht(s, x, z, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · z− f(t− s)ct(x, a), ∇ht(s, x, v, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · v+ f ′(t− s)ct(x, a).
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The mappings Ht(x, z), a?(t, x, z), λ?t (x, z), c?t (x, z), and the probability P?(Z) = Pa
?(·,X·,Z·· ) are
obtained accordingly.
In this section, we are trying to get a deeper understanding of the familyH2,2 under the previous
specification of preferences for the agent. In particular, we want to understand how the elements of
the family (Y s,Z , Zs)s∈[0,T ] are related to each other. In light of Assumption Q and Assumption R,
for any Z ∈ H2,2 we denote M s,Z the (F,P?(Z))-square integrable martingale











∣∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ [0, T ],
where
δ?r (s, x, z) := c?r(x, z)
(
f(r − s)− f(T − s)
f(T ) f(r)
)
, (s, t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X × Rn.
We also recall that P?(Z) is the unique solution to the martingale problem for which X has char-
acteristic triplet (λ?, σσ>, 0). Thus, the representation property holds for (F,P?(Z))-martingales







<∞,1 and, in light of (5.3.10),















, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
The next lemma, proved in Section 5.7, presents relationships satisfied by the elements of family,
(Y s,Z , Zs)s∈[0,T ], and how we can use them to obtain another characterisation of H2,2 and Ξ.









δ?r (s,X·∧r, Zrr )dr
∣∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.







t , dt⊗ dP–a.e.
1The integrability for s ∈ [0, T ] fixed is clear. The sup follows as in Theorem 3.3.5 as δ? is uniformly continuous
in s.
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T ) : (y0, Z) ∈ (R0,∞)×H•
}
. For any ξ ∈ Ξ,
E(ξ) =
{
(a?(t,X·∧t, Ztt )t∈[0,T ]
}
, VA0 (ξ) = y0.
Remark 5.4.8. (i) In the exponential discounting case, i.e. f(t) := e−ρt for some ρ > 0, we have
f(r − s)− f(T − s)f(r − u)
f(T − u) = e
−ρ(r−s) − e−ρ(r−s) = 0. (r, s, u) ∈ [0, T ]3.









t , dt⊗ dP–a.e., s ∈ [0, T ].





δ?r (s,X·∧r, Zrr )
∣∣∣∣Ft],
is exactly the correction due to time-inconsistency.
(ii) We also remark that the choice Z0 in the constraint for the family Z is arbitrary. Indeed, it
could be replaced by any other element Zu of the family Z ∈ H2,2.
5.4.2.1 Principal’s second-best solution
Thanks to Lemma 5.4.7, we have now proved that
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Proposition 5.4.9. The problem of the principal can be represented as the following control problem
VP = sup
y0≥R0

























f(T )−1Z0r · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
We remark that contrary to the example in Section 5.4.1, Proposition 5.4.9 reduces the problem
of the principal to a non-standard control problem. Indeed, we have to optimise over H•, a family
of infinite-dimensional controls which has to satisfy a novel type of constraint, namely (5.4.2).
Nonetheless, under additional assumptions on the model, we can proceed with the resolution.
As in Section 5.4.1, we focus on the case n = 1 so that












Proposition 5.4.10. Let n = 1, the principal and the agent be risk-neutral, i.e. UoA(x) = UoP(x) =
x, x ∈ R.
(i) Suppose there is a unique measurable map z? : [0, T ]×X × Rn −→ Rn satisfying
Ht(x, v) = vλ?t (x, z?(t, x, v)) + λ?t (x, z?(t, x, v))−
f(r)
f(T )c
?(x, z?(t, x, v)), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X ,
where for any (t, x, v) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rn
Ht(x, v) := sup
z∈R
{






Moreover, assume the mapping Rn 3 v 7−→ Ht(x, v) ∈ R is Lipschitz-continuous uniformly in (t, x)





















< ∞. Then, there exists Z? ∈ H2,2, such that (y?0, Z?) ∈
[R0,∞)×H• define a solution to the second-best problem and the optimal contract is given by
ξ? := R0






0, X·∧r, Z0,?r ,Zr
)
dr + f(T )−1
∫ T
0
Z0,?r · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
(ii) Suppose the maps λ? and c? do not depend on the x variable and for any t ∈ [0, T ], the map
R 3 z g7−→ λ?t (z) − f(t)/f(T )c?t (z) has a unique maximiser z?(t), such that [0, T ] 3 t 7−→ z?(t) is
Lebesgue integrable.
Then, a solution (y?0, Z?) ∈ [R0,∞)×H• for the second-best problem is given by
y?0 = R0, Zst :=
f(T − s)
f(T − t) z










Moreover, the associated optimal contract is given by
ξ? := R0




























An upper bound V(y0) is obtained by ignoring (5.4.2). In such scenario, the mapping H in the
statement denotes the Hamiltonian and by classical arguments in control, see El Karoui, Peng, and
Quenez [88], its value is given by U0 where (U, V ) are as in the statement. We are left to show this
bound is attained. For this we must verify Z? ∈ H•.




Therefore, by Theorem 3.3.5 and Theorem 3.4.3, there exists a unique solution (Y ?, Z?) ∈ S2,2×H2,2
to the BSVIE with data (ξ?, h?) given by














Zs,?r · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
On the other side, under the integrability assumption on Z we have that for every s ∈ [0, T ]
Ŷ st := EP
?(Z)
[





defines a P?(Z)-square integrable martingale. Thus, there exists a family of process (Ẑs)s∈[0,T ] such
that












Ẑsr · dXr t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, in light of (Q) we have that Ẑ ∈ H2,2 . Therefore, by uniqueness of the solution
(






, in S2,2 ×H2,2 ×H2
From this, arguing as in Lemma 5.4.7 we obtain that Z? satisfies (5.4.2).
We now argue (ii). Note that we can find an upper bound for VP. Indeed, we have






























We now show that the pair (y?0, Z?) given in the statement is a feasible solution that attains
VP,?. To verify feasibility note that, by assumption, z?(·) is deterministic, and so is Z?. Thus,
it is straightforward from the definition that Z? ∈ H•. Lastly, it follows by definition that under
(y?0, Z?) the upper bound VP,? is attained.
Remark 5.4.11. (i) Let us now present a formal argument regarding our choice UoA(x) = UoP(x) =
x in the previous result for solving (5.4.3). Suppose for simplicity the maps σ, λ? and c? do not
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depend on the x variable so that the dynamics of the state variables are given by






















r · dB?r .
Moreover, suppose the value function v(t, x, y) is regular enough so that Itô’s formula yields,
P?(Z)–a.s.

































(r,Xr, Y y0,Zr )dr,
And let us highlight the presence of both Ztt and Z0t in the last term. From this we can see, formally,
that for general UoA and UoP the process (Ztt )t∈[0,T ] alone is not sufficient to obtain the solution of
(5.4.3). Moreover, recall we can not take Ztt and Z0t independently due to the constraint (5.4.2).
Lastly, under the assumptions of Proposition 5.4.10 one expects, intuitively, that ∂xxv = ∂xyv =
∂yyv = 0 so that the choice Z0 can be made after optimising over (Ztt )t∈[0,T ].
Remark 5.4.12. We close this section with a few remarks.
(i) It is worth mentioning that even in the setting of Proposition 5.2.3.(ii) the optimal contract is
neither linear nor Markovian. Moreover, from the expression describing the optimal contract we
see that this is entirely related to the presence of the discounting structure which is the source of
time-inconsistency.
(ii) It follows from Proposition 5.2.3 that for risk-neutral preferences, the utility of the principal is
the same for both the first-best and second-best problem and that the optimal second-best contract
is also optimal there. This is a typical result for time-consistent risk-neutral agents, and it would
certainly be worth studying whether this remains true for more general specifications of UoP and
UoA. In light of Remark 5.4.11, this question further motivates the study of the general class of
non-standard control problems introduced by Theorem 5.3.7.
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5.4.3 Agent with utility of discounted income
We now consider the scenario in Section 5.2.1 under the additional choice f = 1. We then have





g(T − t)ξ −Kt,αt,T
)∣∣∣Ft], where Ks,αt,T := ∫ T
t
g(r − s)kor(X,αr)dr. (5.4.4)
In the context of (5.3.1), this corresponds to
ht(s, x, y, z, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · z + γAg(t− s)kot (x, a)y,
∇ht(s, x, u, v, y, a) = σt(x)bt(x, a) · v − γAg′(t− s)kot (x, a)y + γAg(t− s)kot (x, a)u,
UA(s, ξ) = UoA(g(T − s)ξ), and ∂sUA(s, x) = −g′(T − s)∂xUoA(g(T − s)ξ)UoA(g(T − s)ξ).
Remark 5.4.13. (i) The problem introduce by (5.4.4) is time-inconsistent even in the case of
exponential discounting, i.e. g(t) = e−ρt, t ∈ [0, T ], for some ρ > 0. This is due to the exponential
utility UA. Indeed, the BSDE representation allows us to interpret the reward of the agent as a
recursive utility in which the terminal value is discounted at a rate eg(T−s) whereas the generator
discounts at a rate g(t− s). It is known, see Marín-Solano and Navas [179, Section 4.5], that even
in the case of exponential discounting the problem becomes time-inconsistent as soon as the rates at
which the terminal value and the running reward are discounted differ. We also recall that the case
of no discounting, i.e. g(t) = 1, corresponds to the seminal work Holmström and Milgrom [130].
(ii) Let us note h exhibits both of the features of the examples in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, this is,
the second term includes the discount factor and the y variable.2 We highlight that a key element in
Proposition 5.4.10 was the fact that the dynamics of Y s,y0,Z were given by (y0, Z) without Y y0,Z on
the right hand side. Consequently, the presence of y in h forces us to begin by changing variables
to the certainty equivalent for the problem of the agent, i.e. from Z to Ẑ as we denote below. In
this way, we remove y in the dynamics of Y y0,Z at the expense of the mapping δ?, which we use to
identify an auxiliary martingale, becoming quadratic in the new variable Ẑ. On the one hand, this
creates a subtle issue when trying to establish a correspondence between the natural integrability of
the variables Z and Ẑ. This will ultimately prevent us from obtaining a complete characterisation
2In fact, (5.4.4) covers the situation in Section 5.4.2 in the particular case of a risk-neutral agent, recall 1/γA −
UA(x) −→ x, whenever γA → 0.
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of the family H2,2. On the other hand, the quadratic term does not correspond to the diagonal values
of the control variable Ẑ. This makes the approach in Section 5.4.2, namely Proposition 5.4.10,
inoperable and forces us to restrict ourselves to a suitable subclass that is amenable to the analysis.
As we may probably expect after our analysis in Section 5.4.1, the process Y y0,Z in the definition
of H2,2 becomes more amenable to the analysis by working in terms of the certainty equivalent.
For this, we introduce, for (t, s, x, z, z, v) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X × (Rn)3,
Ĥt(x, z) := sup
a∈A
ĥt(t, x, z, a), ĥt(s, x, z, a) := σt(x)bt(x, a) · z − g(t− s)kot (x, a),
∇ĥt(s, x, v, z, a) := σt(x)bt(x, a)) · v + g′(t− s)kor(x, a)− γAσ>t (x)z · σ>t (x)v.
The maps â?(t, x, z), λ?t (x, z), kot ?(x, z), ĥ?t (s, x, z, z), ∇ĥ?t (s, x, v, z, z), and the probability P?(z) are
defined accordingly.
Moreover, inspired by Section 5.4.2, we introduce the mapping δ? given, for (s, t, x, z, z, z̃) ∈
[0, T ]2 ×X × (Rn)3, by
δ?t (s, x, z, z, z̃) := kor?(x, z)
(












The following result is analogous to Lemma 5.4.7, we defer its proof to Section 5.7.
Lemma 5.4.14. Let Z ∈ H2,2.
(i) There exists family of processes (Ŷ s,y0,Z , Ẑs)s∈[0,T ] such that for every s ∈ [0, T ]




























Ẑsr ·dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.









δ?r (s,X·∧r, Ẑrr , Ẑsr , Ẑ0r )dr
∣∣∣∣Ft].
(iii) Moreover, if the process M s,Z given by




δ?r (s,X·∧r, Ẑrr , Ẑsr , Ẑ0r )dr
∣∣∣∣Ft], P–a.s., (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2,
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where Ẑs,Z denotes the term in the representation of M s,Z .
Remark 5.4.15. (i) We highlight that in contrast to the analysis presented in Sections 5.4.1 and
5.4.2, the previous result does not provide an equivalent representation of the set H2,2. This is
intimately related to the square integrability condition on the process M s,Z required in (iii) above,
and the fact that (z, z̃) 7−→ δ?t (x, z, z, z̃) is quadratic for (t, s, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X × Rm fixed.
(ii) As a sanity check at this point, let us verify the coherence of the previous system in terms of
the analysis of the previous section. In the following we omit the dependence on X and assume
Ẑ ∈ H2,2(Rn). Let











By applying Itô’s formula to Ỹ sr := K
Z,s
t,r UA(Ŷ s,Zr − Ŷ 0,y0,Zr ), we have that for any s ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
UoA
(

















γA→0−−−−→ y, we see the previous equation induces the corresponding one in Lemma 5.4.7.
5.4.3.1 Principal’s second-best solution
Let us highlight that in contrast to Section 5.4.2, the analysis in the previous section does not
provide a full characterisation of H2,2 in the context to rewards given by (5.2.4). This is principally
due to the integrability necessary on the variable Ẑ, induced by the certainty equivalent, in order
to apply the methodology devised in 5.4.2, see Lemma 5.4.14. Nevertheless, given that current
example generalises the previous two, we build upon the structure of the optimal solution that was
obtained to propose a family over which the optimisation in the problem of the principal can be
carried out.
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We will focus on the case n = 1 and we will pay special attention to the class H̃ ⊆ H2,2 of
processes Z ∈ H2,2 for which given the pair (y0, Z) ∈ I0 ×H2,2, and Y y0,Z given by (5.3.5), there






= ηs,tζt, ηt,t = 1, t ∈ [0, T ].










XT − Ŷ 0,y0,ZT
)]
≤ VP.
Remark 5.4.16. (i) We remark that the previous definition implicitly requires that for any t ∈
[0, T ] the mapping s 7−→ ηs,t is differentiable.
(ii) In addition, provided ko?(x, z) does not depend on x it is easy to verify that that H̃ 6= ∅. In
light of the previous lemma, we have that for Z ∈ H̃

















g(T ) η0,t − ηs,t
)
ζt,dt⊗ dP–a.e.
This implies that H̃ includes, in particular, all the processes Z that are induced by deterministic
pairs (ζ, η). Indeed, for such class of processes we have that M s,Z is deterministic, Z̃s,Z = 0, and
consequently, ηs,t = g(T − s)/g(T − t) provides a non trivial element of H̃. The previous argument
also holds in the case of exponential discounting, in which we recall that the agent’s problem remains
time-inconsistent.
The following result characterises the solution to VP. Its proof is available in Section 5.7.
Proposition 5.4.17. Let principal and agent have exponential utility with parameters γP and γA,
respectively. Let Cy := − 1γP e
−γP(x0−y), R̂0 := UoA(−1)(R0), and assume that:
(i) the maps σ, λ? and ko? do not depend on the x variable;
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(ii) for any (t, η) ∈ [0, T ]× R, the map G : R −→ R given by


































(i) let VP,o denote the restriction of VP to the subclass of H̃ with deterministic η. Then the optimal
deterministic contract is given by the family
Zst :=
g(T − s)
g(T − t) z

















z?(t, g(T − t))
g(T − t) dXr;
(ii) in the case (γA, γP) = (0, 0), i.e. the case of risk-neutral principal and agent, the solution to
VP, and consequently of VP, agrees with the value given by Proposition 5.4.10 and the optimal
family Z is deterministic.
Remark 5.4.18. We close this section with a few remarks.
(i) The solution to the problem of the principal for the general class of restricted contracts induced
by H2,2 escaped the analysis presented above. As detailed in Remark 5.4.13.(ii), this is due to subtle
integrability issues when trying to identify an appropriate reduction of H2,2, and the quadratic
nature of the generator when working in term of the certainty equivalent.We believe this echoes the
intricacies of the non-standard class of control problem introduced in Theorem 5.3.7.
(ii) If, as in Remark 5.4.6, we bring ourselves back to the setting of [130], i.e. bt(x, a) = a/σ,
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σt(x) = σ, kt(x, a) = ka2/2, we have
Zst =
g(T )g(T − s)(g(T − t) + γPσ2k)
g(t)g2(T − t) + σ2kg(T )(γAg(T ) + γP)
.
We highlight that: (a) in contrast to [130], for any type of discounting structure (including expo-
nential discounting) the previous expression and consequently the optimal action is neither linear
nor Markovian. This corroborates our comment in Remark 5.4.13.(i), in the sense that even in
the case of exponential discounting the problem of the agent remains time-inconsistent; (b) in the
case of no discounting, i.e. g = 1, when we bring ourselves back to the model of Remark 5.4.6, the
previous expression coincides with the linear contract result specified by [130]. This shows that, even
if possibly not the best, the optimal contract in the class H̃ at least captures the optimal contract
when the problem becomes time-consistent again.
5.5 On time-inconsistency for BSVIE-type rewards
Let us start by mentioning that in the context of rewards given by (5.1.2), the methodology
devised in Chapter 2, which builds on the approach in the Markovian framework of [38], is based
introducing the family of processes (Y s, Zs)s∈[0,T ] solution to the backward stochastic Volterra
integral equation (BSVIEs for short), which satisfies














Zs,αr · dXr, P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ]. (5.5.1)
Throughout this section we fix ξ ∈ C and α? ∈ E := E(ξ). Thus, we identify the agent’s reward
under α ∈ A via VAt (α) := VAt (α, ξ) = Y
t,α
t . We write VAt for the associated value function under
α?.
To establish an extended dynamic programming principle we need the following minimal set of
assumptions.
Assumption S. (i) (s, y, z) 7−→ ht(s, x, y, z, a) (resp. s 7−→ UA(s, x)) is continuously differenti-
able, uniformly in (t, x, a) (resp. in x). Moreover, the mapping ∇h : [0, T ]2×X × (R×Rn)2 −→ R
defined by
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∇ht(s, x, u, v, y, z, a) := ∂sht(s, x, y, z, a) + ∂yht(s, x, y, z, a)u+
n∑
i=1
∂ziht(s, x, y, z, a)vi,
satisfies ∇h·(s, ·, u, v, y, z, a) ∈ Pprog(R,F); for all s ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) for ϕ ∈ {h, ∂sh}, (y, z, a) 7−→ ϕt(s, x, y, z, a) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous with linear
growth, i.e. there exists some C > 0 such that ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃, a, ã),
|ϕt(s, x, y, z, a)− ϕt(s, x, ỹ, z̃, ã)| ≤ C
(



















Remark 5.5.1. We remark that Assumption S.(iii) is satisfied if one assumes the classic linear
growth condition, i.e. there exists some C > 0 such that for all (s, t, x, y, z, u, v, a)
∣∣ht(s, x, y, z, a)∣∣ ≤ C(1 + |y|+ |σt(x)>z|),∣∣∇ht(s, x, u, v, y, z, a)∣∣ ≤ C(1 + |u|+ |σt(x)>v|+ |y|+ |σt(x)>z|).
Under Assumption S, Lemma 3.6.1 guarantees that for any α ∈ A there exists (∂Y α, ∂Zα) ∈
S2 ×H2,2 such that for every s ∈ [0, T ]
∂Y s,αt = ∂sη(s, ξ) +
∫ T
t




∂Zs,αr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.,
(5.5.2)
which ultimately implies the absolute continuity of the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H2, ‖ · ‖H2) :
s 7−→ Zs,α. With this, the process (Zt,αt )t∈[0,T ] is well-defined. Moreover, see Lemma 3.6.2, for any
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α ∈ A










Zr,αr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
(5.5.3)
We begin stating the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 5.5.2. Let Assumption S hold. For any {γ, γ′} ⊆ T0,T , γ ≤ γ′, and α ∈ A
EP
[






∣∣∣Fγ], depends only on the value of α on [γ, γ′].
Proof. This property is clear for BSDEs whose generator does not depend on (y, z). Indeed,
EP
[










To extend this result to the BSDEs (5.5.1)–(5.5.2) we consider the Picard iteration procedure















∂Y s,α,n+1t = ∂sη(s, ξ) +
∫ T
t





and note that, as in (5.5.3)
EP
[










hr(r,X·∧r, Y r,α,nr , Zr,α,nr , αr)dr
∣∣∣∣Fγ].
(5.5.4)
Then, from the fact that Y α,0 = Zα,0 = ∂Y α,0 = ∂Zα,0 = 0 we see that (5.5.4) implies the result
at the initial step. It is then also clear, again from (5.5.4), that this property is preserved at every
iteration and thus in the limit.
In the following, given (σ, τ) ∈ Tt,T × Tt,t+`, with σ ≤ τ , we denote by Π` := (τ `i )i=1,...,n` ⊆ Tt,T








:= τ, ∀`, and sup1≤i≤n` |τ
`
i − τ `i−1| ≤ `. We also let ∆τ `i := τ `i − τ `i−1. The previous definitions
hold x-by-x.
Theorem 5.5.3 (Dynamic programming principle). Let Assumption S hold. Let α? ∈ E(ξ) and
{σ, τ} ⊂ Tt,T , with σ ≤ τ . Then, P–a.s.




















where for every s ∈ [0, T ], ∂Y s,α? denotes the solution to (5.5.2) with α?. Moreover, α? attains the
ess supP.
Proof. We first show the inequality ≥. We proceed in 3 steps. Let ε > 0, 0 < ` < `ε, and Π` be a
partition of [σ, τ ].
Step 1: From the definition of equilibria we have that for any α ∈ A













Recall that for any ρ ∈ T0,T , Y
ρ,α⊗ρα?
ρ = Y ρ,α
?
ρ . In light of the arbitrariness of α ∈ A we obtain












Step 2: Let us note that in light of Step 1
























































where the second equality holds in light of [210, Lemma 3.5] as [210, Assumption 1.1] holds under
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Assumption Q. Iterating the previous argument we obtain that P–a.s.



































hr(r,X·∧r, Y r,αr , Zr,αr , αr)dr
∣∣∣∣Fσ].
Replacing in the previous expression we obtain that P–a.s.
















r dr − n`ε`
∣∣∣∣Fσ].
(5.5.5)
Step 3: Let i ∈ {0, . . . , n` − 1}. In light of Assumption Q, the stability of the system of BSDE




































|αr − α?r |dr
)2]
`→0−−→ 0.















Back in (5.5.5) we obtain










































Let us recall that the Hamiltonian associated to h is given by
Ht(x, y, z) = sup
a∈A
ht(t, x, y, z, a), (t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× Rn.
Our standing assumptions on H are the following.
Assumption T. (i) For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , the map R×Rn 3 (y, z) 7−→ Ht(x, y, z) is uniformly
Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. there is C > 0 such that for any (t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×R2 × (Rn)2
∣∣Ht(x, y, z)−Ht(x, ỹ, z̃)∣∣ ≤ C(|y− ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z− z̃)|);
(ii) there exists a unique Borel-measurable map a? : [0, T ]×X × R× Rn −→ A such that
Ht(x, y, z) = ht
(
t, x, y, z, a?(t, x, y, z)
)
, ∀(t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× Rn;
(iii) for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , the map R × Rn 3 (y, z) 7−→ a?(t, x, y, z) is uniformly Lipschitz-
continuous, i.e. there is C > 0 such that for any (t, x, y, ỹ, z, z̃) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R2 × (Rn)2.
∣∣a?(t, x, y, z)− a?(t, x, ỹ, z̃)∣∣ ≤ C(|y− ỹ|+ |σt(x)>(z− z̃)|);








H·(·, 0, 0), a?· (·, 0, 0)
)
.
With this we introduce the system defined for any s ∈ [0, T ] by









Zr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.














Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (H)
∂Y st = ∂sη(s, ξ) +
∫ T
t





∂Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
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We will say (Y,Z, Y, Z, ∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ H is a solution to the system whenever (H) is satisfied. In light
of Theorem 5.5.3, given α? ∈ E it is reasonable to associate the value along the equilibria with a
BSDE whose generator is given, partially, by H. This is the purpose of the next result.
Theorem 5.5.4 (Necessity). Let Assumptions S and T hold and α? ∈ E. Then, one can construct
a solution to (H).
Proof. Given α? ∈ E , Assumption S guarantees that the processes (Y α? , Zα?) and (∂Y α? , ∂Zα?)
solution to (5.5.1) and (5.5.2), respectively, are well-defined. Moreover, the diagonal processes(
(Y t,α
?




are well-defined as elements of S2 × H2, see Lemma 3.6.2. Given
(∂Y t,α
?
t )t∈[0,T ] ∈ S2, for any α ∈ A, we can define the processes (Yα,Zα) ∈ S2 ×H2 solution to











Zαr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
We now note that under Assumption S the classic comparison result for BSDEs, see for instance




















Zr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
Moreover, the second part of the statement of Theorem 5.5.3 implies that α? = a?(·, X, Y·, Z·),
dt⊗ dP–a.e. Consequently, (Y α? , Zα?) and (∂Y α? , ∂Zα?) define a solution to the second and third
equations in (H), respectively.
We close this section with a verification theorem for equilibria.
Theorem 5.5.5 (Verification). Let Assumptions S and T hold. Let (Y,Z, Y, Z, ∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ H be a
solution to (H) with α? := a?(·, X,Y·,Z·). Then, α? ∈ E and
VAt = Yt, P–a.s.
Proof. We verify the definition of an equilibria. Let ε > 0, (t, `) ∈ [0, T ] × (0, `ε) with `ε to be
chosen. Let (Yα⊗t+`α? ,Zα⊗t+`α?) ∈ S2×H2 be the solution, which exists in light of Assumption S,
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to (5.5.1) with action α⊗t+` α?, that is to say, P–a.s.
Ys,α⊗t+`α
?

















r · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ].
It then follows that
Yt,α⊗t+`α
?







































































































where the inequality follows by definition of H and α? and Assumption T. The second equality
follows from the fact that the first term cancels on [t+ `, T ], see Lemma 5.5.2. Taking expectation
we find

































By the boundedness of the action set, we may choose `ε such that the last term above is smaller
that `ε. With this, we conclude α? ∈ E . The second part of the statement follows from the fact
that Yt = Y t,α
?
t , P–a.s.
5.6 On forward stochastic Volterra integral equations
We are given a jointly measurable mapping h, a processes Z, and a family (Y s0 )s∈[0,T ] ∈ I such
that for any (y, u) ∈ R2 × (Rn)2
h : [0, T ]2 ×X × R× Rn × R× Rn −→ R, h·(·, y, u) ∈ Pprog(R,F).
Moreover, we work under the following set of assumptions.
Assumption U. (i) (s, y) 7−→ ht(s, x, y, u) (resp. s 7−→ Y s0 (x)) is continuously differentiable,
uniformly in (t, x, u) (resp. in x). Moreover, the mapping ∇h : [0, T ]2 × X × (R × Rn)2 −→ R
defined by
∇ht(s, x,u, y, u) := ∂sht(s, x, y, u) + ∂yht(s, x, y, u)u, ∇h·(s, ·,u, y, u) ∈ Pprog(R,F);
(ii) for ϕ ∈ {h, ∂sh}, (y, u) 7−→ ∂sϕt(s, x, y, u) is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, i.e. there exists
some C > 0 such that ∀(s, t, x, y, ỹ, u, ũ),
|ϕt(s, x, y, u)− ϕt(s, x, ỹ, ũ)| ≤ C
(
|y − ỹ|+ |u− ũ|
)
;
(iii) (Y0, ∂sY0) ∈
(
I
)2, Z ∈ H2,2, (h̃·(s),∇h̃·(s)) := (h·(s, ·,0), ∂sh·(s, ·,0)) ∈ (L1,2,2)2, for 0 :=
(y, u)|(0,0).
We are interested in establishing the well-posedness of the FSVIE














Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ]. (5.6.1)
To alleviate the notation we write Y instead of Y Z in the previous equation.
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Definition 5.6.1. We say Y is a solution to the FSVIE (5.6.1) if Y satisfies equation (5.6.1) and
Y ∈ S2,2.
Remark 5.6.2. We remark that in light of the pathwise continuity of Y s for every s ∈ [0, T ] the
process (Y tt )t∈[0,T ] is well defined dt⊗ dP–a.e. on [0, T ]×X .
We begin presenting a priori estimates for solutions of (5.6.1). These can be recover from the
arguments in [273].
Lemma 5.6.3. Let Y be a solution to (5.6.1), there exists a constant C > 0 such that









Moreover, for Y i solution to (5.6.1) with data (Y i0 , hi, Zi) satisfying (U) for i ∈ {1, 2} there exists
C > 0 such that
‖Y 1 − Y 2‖2S2,2 ≤ C
(
‖Y 10 − Y 20 ‖2L2,2 + ‖h̃



















dr ≤ T‖∆Y ‖2S2,2 . (5.6.2)
With this, the proof of both statements can obtained following the line of [273, Theorem 3.2.2 and
Theorem 3.2.4].
We are now ready to establish the well-posedness of (5.6.1).
Proposition 5.6.4. Let Assumption U hold. There is a unique solution to (5.6.1).
Proof. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 5.6.3. We use a Picard iteration argument. Let Y s,0· =
Y s0 , s ∈ [0, T ] and














Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ].
We note that Y n ∈ S2,2 for n ≥ 0. Indeed, the result holds for Y 0 and the process (Y t,0t )t∈[0,T ] ∈ L1,2
is well-defined. Inductively, in light of Assumption U, the fact that Z ∈ H2,2 and (Y t,nt )t∈[0,T ] ∈ L1,2,
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see (5.6.2), yields Y s,n+1 ∈ S2 for every s ∈ [0, T ]. The continuity of s 7−→ ‖Y s,n‖S2 , Assumption U
together with Lemma 5.6.3 guarantees Y n+1 ∈ S2,2. Moreover, the pathwise continuity Y s,n+1 for
any s ∈ [0, T ] guarantees (Y t,n+1t )t∈[0,T ] is well-defined dt⊗ dP–a.e.





hr(s,X·∧r, Y s,nr , Y r,nr )− hr(s,X·∧r, Y s,n−1r , Y r,n−1r )
)
dr.
















|∆Y s,n+1r |2(C(ε)− c) + ε|∆Y s,nr |2 + ε|∆Y r,nr |2
)
dr,

















Now, as ∆Y s,n ∈ S2,2 we may use (5.6.2) back in (5.6.3) and obtain that for ε̃ = 18T , c > C(ε̃), we
have‖∆Y n+1‖2S2,2,c ≤ 4
−1‖∆Y n‖2S2,2,c . Inductively, we find that for all n ≥ 1, ‖∆Y
n‖2S2,2,c ≤ C4
−n.
Thus, for m > n,










Hence there is Y ∈ S2,2 such that Y n n−→0−−−−→ Y .
We now establish a result regarding the differentiability of (5.6.1). Recall that for Z ∈ H2,2
there exists by definition, see Section 5.3.1, a process ∂Z which can be interpreted as the derivative
of the mapping ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H2,2, ‖ · ‖H2) : s 7−→ Zs.
Proposition 5.6.5. Let Assumption U hold and Y ∈ S2 be the solution to (5.6.1). There is a
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unique process ∂Y ∈ S2,2 that satisfies
















∂Zsr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., s ∈ [0, T ]. (5.6.4)
Moreover ∫ s
0
∂Y udu = Y s − Y 0, in S2.






∣∣∇h̃r(s,X·∧r, 0, Y sr , Y rr )∣∣dr)2 ≤ C(‖∂sh̃‖2L1,2,2 + ‖Y ‖2S2,2) <∞.
We now note that Assumption U.(ii) guarantees u 7−→ ∇ht(s, x,u, y, u) is Lipschitz uniformly in
(s, t, x, y, u). Therefore, Proposition 5.6.4 guarantees there is a unique solution ∂Y ∈ S2,2. The
second part of the statement, follows arguing as in Lemma 3.6.1 in light of the stability result in
Lemma 5.6.3 and the fact Z ∈ H2,2 .
5.7 Proofs of Section 5.4
5.7.1 Proof of Proposition 5.4.5
We first note that, P–a.s.
XT − Ŷ y0,ZT








































r (x)(1− z)|2 −
1
γA
f ′(T − r)
f(T − r) ,















, t ∈ [0, T ].
Indeed, M is a local martingale that is bounded from below and M0 = 1. Consequently,
EP










Now, under assumptions (i) and (ii) in the statement it is clear that


















































z?rdXr, t ∈ [0, T ],
it is easy to verify that the integrability assumption on z? guarantees that Z? ∈ H2. We conclude
that ξ? ∈ Ξ, where ξ? denotes the contract induced by R̂0 and Z?, is optimal as it attains VP,?.
this concludes the proof.
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5.7.2 Proof of Lemma 5.4.7
We argue (i). Let Z ∈ H2,2. Recall





















, (s, u) ∈ [0, T ].






















)( f(r − s)


















f(T − s) −
Y 0,y0,Z0









































dXr − λ?r(X·∧r, Zrr )dr
)
.
The result then follows taking conditional expectation thanks to the integrability of Zs and Z0.
We now argue (ii). Let s ∈ [0, T ] be fixed. Note that




δ?r (s,X·∧r, Zrr )dr
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= M s,Zt −
∫ t
0
δ?r (s,X·∧r, Zrr )dr










δ?r (s,X·∧r, Zrr )dr. (5.7.1)
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dXr − λ?r(X·∧r, Zrr )dr
)
, P–a.s.
The result then follows from the uniqueness of the Itô decomposition of Y s,y0,Zt .
We are only left to argue (iii) as (iv) is a direct consequence. The inclusion H2,2 ⊆ H• follows
from (ii) and taking Y Zt := Y
0,y0,Z
t /f(T ). Conversely, given Z ∈ H• we define for any s ∈ [0, T ]










t , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
Let us note Y s,y0,Z0 is clearly differentiable and Y s,y0,Z satisfies (5.3.6). Indeed, as N
s,Z
T = 0,
s ∈ [0, T ], we have
Y s,y0,ZT




f(T − u) , (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]
2.

































, t ∈ [0, T ].











∣∣δ?r (s,X,Zrr )∣∣2dr]+ ‖Z̃‖2H2,2) <∞.
We also note that the continuity of s 7−→ f(t−s) implies the continuity of s 7−→ ‖N s,Z‖S2 . Moreover,
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‖Y 0,y0,Z‖2S2 <∞ guarantees, by definition, that ‖Y
y0,Z‖2S2,2 <∞. Moreover, by definition
Y s,y0,Zt























δ?r (s,X·∧r, Zrr )dr
= f(T − s)

















dXr − λ?r(X·∧r, Zrr )dr
)
= f(T − s)



























where the third inequality follows from the fact Z ∈ H•. We conclude Z ∈ H2,2.
5.7.3 Proof of Lemma 5.4.14
Let us note that (ii) and (iii) are argued as in Lemma 5.4.7. We now argue (i). Let (y0, Z) ∈
I × H2,2. Note that given Y s,y0,Z , in light of the regularity of ys0 and the generator, it is possible
to define ∂Y s,y0,Z such that


























































































































The result then follows by Itô’s formula introducing
Ŷ s,y0,Zt := −
1
γA





















5.7.4 Proof of Proposition 5.4.17
































































∣∣∣∣σ>r (x)(1− vg(T )
)∣∣∣∣2,
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Consequently
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Now, under the additional assumptions, we have that for any Z ∈ H̃
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∣∣∣∣σ>r (1− zg(T )η
)∣∣∣∣2},
as longs as η is chosen so that Zη ∈ H̃ the upper bound is attained.
Let us argue the second part of the statement. Since we are now constrained to deterministic
choices of η the integrability of z? and the boundedness of [0, T ] 3 t 7−→ g(t) guarantee that
the constant process M s,Z in Lemma 5.4.2 is finite and thus square integrable. Therefore, as the
contract induced by the family
Zst :=
g(T − s)
g(T − t) z
?(t, η?0,t), η?0,t =
g(T )
g(T − t) ,
attains the upper bound in (5.7.2), the result follows. The last statement follows letting (γA, γP) −→
(0, 0) and noticing the terms involving Ẑ0 in (5.7.2) vanish. Therefore the upper bound is attained
by the maximiser of G(z) = λ?t (z) − g(t)kot ?(z)/g(T ), i.e. the deterministic contract given by
Zst = f(T − s)z?(t)/f(T − t).
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Conclusion
This thesis studied the decision-making of agents exhibiting time-inconsistent preferences
and its implications in the context of contract theory. In particular, we studied the contracting
problem between a standard utility maximiser principal and a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent.
We showed that the contracting problem faced by the principal can be reformulated as a novel class
of control problems exposing the complications of the agent’s preferences. This corresponds to the
control of a forward Volterra equation via constrained Volterra type controls. The structure of this
problem is inherently related to the representation of the agent’s value function via extended type-I
backward stochastic differential equations. Despite the inherent challenges of this class of problems,
our reformulation allows us to study the solution for different specifications of preferences for the
principal and the agent. Regarding the implications of our results we can mention the following:
(i) from a methodological point of view, unlike in the time-consistent case, the solution to the
moral hazard problem does not reduce, in general, to a standard stochastic control problem. Nev-
ertheless, the solution to the risk-sharing problem between a utility maximiser principal and a
time-inconsistent sophisticated agent does, see Section 2. This suggest a dire difference between
the first-best and second-best problems as soon as the agent is allowed to have time-inconsistent
preferences;
(ii) a second takeaway from our analysis is associated with the so-called optimality of linear con-
tracts. These are contracts consisting of a constant part and a term proportional to the terminal
value of the state process as in the seminal work of [130]. We study two examples that can be
regarded as (time-inconsistent) variations of [130], which we refer to as discounted utility, and
utility of discounted income. In the former case, by virtue of the simplicity of the source of time-
inconsistency, we find that optimal contract is linear. In the latter case, we find that the optimal
contract is no longer linear unless there is no discounting (as in [130]). Our point here is that slight
deviations of the model in [130] seem to challenge the virtues attributed to linear contracts and
this suggests that would typically cease to be optimal in general for time-inconsistent agents;
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(iii) lastly, we comment on the non-Markovian nature of the optimal contract. It is known that,
beyond the realm of the model in [130], the optimal contract in the time-consistent scenario is,
in general, non-Markovian in the state process X, see [64]. Indeed, we find the same result in
the case of an agent with separable time-inconsistent preferences. Moreover, in our context the
non-Markovian structure is also manifestation of the agent’s time-inconsistent preferences.
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